THIS IS AN UNEDITED TRANSCRIPT
Hello, I'm John Milewski and this is Wilson Center NOW, a production of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Today, we're going to be talking about the work of the Wilson Center's Africa programs, Sudans Working Group. Let me introduce you to our guests, Oge Onubogu, who is the director of the Wilson Center's Africa program. We have two ambassadors with us, Ambassador Nureldin Satti and Ambassador Donald Booth, who are co-chairs of that working group.
A little more about both. Ambassador Satti is a retired U.N. senior official who previously served as Sudan's ambassador to the United States, also to France, Portugal, Switzerland and the Vatican. And Ambassador Booth served as U.S. special envoy to Sudan and South Sudan and was also U.S. ambassador to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Republic of Zambia, and the Republic of Liberia.
And as I mentioned, they are co-chairing the Sudan's working group. And okay, I thought it would be good for our viewers and listeners if we began with a little background on the group. If you could talk to us about how it was formed, why it was formed, and what it's intended to do. Thank you very much and thanks for hosting this conversation.
So the Sudan Working Group was actually established in 2009, and it was established to engage U.S., African and international policymakers and stakeholders in forward leaning policy dialogs aimed at advancing the prospects for peace, security and development between Sudan and South Sudan. In fact, boats Ambassador Satti and Ambassador Booth were also initial members of the Sudan Working Group in 2009.
So they will also be able to provide some more information about sort of the thinking and what was happening in Sudan, U.S. relations at that time that actually informed the creation of the working group. So since 2009, the Sudan's working group has really served as a space for key stakeholders from the U.S., Africa and the international community to really share analysis and their perspectives and also provide different policy options to help address some of the critical issues related to both Sudan and South Sudan.
Okay. Thanks. And so you've achieved that episode, gentlemen. And if you could take us back to the original year before, okay, it's time on the job here at Wilson and talk about the formative years and how you decided on how you would recruit the discussants who would be part of the various discussions that you conducted at the group.
Give us some insight into how that went and and what the buy in was initially. Well, if you'll allow me. Well, the idea actually came out early 2009 when the late Howard Wolpe and C Mark Donovan, where you know, in charge of the on the Africa program. And initially the co-chairs was Ambassador Woolsey and myself. And the idea came at a time when Sudan was one, actually just before the independence of South Sudan.
And it was a critical moment actually, at that time when, you know, the negotiations, as you know, have taken place. The CPA, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, you know, in Kenya. Implementation was well ahead, but very complex issues with your asking about the preparing for for the referendum was to take place. You know a couple of years later on and the independence that has taken place.
And the idea was to bring around all those who are also, you know, interested in Sudan, concerned and engage in the issue of Sudan in Washington and and around the world, actually. But the initial idea was to get all those who are concerned directly with it, the State Department, Congress, state, you know, White House, University NGOs, personalities, academicians concerned about Sudan and working on Sudan.
So that was the initial idea, you know, and how it was is it became to to be Ambassador Saadi. And I thank you for mentioning our dear and dearly departed colleagues, Howard Wolpe and Stephen McDonald, to terrific professionals, but also just great human beings, and we miss them dearly. Ambassador Booth, then talk about how you became involved in and expand more on what the some of the focus of the group has been.
Well, I became a co-chair with Ambassador Satti about two years ago, and we initially one of our first activities actually was to when Sudan was still somewhat at peace. It was after the military coup, but there was a functioning unity government. And we've initially focused on the issue of Abyei, which is a territory that has been disputed between Sudan and South Sudan for really since before the South Sudan independence referendum.
However, with the developments in Sudan, the war starting in April of last year, we shifted our focus to really addressing the conflict there and we initiated a four part series trying to bring out the in enhance the voices of Sudanese civilians, including grassroots civilians, not just elites and political parties, into the to the dialog about how to convince the generals to stop fighting, how to address future political negotiations, security sector reform, issues that are absolutely critical if Sudan is to have peace restored.
So we have conducted those those four workshops. We've invited policymakers in Washington as well as others that Ambassador Sarti mentioned and the NGO community, think tanks, etc.. And I think we've made some important contributions in terms of the policy recommendations that have come out of those discussions. Where do you when you you've had the four working groups or the folks for focuses, when those recommendations are created, who are they shared with and how are they distributed?
Well, we have drafted policy papers as a result of those, and they are, of course, on the Woodrow Wilson website. And as a co-chair, I have taken the opportunity to to share it with others in the U.S. government that I know to try to make sure that it's an it is being being read and considered. Okay. You know, a lot of groups like this I shouldn't say a lot of groups like this because there aren't a lot like this.
We wish we had more. But groups that talk about involving civilians, involving the people who are most affected by the issues that are being discussed and debated, you know, often easier said than done. What has been the experience of this group and how do you enlist the civilians who participate in the discussions? Well, thank you for that question.
I think the longevity of the Sudan Working Group at the Wilson Center and just the credibility that this group has, knowing that this has been around since 2009 and also with our coaches too, as well, with the networks and connections that we have, not only within the U.S. government, but most importantly within the Sudanese community as well. Those who are resident on the continent and also the diaspora.
