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Russian Geopolitical Assault: Possibilities and Realities

History proves that if, following the radical changes in the international relations, reliable mechanisms and instruments to support the new configuration are not set up, earlier or later some members of the system will try to disrupt the balance of forces. Geopolitical assault can be considered one of such instruments. Its essence is the restoration of the control over the lost territories and spheres of influence, and in the end, it leads not only to restoration, but also to the enhancement of its status in the international system.

Russian Geopolitical Assault: Possibilities and Realities

History proves that if, following the radical changes in the international relations, reliable mechanisms and instruments to support the new configuration are not set up, earlier or later some members of the system will try to disrupt the balance of forces. Geopolitical assault can be considered one of such instruments. Its essence is the restoration of the control over the lost territories and spheres of influence, and in the end, it leads not only to restoration, but also to the enhancement of its status in the international system. Versailles-Washington system is a classical example of failure to create reliable preventive mechanisms in the face of a new war, which enabled not only Hitler’s rise to power in Germany, but also an attempt of geopolitical assault on the European continent. True, it was not successful in the long run, but it resulted in the destruction of the inter-bellum system. 

Similar processes have been registered after the end of the cold war. Russia, as the natural successor of the Russian empire and the Soviet Union is trying to regain its status of a global center, using geopolitical and ideological assault. For Russia, it is not just the restitution of its top position in the world hierarchy, but mainly, the means of surviving under multi-strata degradation of social sector. Its main area of the application of force is the territory of the former USSR, and in this context one should pay the tribute to the Russian leadership: from the very beginning Moscow position has been rather consistent and included regaining and institutionalization of political and economic control in the territories of the new independent states.  

For the sake of the argument Russian strategy can be divided into two periods. The first decade following the Soviet Union collapse was defined by predominance of the centrifugal forces, and by the difficulties of Russia’s internal adjustment to the new post-communist and post-bipolar realities, i.e. to the painful post-totalitarian social transformation, on the one hand, and to accepting the loss of the status of the superpower and attempted transformation into the regional power, on the other. At that time its claims to regional domination were evident, but never implemented, because Russia was “concentrating”, pulling together its resources and creating conditions enabling it to strengthen its political and economic influence in the neighboring states.

Under these circumstances the Russian leadership counted on establishing closer relations with the West, deliberately curbing its ambitions and rejecting the actions that could prevent Western partners from building up their strategies in the former soviet states. In exchange for its decreased activity in the post-soviet space, B.Yeltsyn’s administration craved for and eventually obtained the unofficial status of the “senior partner”, granted to it by the US and Europe.   Russia was even invited in 1997 to participate in “Big Seven” conference. It signified not only Russia’s priority status in the West’s dealings with this part of the world, but also gave Moscow the right to claim the responsibility for regional stability, which it perceived as the incentive for geopolitical control.  This “carte-blanche” provided it with the chance to preserve, sustain, and even eventually increase economic and cultural/ideological factors, in particular, the high scale of economic integration and dependence of the new states’ economies on the Russian energy carriers, common and similar characteristics in mentality etc. Eventually these factors had to become the tools of the political control.  

Geopolitical assault became possible in the beginning of the new century, after Putin had risen to power. His goal was final and real return to the club of the superpowers, and he considered several ways of achieving it. First, it was further increase in economic potential, (mainly, due to the export of energy), at the world-wide and continental level, as the real strength is always economy-based. Second, it was the broadening the scope of Russian influence on global agendas by means of establishing partnerships with NATO and the USA, participation in “Big Seven” events etc. Counteracting world terrorism and sustaining of nuclear strategic stability were regarded as the main spheres of collaboration. And, finally, according to the logic of the Russian leadership, the Russia’s own “sphere of influence”, or “sphere of priority interests”, in its own words, was to be established, as it gave Russia advantage in its dealings with the Western partners, and also eliminated psychological complexes, developed after the USSR collapse by the Russian ruling class. Generally speaking, Russia managed to achieve success in all three areas: oil and gas export increased, ensuring certain dependence of West-European economics on the Russian energy carriers. Moscow influence on decision-making in the common partnership institutions and informal groups of the global leaders has grown. The systemic process of setting up integrated military-political and economic structures started in the post-soviet space.  

Second Putin’s term as president was marked by a rigidly selective transition to the partnership with the Western countries and deliberate aggravation of relations in the strategically important regions in resolving most sensitive issues. At the cost of war with Georgia, Russia managed to stop NATO’s progress in the post-soviet territory. It is also safe to admit the Russian leadership has succeeded in launching the re-integration mechanism in the region; in particular, a military/political Organization of the collective security agreement was set up and the Eurasian economic union is to start its operation in 2015. The recent events confirm the fact that Russian hyperactivity in the post-soviet territory, especially, in Georgia, Moldova, and, first of all, in Ukraine, has seriously scared the West, which had no adequate response to Putin’s policy.  

However, no one knows how successful and long-term this policy will be. Russian leadership is implementing rigid policy against the USA and Europe, feeling certain that the West is constantly declining as geopolitical player and center of ideological influence. Such perception gives the grounds for talks about irreversible decrease of the US global influence, special role of Russia as safeguard of common human values etc. As to the US, one can agree partially, because Obama’s administration has lost its key positions, especially in the Eastern Europe and in the former soviet territory.  On the other hand, though, the Western world is successfully overcoming the crisis, and is much ahead of Russia by its economic indicators. As to the newly-found Russian “Messianism”, it is to be used mostly inside the country; it is not popular among its neighbors and is not accepted by the rest of the world. Analysts trying to define the borders of Russia’s geopolitical assault point out the interrelation between expansionist policy and availability of relevant resources.  At least at the current stage the decrease of economic potential caused by stagnation and inefficient government can be considered probably the only restrictive factor in Moscow geopolitical activity, as the West is obviously bewildered and incapable of offering any viable counteraction to the new imperial projects of Russia.

About the Author

Sergiy Fedunyak

Fulbright-Kennan Scholar;
Professor, International Relations, Chernivtsi National University, Chernivtsi, Ukraine.
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