THIS IS AN UNEDITED TRANSCRIPT
Hello, I'm John Milewski, and this is Wilson Center NOW, a production of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. My guest today is Robin Quinnville. Robin is director of the Wilson Center's Global Europe Program. She just returned from some travels through Europe during some pretty historic moments that we're going to talk to her about all kinds of things happening on the continent.
Robin, welcome back and welcome to What is it about? Thank you so much. Pleasure. So before we dig into some of the details of what you observed, what you did, just tell us where you traveled to. So I traveled to Munich, Germany, because every year the Munich Security Conference takes place over a weekend in mid-February. Now, this is like the Davos Economic Forum, but for security walks, right.
And it gets people from across the world, a global group of people together to talk about aspects of security, whether that's military security, energy security. But it focuses historically on the transatlantic relationship, and it retains that thread throughout. And so I was also staying in Munich for the German elections. Yeah. Excuse me for stepping on that. Yeah, I know that as well.
So? So I wanted to ask you about at the security conference. Now, we've had a couple of weeks since it concluded. What has been the fallout from the way things transpired like security conference? Big? Our European allies were prepared, I think, for discussion of defense spending and defense capabilities. They have done their own reassessment in the last three years since Russia invaded Ukraine of their lack of capability.
They really ran into it when they were trying to prepare to send material to Ukraine. They know they have to build up their defense industry. They know that they need to spend more on defense. And in the run up to last year's NATO's summit, they were doing that. And many more countries are reaching 2% than ever before. But they knew that with the Trump administration, they would have to argue their case again.
And I think that they were prepared to do that, but they weren't prepared for was a discussion of whether or not we continue to share values as democracies. And that was what they got with the vice president's speech. And it really shook the trans-Atlantic community and shook the Europeans because they were not prepared for a critique of their own democracies.
They were especially not prepared in Germany, which would have an election a week after this attack. And so the result has been a lot of concern about where the transatlantic relationship is going, what U.S. security and European security means and what they can rely on. And fundamentally, it's a lack of trust. Yeah. So and then let's segue to the elections.
And you were there during this moment. So I wondered if, you know, when you're watching from afar and you're reading the headlines and you're hearing the commentary. There was certainly a lot of concern expressed about the rise of the far right and what it could mean for the EU, for NATO's, for U.S. relations, for the whole world. Was that the same within the country?
Was there really a sense of anticipation of these elections as being potentially significant? There was, in Germany, a strong sense that this was going to be a real game changing election, that the results were important. We saw it in the turnout. Their turnout was 82%. That is remarkable, really, when you think about it. Even Germany's turnout numbers are always higher than in the US, But 82% is a really high number and it shows the importance that was placed on that.
It's worth reminding the American audience that all German governments are coalitions. They have have a number of parties, so they always have to form a coalition between the the winner and at least one other party. The government that fell and led to this elections have actually been composed of three parties, which was very difficult to as a governing entity and ultimately fell apart.
So they had this unusual winter election and everyone was looking at the numbers on the far right. But then they also started to look at the numbers on the populist and left because a brand new party was potentially going to make it into parliament, that of the whole question was, are you going to get an election result that will allow for a coalition of two rather than three parties?
And it depended on what the vote for the far right would be and what the vote for the far left would be. Now, the rise of the populist AfD, they held out 20%, which was pretty much the poll, the number that polls that indicated all the way along. That's a doubling over its last election, but it did not reach the heights that are above 20% that some were suggesting.
But it is a significant number for Germany and the other parties have said they will not bring back into government. They don't want that far right party in government. So they will have to find a way to join a coalition without a support base of this election. Was the success, the relative success of a party that had truly been discounted until about a week before the election, and that was with former Communist Party.
They are called the left. They're the successor to the Communist Party that had been in East Germany and they got 8.8% and that rose during a week on the weekend before people thought maybe it wanted to get in. But by election night, 8.8%, which they were celebrating. And yeah, for for those who who see the AfD as a threat, you know, 20%, it's sort of a mixed bag.