And the fact that this conversations have been ongoing for several years. I think it has also helped to build the credibility of the Sudanese working group at the Wilson Center. Now, there are various other Sudanese working groups or other groups within the Washington, D.C. area and elsewhere that are also working on Sudan and working on these issues. And one of the good things that we've done at Wilson is that we've also found ways to collaborate with them to as well, to ensure that even as they work with their own partners, that the recommendations that are produced by those who participate in the Wilson Working Group conversations are also shared with a broader network.
I think, as you rightfully mentioned, we need more people, we need more organizations working on issues like these. So it's really important for us to to collaborate. And that's one of the things that the Wilson Center, Sudan's working group, that very well collaborating with others, but most importantly also serving as a convening space as a convener, where we're able to bring together different voices, different organizations, and also building on the networks and relationships that we have built over time to ensure that we are able to drive a message and ensure that we're able to keep, keep the message, keep our eyes on Sudan as it where we need more people paying attention to this issue.
As ambassador has mentioned, with the Civil War, the war that broke out in April of last year, we're really facing a dire situation in Sudan at this point. One of the largest, if not the largest internal displacement crisis in the world. And it's not really getting the type of attention it deserves. Thanks. Okay. You know, the gentleman, the what OJ mentions the largest displacement crisis in the world, unprecedented potential humanitarian crisis related to food security.
Now mounting that. Can you focus on some of the longer term structural and divisive conflicts that that predate the current civil war whilst in the midst of this incredible humanitarian crisis? Or is it a triage approach where, you know, you stop the bleeding first before you can talk about some of the longer term solutions? How do you go about thinking about those two sometimes diametrically opposed goals, longer term solutions to preexisting problems, the immediate acute crisis.
Ambassador, sorry, let's begin with you. Get your thoughts on that and then we'll hear from Ambassador Booth. Yeah, the question you are posing is that one that actually that encounter with many mediators around the issue of sequencing, the issue of priorities, how to prioritize solutions. And my my take on this is that actually you have to to work on on various rounds at the same time in order to resolve a conflict like the one in Sudan while giving utmost priority to the humanitarian issue.
Questions you have to have in mind also what we call commonly called the endgame, because you can only is to stop the, you know, conflict in a sustainable manner. If you understand exactly what are the goals and objectives of the belligerents and what is their take on the problem and what the what are the red lines and what are the options that are open for you in order to get what are the points of entry into the conflict?
So to answer the question, yes, of course we need to give our utmost priority in certain situation. But while doing that, we also need to look at the possible options that are open to us in order to convince the belligerents to accept what is yet to come and to make a solution sustainable and acceptable to the belligerents and those who are supporting them.
Because this much more complex, it's not only to fighting armies, this are armies that have their supporters and they have the whether on the surface front or the military front. And you have to take that into consideration. Thanks to Ambassador Booth, your thoughts on this? You know, it's almost the chicken and the egg conundrum right there. You have to really address all the things that are happening.
But is there any sequencing as described by Ambassador Saadi that makes the most sense when people are literally starving? Well, I think we have to start with the understanding what this conflict is about. Sudan has been at war with itself since independence, with a brief period from 1972 to 1983. The first war since independence was in South. There was a brief pause for 11 years.
It resumed in 1983. We had the Darfur conflict beginning in 2003, fighting in South Kordofan, Blue Nile states following that. So the problem in Sudan has been that there hasn't been a way for the political system to address the fact that it is an extremely diverse country and to embrace that diversity within the political process. So you've had the country at war with itself.
Now, this latest fighting is obviously the worst. It is, I think, the the world's largest humanitarian displacement crisis. The prospect of famine for hundreds of thousands of people is very real. Though the U.N. hasn't officially declared that. But that's what most observers are saying. So you have to basically address the question of the combatants and a ceasefire at the same time that you're trying to define what the end state is.
Massacre, Satti said. The you have to find a way that Sudan Sudanese can live together in peace, that they can have a governance structure that will enable that. And so this is one of the things that we've been encouraging. And the engagement with civilians is to come up with a common approach so that they can put that out there.
And the other thing that has to happen is the external parties who are supporting the various warring factions, their interests also need to be brought into consideration and hopefully reconciled. I can't see that it is in anyone's interests internationally for Sudan to descend into chaos for hundreds of thousands of its people to starve to death. So what are the common threads that can be brought together between what the Sudanese want and what the external actors want?
Now you need to address the external actors to stop the fighting, but you need to let the Sudanese run the process for determining their own political future. You know, as I'm listening to you and I'm jotting notes because of all the things that each of you are saying, I wrote down the term external forces, and then you introduce that into the conversation.
And that can cut both ways, right? There are external forces that are part of the problem. There can also be external forces like the group that you represent that can be part of the solution. Can you can I get each of your thoughts on this notion of the limits of foreign intervention or foreign aid as much as it's well intended and and how much solutions need to come from the inside for any sovereign nation?
