New Russia, Old Chicago: The Tenacity of Machine Politics

At a recent Kennan Institute talk, Georgi Derluguian, Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Northwestern University, noted that the Russian state is often seen as unique. However, he argued that Russian politics have many things in common with the "machine politics" of prohibition-era Chicago. Understanding machine politics, he contended, can help us understand the Russian political system today. Derluguian defined machine politics as a system in which the trappings of modern state institutions exist, but real power is held by an informal group of elites who maintain control through patronage networks. He argued that machine politics are quite common throughout the world, because it is much easier to build informal patronage networks than to build stable state institutions. However, machine politics are also more easily destabilized or destroyed than are state institutions.

Throughout its history, Derluguian argued, Russia has been in a cycle of falling behind and catching up with Europe in terms of building state capacity. Without the legal and administrative legacy of the Roman Empire to build upon, and without rich capitalist towns to tax, state building in Russia occurred largely through coercion. Regular modernizations then were achieved by destroying old ruling elites and replacing them with new elites. This strategy was successful in increasing state capacity in the times of Ivan the Terrible, Peter, and Stalin-Khrushchev. However, bouts of coercive modernization led to plateaus when elites could enjoy the fruits of their power and prestige. In retrospect this appeared as periods of stagnation because Western states would continue to innovate and grow.

According to Derluguian, Russia today is again at a low point in its catching-up cycle. As the Soviet system began to collapse, a large number of bureaucrats fled the Soviet power structure, he said. When they fled, they took with them whatever material, social, and political assets they could, effectively privatizing them and creating the basis for a system of machine politics. President Vladimir Putin, Derluguian argued, has attempted to take control of political machines by strengthening the central bureaucracy and consolidating his own control of state structures, but he has not succeeded so far in changing the fundamental nature of Russia's political system. One reason for this, according to Derluguian, is that Russia does not face any threats that would force it to develop strong institutions. Because invasion by another state is not a possibility, Russia has not had to build a strong army, and because the state can satisfy its budget needs through taxes on the export of natural resources, it has not been forced to develop a real system of taxation. Therefore, the state has not been forced to negotiate with its citizens for conscripts and taxes.

Moving beyond the system of machine politics will be a difficult task, according to Derluguian. Overcoming political machines, he argued, requires empowering citizens to challenge the actions of patronage networks through established legal channels. First, it requires an active, independent media and state officials who are willing to cooperate with the media to make abuses known to the public. Second, it requires empowering wage earners so that they can stand up against political abuses without the fear of losing their jobs. Third, it requires an independent judiciary, and the means to enforce judges' rulings, in order to provide strong legal channels to contest political abuses. Without these changes, Derluguian concluded, Russia will remain a weak and peripheral state, because machine politics works for its elites.