The High Price of U.S. Cooperation With Iran

Rarely does an entire region experience the kind of turbulent change that has roiled the Middle East over the past five years. And, on balance, the meltdown has played into Iran’s hands as U.S. influence wanes.

Of the key states that had dominated Arab politics and served as a counterweight to Tehran’s influence, consider: Iraq is semi-dysfunctional; Egypt has been consumed by internal challenges; in Syria, what remains of Bashar al-Assad‘s regime is dependent on Iran and its ally Hezbollah. The rise of Islamic State has challenged Tehran but also, paradoxically, created an opportunity for Iran to expand its influence among Iraqi Shiites and to score points with Washington in jointly opposing the Sunni jihadists. Bad governance or no governance–as in the case of Yemen–has allowed Iran to make inroads in countries with aggrieved Shiite population (Yemen, Bahrain). It is by no means clear whether recent Saudi, Egyptian, and related efforts to turn back Houthi rebels’ influence in Yemen can succeed.

Ironically, the behavior that had made Iran an outlier–its furtive effort to attain nuclear weapons’ capacity–has turned out to offer Tehran a way in from the cold.Negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program have created an unprecedented level of U.S.-Iranian cooperation; already, the talks have led to the easing of some sanctions and the validation of Iran’s right to enrich uranium. The outcome may leave much of Tehran’s nuclear infrastructure intact, even if its weapons aspirations are delayed. There is little doubt that one reason the Obama administration didn’t want to use force with the Assad regime was because it feared a proxy war with Iran that might undermine U.S. efforts to stop Iran’s quest for nukes. The negotiations have given Iran international legitimacy and served as a palliative toward internal dissent from a public hungry for an improved economy. Should a deal be reached, the Iranian regime will get serious sanctions relief and still be in a position to exercise nuclear weapons options in the future.

Meanwhile, the nuclear issue has driven a wedge between Washington and some of its closest allies in the Middle East, an area where the U.S. already has too few partners. Most serious is the deterioration with Israel, principally on the nuclear issue, but the Saudis and Emiratis too wonder how much Washington can be trusted in light of its new relationship with Tehran. It is remarkable that the Obama administration chooses to hammer Egypt for its anti-democratic character and the Israeli prime minister for his election statements about Israeli Arabs when Iran’s repressive regime is the region’s greatest violator of human rights and Iranian-backed Shiite militias in Iraq commit atrocities against Iraqi Sunnis. As tense as relations may be between Washington and its traditional friends, those countries’ view of the Middle East is much more compatible with U.S. interests than is Iran’s conception of the region.

A deal on the nuclear issue may well slow Iran’s program. That would be a good thing. But a situation where the U.S. is not moving to check Iran’s influence or, worse, making excuses for Iranian behavior is likely to create huge problems for Washington and its friends in the region. U.S. interests are little served or protected by the perceptions that Iran is rising, that the U.S. is quarreling with traditional allies, and that Washington now sees Iran as a central player with the Arabs and that Israel is playing secondary roles. The United States is not admired, respected, or feared as much it needs to be in a region where it has vital interests, partly because it’s perceived to be playing footsie with the mullahs. Even while it tries to conclude a nuclear deal, Washington ought to consider toughening its stand on Iran’s human rights abuses and meddling in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. That might help U.S. street cred and temper the perception that  Iran has hoodwinked America and is playing three-dimensional chess in the region while Washington plays checkers.

The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author. 

This article was originally published in The Wall Street Journal