Skip to main content
Support
Article

What Inhibits a ‘Complete Strategy’ for Fighting ISIS

Aaron David Miller image

"The Obama administration and its critics in Congress should stop using language like “defeat.” This isn’t World War II. Eliminating ISIS requires fixing Syria and Iraq, creating well-governed, functional states. And not even the hawks in Congress are prepared to expend the resources required for that," writes Aaron David Miller.

During the G-7 summit on Monday, President Barack Obama admitted the obvious: “We don’t yet have a complete strategy” against Islamic State “because it requires commitments on the part of the Iraqis.” Critics seized this as evidence that the administration lacks the resolve to adequately address the growing threat from ISIS. “What has President Obama been doing for the last 10 months?” the Republican National Committee asked in a statement.

Frustrations abound across party lines at ISIS’s unchecked advances. Still, for all the criticism of the administration’s policies, the challenge of how best to fight ISIS doesn’t always appear to be clear to the president’s opponents–or defenders.

The issue is not just what would be required to change the battlefield and political balance against ISIS but also what’s militarily and politically feasible in the Iraq/Syria context and in Washington, particularly when it comes to expanding the U.S. military commitment. Any U.S. strategy needs to factor in constraints that are certain to limit any Democratic or Republican administration’s capacity to “defeat” ISIS:

The specter of Iraq and Afghanistan loom over what Washington is prepared to do to confront Islamic State. The basis of any renewed U.S. military commitment to Iraq and Syria is rooted in the failures of the two longest wars in U.S. history and the disappointment with what Iraqis and Syrians were willing and able to do militarily and, in particular, politically. President Obama is right to expect from Iraq’s current Shiite prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, what he couldn’t or wouldn’t demand from the last one: more inclusion for Sunnis, especially empowering the local militia, guard, and tribal forces with military assistance and the mandate to confront ISIS. Otherwise, no matter what Washington does in military terms, ISIS will continue exploiting Iraqi Sunnis’ grievances–and there will be no stable, or sustainable, political end state.

Now, Iran has no stake in seeing ISIS take over Iraq—but neither does it share Washington’s vision. Tehran doesn’t want to see an Iraqi (or Syrian) government dependent on Washington or Riyadh, confessionally balanced and free of heavy Iranian influence. Iran wants to preserve Shiite privilege and what it sees as its own role as the key arbiter of Iraq’s orientation domestically and in the region. In a perverse way, keeping Iraqi Shiites fearful of ISIS deepens Shiite dependence on Iran and its Shiite militias. The pending U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement reinforces (correct) perceptions that Washington is acquiescing in a rising Iran.

There are no quick fixes to this situation. Countering ISIS is a multiyear enterprise. Nearly 14 years after the 9/11 attacks, we haven’t defeated al Qaeda or its derivatives. And ISIS isn’t merely a terror organization; it has the makings of a quasi state. The Obama administration and its critics in Congress should stop using language like “defeat.” This isn’t World War II. Eliminating ISIS requires fixing Syria and Iraq, creating well-governed, functional states. And not even the hawks in Congress are prepared to expend the resources required for that.

The balance between not in and all in: Neither Republicans nor Democrats are calling for tens of thousands of U.S. combat forces to defeat ISIS. The Obama administration seems reluctant to expand the U.S. military presence by adding more Special Forces and embedding them with Iraqi combat forces as spotters for airstrikes or to help direct Iraqi operations at the brigade and battalion levels. Key Republicans such as Sen. John McCain seem willing to do that and to expand U.S. airstrikes. But it’s not at all clear that Congress would be willing to risk U.S. casualties and the possibility of Americans being taken hostage by ISIS in what promises to be an open-ended military commitment. The fact is, barring a major ISIS attack against the U.S. homeland, risk-aversion among the public and Congress and the messes that are Iraqi and Syrian politics are likely to impose sharp constraints on any president seeking to ramp up U.S. military involvement in the fight against ISIS. And that makes any effort to roll back ISIS’s gains or eliminate it altogether that much more difficult.

The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author.

This article was originally published in The Wall Street Journal.

About the Author

Aaron David Miller image

Aaron David Miller

Global Fellow
Read More

Middle East Program

The Wilson Center’s Middle East Program serves as a crucial resource for the policymaking community and beyond, providing analyses and research that helps inform US foreign policymaking, stimulates public debate, and expands knowledge about issues in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.  Read more