Skip to main content
Support
Article

There Are No ‘Good’ Iran Deals, Only Varying Degrees of Risk

Aaron David Miller image

"Negotiating with Iran in an effort to slow its nuclear program and avoid war is the least bad alternative. But there are no good deals that will end Iran’s nuclear weapons aspirations, only ones with varying degrees of risk," writes Aaron David Miller and Jason Brodsky.

The Obama administration should not mislead itself or the public that the framework agreement announced last week is complete or will allay U.S. or allies’ concerns about Iran’s regional or nuclear ambitions. Negotiating with Iran in an effort to slow its nuclear program and avoid war is the least bad alternative. But there are no good deals that will end Iran’s nuclear weapons aspirations, only ones with varying degrees of risk. Some things to keep in mind:

1. The talks are not over. What was announced last week is not itself a deal. The administration’s fact sheet notes that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.” Washington and Tehran are alreadysparring over details, namely whether international sanctions against Iran would be suspended or lifted gradually or immediately.
2. No really good deal was ever possible. Iran has mastered the fuel cycle and, the president said Thursday, is probably only two to three months from being able to produce enough fissile material for a single nuclear bomb. A final agreement would extend that period to a year, perhaps, but Iran would still retain its nuclear know-how. And if Iranian research on advanced centrifuges continues even if the centrifuges are not operational, all that information will be kept–and consulted should Iran decide in a decade that it wants to accelerate its program or weaponize. And none of the “good deal” talk allows for the fact that we don’t know what all we don’t know about some of the possible military and other secret dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program.

3. Whose side is time on? Assuming that the comprehensive deal is concluded and that implementation proceeds without serious problems, it’s still impossible to predict what the situation will be in a decade. Key figures in the Iranian regime may no longer be present. Perhaps the Iranian public will become so enamored of sanctions reliefthat no successor regime or supreme leader would dare cheat on the accord’s terms and risk public wrath. But it’s equally plausible that Iran, which has slowly and steadily pursued its nuclear program, will simply defer its weapons aspirations, taking advantages of sanctions relief and its new status in the international community, and enhance its regional role.

In the out years of the agreement, Tehran would be left with a sizable nuclear capacity; the international community, now used to a nuclear agreement deemed too big to fail, is likely to pay much less attention. Washington measures its political life in four- to eight-year spans. Iran’s mullahs have been in power since 1979. Who’s going to shift focus first? Already, it’s clear that Iran is playing the long game: Last month hard-liner Mohammad Yazdiwas elected chairman of the Assembly of Experts, the body charged with appointing Iran’s supreme leader. In a 1998 speech Mr. Yadzi signaled support for nuclear weapons. We don’t know whether he still supports a push toward weaponization, but past statements raise serious questions about the policy views of Iran’s future leaders.

4. Non-Arab states are rising in the Middle East. As the Arab world melts down, Israel and Iran remain powerful and ascendent. But Iran occupies a more strategic position in the region than Israel. Tehran sees itself as a great power both vulnerable and entitled, with a sphere of influence that includes Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and even Yemen. But Iran doesn’t need to take over the region to cause problems. Its vision of the Middle East conflicts with the U.S. view of the region, and a deal on the nuclear issue not only isn’t going to resolve this but already has made U.S. allies in the region tense that Washington is pursing an Iran-centric policy. The view that Washington defers to a rising Tehran fuels the broader Saudi-Iranian cold war, widens the region’s Sunni-Shiite divide, and stokes tensions in Israel. A U.S.-Iranian nuclear agreement is hardly the key to regional stability, but in trying to fix one problem it creates others.

Negotiations by the June 30 deadline could produce a comprehensive agreement that leads to a slower, smaller, more transparent Iranian civilian program–a deal the Obama administration would describe as the best the U.S. could get and an outcome that the president has asserted is better than the alternatives. But a deal that neutralizes the threat from an Iranian nuclear program or checks Tehran’s regional ambitions is not in the cards

The opinions expressed here are solely those of the authors.

The article was originally published in the Wall Street Journal.

About the Author

Aaron David Miller image

Aaron David Miller

Global Fellow
Read More

Middle East Program

The Wilson Center’s Middle East Program serves as a crucial resource for the policymaking community and beyond, providing analyses and research that helps inform US foreign policymaking, stimulates public debate, and expands knowledge about issues in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.  Read more

Middle East Program

The Wilson Center’s Middle East Program serves as a crucial resource for the policymaking community and beyond, providing analyses and research that helps inform US foreign policymaking, stimulates public debate, and expands knowledge about issues in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.  Read more