Six-Party Stall: Are the ROK and PRC Part of the Problem or the Solution?

As befitting the difficult question posed in the event title, the speakers had various opinions as to the primary reason for the current stalemate in the Six-Party talks (the multinational forum composed of the United States, South Korea, North Korea, China, Japan and Russia to deal with North Korea's nuclear weapons program). Assessing South Korea's approach, Sung-Yoon Lee of Harvard University bluntly blamed the government of South Korea, over the last eight years, for a morally bankrupt policy of rewarding a "criminal" regime without demanding any accountability or reciprocity. Kirk Larsen of George Washington University focused on Seoul and Washington, noting the two capitals had somewhat different objectives, based on their historical experiences, resulting in a situation where South Korea perceives Washington's lack of flexibility as a key stumbling block, while the Bush administration views Seoul's accommodating policy toward North Korea as part of the problem. Turning to China, Kerry Dumbaugh of the Congressional Research Service noted that what China actually says to North Korea remains a mystery, opining that perhaps China seeks "strategic ambiguity" to preserve the status quo in North Korea. Maintaining stability on the peninsula, said Dumbaugh, is China's primary strategic goal. Bojiang Yang, visiting fellow at Brookings and a member of a Beijing-based think tank, argued that China was doing all it could to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue, and questioned whether Washington was doing the same.

Lee noted that, by its very existence, South Korea poses a long-term threat to North Korea. He called the "carrots and sticks" approach to North Korea "offensive," stating that such an approach is generally used when you are trying to influence the behavior of a donkey. The leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-il, is not a donkey, stated Lee. Kim can think for himself, and does not simply react to actions by the Washington or Seoul. Lee asserted that on May 31, the South Korean people voiced their opposition to the present South Korean government by handing it an overwhelming defeat in local elections. Lee predicted that North Korea, fearing a change in government in Seoul and a harsher policy, will try to wrest as many concessions from the present Seoul administration as possible until the next South Korean presidential election in 2007. Lee further asked why South Korea should "forgive and forget" the long list of atrocities that Kim Jong-il and his regime has perpetrated against South Korea.

Larsen noted that the objectives of the Six-Party talks are not the same for everyone. He stated that one view in the U.S. is that the Six-Party talks will fail, that North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons, and especially will not agree to a strict verification regime. The purpose of the talks, from this point of view, is to demonstrate that negotiations are not the answer, thus clearing the way for stronger measures. Larsen noted that if this is really the goal for the Bush administration, then South Korea's attempts to prop up North Korea runs counter to U.S. policy. Another interpretation of Washington's policy is that the goal of the talks is neither to fail nor succeed, but to keep on talking. This will prevent a dramatic negative action by North Korea, such as another missile launch or a test of a nuclear weapon. Even if, said Larsen, there is a shared goal between Washington and Seoul to dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons, there is disagreement over the urgency. Thus, concludes Larsen, whether you are part of the problem or part of the solution depends on your point of view. From Washington's vantage point, South Korea is part of the problem; and conversely, from Seoul's viewpoint, Washington is part of the problem.

Dumbaugh asserted that North Korea is an enigma, and what China says to North Korea is a mystery. She noted two dramatically different U.S. views toward what China is doing in the Six-Party talks. One view is that China is sincere and trying to help; the other is that China is insincere and wants North Korea to possess nuclear weapons. Trying to analyze China's real motives, Dumbaugh posited the "three yeses and three noes." She said that the three questions to which Chinese leaders are most likely to answer yes to are: Do we support North Korea? Do we feel strongly about the historical ties and the human and capital investment we have made there? Ultimately, are there any limits to our support? The three questions to which Chinese leaders are most likely to answer no to are: Are we happy about the policy direction North Korea is taking? Are we satisfied with the amount of control we exert over Pyongyang? Are we willing to abandon them? Dumbaugh noted that these questions and answers indicate a mixed picture of Chinese policy goals that seem at times to be in conflict with one another. Dumbaugh concluded that Beijing's endgame in the Six-Party process is to preserve "strategic ambiguity," maintain maximum flexibility and influence for China, and preserve the status quo.

Yang stated there were two fundamental goals to China's position on North Korea's nuclear weapons program: first, there must be denuclearization, and second, this must be done in a peaceful manner. Otherwise, there would be regional instability, and China, above all else in light of its emphasis on its own internal economic development, seeks regional stability. Yang noted that while Beijing and Washington share the same goals, they differ on how to deal with the problem. Noting that the Six-Party talks had been deadlocked for over half a year, he posed the following questions to Washington:

• Is North Korea the only party to be blamed for the current deadlock?
• How much energy and attention has the Bush Administration put into northeast Asia?
• How much do U.S. officials know of the region, especially the sensitivities and
thinking of the parties involved?
• Does the U.S. administration really have a unified policy toward North Korea?

Drafted by Mark Mohr, Asia Program Associate
Robert M. Hathaway, Director, Asia Program. Ph: (202) 691-4020