It's higher than they ever had, but it didn't exceed expectations. As you said it. It kind of matched the prediction heading in. But it's 10 million people to get to that 20%. That's a lot of people. Well, is this viewed as the threat is subsided for now or but nobody should get complacent? How are German politicians who aren't of that ilk treating this okay in their in their minds, they're like, we dodged a bullet, but must address the issues that voters saw that drove them to where that is.
The rhetoric from the from the party that came out first in these elections, the big conservative CDU party, they know that they have a limited amount of time to address some of these issues and they are focused on this. Their their real concern is economic growth, how to cut regulation that will provide for economic growth. They know a lot of voters were after coming from economically challenged areas of Germany, the former East German parts of Germany, where actually there there is still they still lag behind the West, but they also know that migration was a huge concern for these people, despite the fact that the numbers of migrants were, in fact, lower, that they worry
about that there is a perception of inequality there. So they know they have to address migration, economic growth, but they really need to reach out to address the issues that drove voters to adopting. And they know they've got basically this parliament to do it. It's going to move on to another topic. But before doing so, I just want to let our viewers know that if you would like to know more about the German elections from Robyn's perspective, she's also the guest this week on our sister program Need to know a podcast that is directed toward policymakers but available to everyone.
And we'll dive deeper into that in this week's episode of Need to Know. Robyn And today, as we were preparing to record this episode, the EU has announced a new plan to spend 840 billion more on its own defense after the U.S. paused its aid to Ukraine. And Ursula Vandal von der Leyen's said this I do not need to describe the grave nature of the threats that we face or the devastating consequences that we will have to endure if those threats would come to pass.
So is this all the things we're talking about overlap? Right. And this gets us back to the Munich Security Conference. And is this the new attitude moving forward across Europe and across the EU that they're going to have to rethink how they approach their security because they no longer view us, the United States, as a reliable partner? The short answer is yes.
They actually have had to reassess their their strategic threat assessment twice now within three years. The first when Putin invaded Ukraine. They had not believed that he would, in fact, do this, that he would try to change borders by force. They viewed the the commitments to changing the borders by force as something that would protect that from happening didn't happen.
They then had to reassess what the threat assessment was for them from Russia. Now concerned about whether or not the US to transatlantic security guarantee for Europe stands. The degree to which it stands, what changes are coming up in the future, if any, has caused them to reassess that part of their of their strategic threat assessment? How reliable is the US as a partner now?
They are not overreacting. In fact, much of what's underlying is doing is previewing in terms of what changes that Europe may make to its to its spending posture are things that she kind of that works before going to Munich. But at the same time, she is now putting it in a different strategic confidence. So are we just starting this what seemingly is an almost a feud with what has been our strongest allies?
I saw headlines out of northern Europe calling for a boycott of U.S. products. And then, of course, we've all seen the news from the Norwegian company that announced that it will stop supplying U.S. military vessels with fuel. You know, this tit for tat is just in its early days. But how do we how do you the people in Europe, the leadership in Europe, the governments, do they see this as just the beginning of what's going to be a downward spiral?
Or do they see this as a bump in the road, perhaps a negotiating ploy? How is it being viewed? I think it's somewhere in the in the middle. First, I'm going to discount some of the some of the kind of popular protest think, because those those are are things that come up periodically and can happen on virtually any policy that the US does.
So putting those aside and going to the to the real heart of this, it's more than a bump in the road, but that they know they have to be serious about this. And it is a it's a tough time. You know, in Germany, the economy is not doing well. It is basically stagnating. And they have there are manufacturing economies.
So they really need growth. And they but they all see that they need to get over the years of postponement of what it is that they do and be innovative when it comes to how they can invest in their own military capabilities and delivery going forward. Does that speak to what has been an overreliance on the US and NATO's?
So there are my talking points, but I was a diplomat were the same more or less in the Obama and Trump administration. So they spend more. You need capabilities. Deterrence relies on having robust capabilities. But in an era of peace, that was a hard sell to publics. However, again, this is why the strategic threat assessment is so important.
Once Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, that led to a new perception that, yes, you do need those capabilities. And so this is this has been an issue for the last three years, and it will be an issue going forward. The forces at play, where are you going to have to spend more on defense? But you're already have economies that are lagging.
