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How Supplying Sunni Tribes Could Backfire on the U.S.

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"If the U.S. opens an assistance conduit to the tribes, it could have major consequences among Shiites: It could weaken Mr. Abadi in the eyes of his Shiite constituency; it could undermine the premise of central government the U.S. is trying to support; it could even lead Iran to more aggressively push their Shiite militias in Iraq, further weakening the idea of centralized authority," writes Aaron David Miller.

The possibility that the Obama administration is considering supplying military assistance directly to Sunni tribes in Anbar underscores a central challenge in Washington’s approach to Iraq,  Syria, and the Middle East generally. I call it the “one person’s floor is another person’s ceiling” problem.

That the floor below you can also serve as somebody else’s ceiling means a pretty close connection in a variety of situations, whether noise issues or leaky pipes or a thin divide separating two parties. Now consider how U.S. actions in a region where things are often interconnected and where policy initiatives can have consequences–often unintended–on other parties.

Arming the Sunni tribes: This would appear to make sense. After all, Iraq’s Shiite former prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, pursued an exclusivist policy designed to empower his constituency in the military and political systems. His successor, Haider al-Abadi, has tried to take a different tack but ended up failing to deliver on his promises of military support to Sunni tribes in Anbar. Islamic State, as we know, capitalized on this vulnerability. But if the U.S. opens an assistance conduit to the tribes, it could have major consequences among Shiites: It could weaken Mr. Abadi in the eyes of his Shiite constituency; it could undermine the premise of central government the U.S. is trying to support; it could even lead Iran to more aggressively push their Shiite militias in Iraq, further weakening the idea of centralized authority.

Using Iran to fight ISIS: The U.S. has gotten back into Iraq primarily to confront what it sees as the most immediate threat to the homeland: Islamic State. To facilitate its efforts, Washington is indirectly cooperating with Tehran, which is using the Shiite militias it controls to expand its influence in Iraq. This does two things: The authority of the central government in Baghdad is being weakened, and our actions guarantee a perpetuation of sectarian tension between Sunnis and Shiites–an outcome that benefits ISIS, whose extremists see the sectarian divide as a way to capitalize on Sunni disaffection and boost their own influence.

Not pressuring Assad: The logic of not striking Syria’s embattled president, Bashar al-Assad, seems sound: Facilitating the collapse of the Syrian regime might enhance ISIS’s capacity. (Imagine Islamic State claiming its first Arab capital in Damascus.) But not pressuring him has many downsides: We can’t train rebel forces faster than Mr. Assad’s artillery can kill Sunnis and thus bolster ISIS’s recruitment. By not  going after Mr. Assad, a member of Syria’s Alawite minority, the U.S. feeds the perception that it is pursuing a pro-Shiite policy that in turn alienates the region’s Sunnis–particularly Saudi Arabia–and strengthen’s Islamic State propaganda. Throw in Washington’s new rapprochement with Iran … and you see the unintended consequence of the impending nuclear deal.

An agreement between the U.S. and Iran would presumably delay and even constrain Tehran’s nuclear program, avoiding war and an acceleration of Iran’s breakout capacity. But the costs are considerable: Nuclear talks have already alienated this country’s two oldest allies in the region: Saudi Arabia and Israel. A deal would lead to billions of dollars in sanctions relief, and given the residual nuclear infrastructure Iran is likely to be allowed to maintain, it’s not certain there are any real assurances that Iran won’t wait out the time frame specified in an agreement–and still be left will an option to weaponize. Put another way: What is intended to contain a rising Iran could lead to its empowerment and expansion.

The bottom line is that the U.S. is stuck with bad options and constrained by the contradictions that define the region’s politics. Policies would have negative implications whichever way we turn. There are no neat, let alone comprehensive, solutions to Iraq, Syria, or most other challenges confronting U.S. policymakers. The Lebanese historian Kamal Salibi was right: Great powers meddle in the affairs of small tribes at their own risk.

The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author.

This article was originally published in The Wall Street Journal

About the Author

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Aaron David Miller

Global Fellow
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Middle East Program

The Wilson Center’s Middle East Program serves as a crucial resource for the policymaking community and beyond, providing analyses and research that helps inform US foreign policymaking, stimulates public debate, and expands knowledge about issues in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.  Read more