No doubt about it, 2010 was not a good year for Mexico. After setting new records for cartel-related violence, it’s hard to imagine 2011 could be much worse. While reversing this trend will be extremely difficult, here are three things the Mexican and U.S. governments can do to help make this a better year for Mexico and, by extension, the United States.
Fraud Allegations by Losing Candidate Prompts President Elect Peña Nieto to Consider Delaying Economic Overhaul Plan. Mexico Institute's Eric Olson comments.
The Woodrow Wilson Center, together with the Migration Policy Institute and the Manhattan Institute, recently launched the Independent Task Force on Immigration and America's Future, chaired by the Hon. Lee H. Hamilton and former Senator Spencer Abraham. Several publications for the study are now available.
Cooperatively organized by Georgetown University, Monterrey Tec, and the Wilson Center, this program brings professors and doctoral students from Monterrey Tec's Graduate School of Administration (EGAP) to Washington, DC for a month each year.
Many Mexicans are weary of the sharp rise in violence that has accompanied Calderón's military-led strategy against drug traffickers. So why aren't presidential hopefuls offering alternatives?
“The Expert Take” features original analysis and commentary from guest contributors featured exclusively on the Mexico Portal and on the Mexico Institute website. We invite you to check back frequently for updates to this column.
Mexico Institute in the News: With Stake in Stability, Businesses in Mexico Help City Shaken by Violence
Three Mexico Institute Board Members were featured in a New York Times story highlighting the commitment of the business community in Monterrey, Mexico to help recruit vetted police forces, build confidence in state law enforcement institutions, and ensure stability and safety in Mexico’s industrial capital.
During the era of the pre-democratic PRI in Mexico there existed a long history of national political pacts. Those pacts typically were between the PRI dominated executive branch and the two most influential actors, labor unions and business organizations. In the 1990s, at the highpoint of the democratic transition, the PRI for the first time in its history lost its ability to ensure a two-thirds vote in the legislative branch, preventing it from accomplishing constitutional changes.