Not a great a great circumstance. But I wonder, do European countries view this these these just percolating up U.S. trade wars with Canada and Mexico and China? Do they see any opportunity there? They're actually concerned about whether the next trade war coming is a tariff imposed on the EU and so that they're concerned about what the ramifications of that will be on their economies.
But it, I think, is a separate concern from the knowing that they need to do more on their own defense, that they will not trade off what they need to do on tariffs if they are hit with tariffs and stop paying attention to defense because they know that they need to do that too. So in the question, you know of that, we always like to look at at the Wilson Center of the headlines versus the headlines, you know, as as you process all of this, all of this you saw and all of the people you talked to, you know, what are you what are going to be really watching closely?
What will the Global Europe program be tracking? What are the areas over the next months that will be most important to give us an indication of where things are headed and what the European response to U.S. policy changes will look like? So the first thing we'll track is their assistance to Ukraine, how they fund it and how much there is, how much they are able to put real equipment into that fight and what end to what degree they're able to backfill for capabilities that the US may be withdrawing.
We will watch their defense spending and what they spend it on and also how it is that the EU will plan to open up opportunities for more defense investment by, for example, encouraging and encouraging banks to do more lending to to companies, to governments on defense, to whether they will open up the debt ceiling for more defense investment, things like that.
So are they doing, you know, the EU, as has its power regulation, right. How? To what degree do they free themselves from that? And then it is to what degree are they able to put their their domestic politics aside in order to have unity, to grow their defense capabilities and to be a real deterrent, no matter what happens with the US force posture in Europe?
I'm going to cheat. I thought that would be my final question. But your response has led me to another book, which which is about Ukraine. Right. And rhetorically, European leaders are expressing strong support for Ukraine, even in the face of the U.S. freeze on support and even in the aftermath of the contentious meeting in the Oval Office. Do you think and I mean, over a year ago, we were talking about potential Ukraine fatigue for all the nations supporting Ukraine, not just European nations, the United States as well.
How strong is the commitment and is this rhetoric something that can really be translated into ongoing support for Ukraine? I think what you're seeing from the meetings that happened in London over the weekend is that there is a focus on trying to ensure that they have a policy in which both Europe and Ukraine are at the table, at the negotiating table.
It's why they've actually focused on proposals for perhaps a cease fire short term in order to try and see what they can do next. The thing that was most difficult from the Munich Security Conference discussions on this topic was a realization among European allies that they would not be at the table, but nor would necessarily Ukraine be at the table.
And given their investment in this and the proximity and geography and so forth, and there commitment to Ukraine, that was something that they found unacceptable. So now they are doing this separate track in order to try and reach something that would allow for a negotiation in which they would be at the table. And I'm going to sneak in another question, Robin, because you've got so much good information, and that's about the U.K. And, you know, in the post-Brexit world, is it still strongly aligned with the EU, even no longer an official member?
You know, the the new Labor government came in last summer, and this has really been Keir Starmer's moment. He had he had a positive meeting with the president in the White House just before and the same week actually as a presidential landscape that he has looked forward is in or in order to emphasize that Britain, while not an EU member, is still in Europe in a in the way that it leads in defense with it within NATO's and stuff, that it's been a leader on Ukraine throughout and even under the previous government.
Right. So this is something where I think he thought, Right, this is my moment. I can actually lead this this meeting forward and show that we are engaged in the issues affecting the European continent. And even though we are not in the EU, that perhaps he sees that as an advantage. Robin, as always, thank you. You know, the stakes are high here and there's so much to sort out, but having you in house with your finger on the pulse really is helpful as we try to figure this out.
And I want to encourage our our viewers, if you'd like to learn more, check out the work of the Global Europe program at Wilson Center Talk. Robin Quinnville. thanks for joining us. Thank you. My pleasure. Our guest has been Robin Quinn film director of the Wilson Center's Global Europe program. We hope you enjoyed this edition of Wilson Center now and that you'll join us again soon.
Until then, for all of us at the center. I'm John Milewski. Thanks for your time and interest.
