President Obama and Arab-Israeli Peace: Picking His Spots
Aaron David Miller, Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar and a 20-year veteran of Arab-Israeli negotiations, discusses four realities Washington must come to grips with in crafting an approach toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Regardless of the outcome of the torturous process of government formation in Israel, would-be peacemakers in Washington must come to grips with four realities in crafting an approach toward the Arab-Israeli conflict.
First, the age of heroic politics and diplomacy in Arab-Israeli peacemaking on both sides is likely over for now. Gone are the authoritative figures of past successes—Begin, Sadat, Rabin, even Arafat in his first Oslo incarnation. In their place are politicians who are more prisoners of their constituents than masters of their politics. Even if leaders like Bashar Assad, Benjamin Netanyahu, Tzipi Livni, and Mahmoud Abbas have the incentive to make serious decisions on peacemaking; it's arguable whether they have the power. These leaders seem to lack the authority and historic legitimacy to inspire, lead, and generate real confidence required for big decisions.
Second, the Palestinian national movement is in crisis, split between Fatah and Hamas (themselves divided) which compete for the legitimacy and power to be the Palestinian Authority. Without a monopoly over guns, resources, governance, and negotiating strategy, it's hard to see how a Palestinian decision-maker could hope to make concessions in peacemaking that all or the vast majority of Palestinians would support; it's even harder to imagine any Israeli leader making concessions to a Palestinian counterpart who doesn't control all the guns. A functional Palestinian unity for negotiations with Israel seems remote.
Third, Israel confronts its own leadership crisis. The results of the February elections will result in either a narrow-led, right-wing government or one of national unity. Either way, the odds of bold and decisive action in the Israeli-Palestinian track seem slim. More likely, the next Israeli government will focus on security issues, including how to deal with Hamas, Hezbollah, and particularly Iran.
Finally, what does all of this mean for President Obama's aspirations for Arab-Israeli peace? It means no quick or early breakthroughs and, given their political or ideological constraints, bold initiatives will not come from the Arabs and Israelis themselves. America will need to play a big role if it wants something to happen, but the new administration will need to pick its spots carefully.
The United States should help shore up the Israeli-Hamas ceasefire, help keep crossing points open so that aid gets into Gaza and agricultural exports get out, and help stop the flow of weapons to Hamas while not preventing Arab or Palestinian efforts to unify Fatah and Hamas.
The real opportunity is with Syria. The administration should seriously test whether Israel and Syria are willing and able to reach an accord. The Syrians will be hard-pressed to give up their relationship with Hezbollah or Iran, something Israel will press them to do. But the gaps between the core issues—water, normalization, security, and withdrawal—are clear and bridgeable. Doing this will require Israel and Syria to pay the full price and it will require an American president to get personally involved.
Still, it's not only worth the effort; it may be the only peace process in town that has a chance of succeeding. Ignoring the Palestinian issue is a recipe for disaster, but allowing it to hold progress on another front hostage makes no sense. Indeed, progress should be pursued where progress is possible.