And can we get each of your thoughts on that and maybe in the order of introduction? Okay. We'll start with you. Yeah, thank you. I think to the point on external actors, I think with this war that we see in Sudan, this is quite different from any conflict of at least from past conflicts that we've seen in the country, where in the past conflicts were typically, you know, concentrated in certain areas of the country as we saw in the very visible Darfur crisis in Sudan.
This time around, we've basically seen fights breaking out all the way from from Khartoum, the center, and spreading out across the different parts of the country. So this is quite different. And we also see the two actors, the two key actors that are involved in this crisis, the the the armed forces led by General Berhanu and then the RSS as well, led by Amity.
So what we're seen as going back to the points that Ambassador Booth and Ambassador Satti have both made, is that we're basically seen a country at war with itself, and we're seeing a breakdown of this political economic structure with for so long the center has continued to benefit from the periphery. This time around, we see groups like the RCF and other nonaligned groups that are fighting back from the periphery, fighting in the center.
So this is really a country at war with itself. And to the point of the external actors, we see external actors in terms of countries that are either supporting one group or the other. There's visible support from the UAE going towards ISAF and then support on the other side as well to to the the the armed forces from other actors.
So this is where it becomes really complicated because right now we're seeing the rise of a role, the rise of middle powers basically playing a role in this in this crisis, and really thinking about how you bring these actors to the table from UAE to Saudi Arabia to Turkey to Russia. These are all different actors. How do you bring them to the table as part of the discussion process?
Because in many ways, some of them are actors and some some of them are actors and also spoilers, too, as well. How do you bring the spoilers and those that might be helping to correct the situation to the table? That's a key point in terms of the rise of the middle powers. And then from the external actors, the U.S., the the the Brits, the international system, the African Union, all those others who in one way or the other, have vested interest to ensure that there is peace and stability.
Bringing those actors to the table will be important. Now, there have been several ceasefire attempts with this crisis and we've seen very little progress. I think one of the things that we try to remind people just in the peacebuilding process and the conflict resolution process is a failed ceasefire shouldn't be seen as, you know, closing the door. A sea of failed cease fire process should be an opportunity for learning lessons.
A failed ceasefire process should be an opportunity for us to go back to the drawing board to really rethink and ask ourselves who are the right partners, who are the right individuals that should be at the table, and how can we really make a role for civilians? I think for so long in the process, we haven't seen an effective role for civilians in this process.
How do we ensure that civilian voices are engaged in the process? I think this is a question that has been on the table for quite some time now. So I will leave it there of that. Thank you, gentlemen. As we continue this discussion about the role of external actors or forces, you know, perhaps as as each of you make your comments, you could also think in terms of of what would be most helpful in terms of recommendations, what can external forces do.
And then perhaps the other side of that coin, identifying those that are instigators or troublemakers that need to be dealt with if there's going to be a solution? Founder. Ambassador Saadi, you're up. Yeah, well, I just said that actually there are many hands, you know, in this in this problem of Sudan, many much is at stake. It's about democratic transition.
It's about civilian rule. It's about the role of the military in politics. It's about resources. It's about the EU's geostrategic interests. And that's why, as early rightly said, the many powers are engaged in this on one side or the other. And to answer your question, it is important that what we have been saying since the beginning, the external actors have have to align their thinking about what they want to do in Sudan.
But we know that it's, you know, this is not an easy thing to do. Bearing in mind the conflict of interest that exists around Sudan and that you are in a particular moment in history where the the issue of a middle powers has come into the picture, the the this agreement or that conflicting, you know, ideas about what to do not only with Sudan but actually the whole how coming on of Africa and Red Sea security and wider world security also has reflected in that area.
And the struggle that we have, whether it's in Ukraine, whether it's in Gaza where they sit with the host is in Yemen and all that and all of these things, you know, interacting together and giving us a very complex picture. But to answer your question, the way we see it, the on the civilian side, we have been trying to put our act together.
I think we are gradually getting some somewhere now on what we have always been saying since the beginning is that this is a political question that can only be resolved through political means and which gives us, we civilians, a role to play in this conflict. And we are calling on the regional powers and international powers and African Union eager to get the process.
The international actors who are interested in the case of Sudan, the the the neighbors of Sudan, to put their acts together in order to be able to help Sudan to move forward. We see now that things are moving more or less in the right direction. We we see the Egyptian the now all by the Cairo, you know, meeting that took place a few days ago.
The African Union getting its act together now, getting getting the Sudanese to get together also in a few days. I understand that there is going to be a meeting of mediators in Djibouti that would take place in about three or four days and the first on all media to meet together in order to see how they can work together.
All those efforts, we hope that will produce results that would help us move forward. Thanks, Ambassador Booth. Well, I agree with Ambassador Saadi. I mean, you need to have some unity of effort among the various players that have been trying to mediate this conflict. One of the worst things that can happen in any peace negotiation process is to have forum shopping.
So that's an important development that all of the mediators are supposed to be getting together to discuss the way forward. That's that's critical. As I said earlier. It's also important to understand sort of and tease out what the core interests are of the neighbors of the other key regional players that are involved. Now, there are going to be some players that may be engaged in Sudan simply to perpetuate instability and conflict that that indeed is their interests and they are the ones that would need to be isolated.
But everybody should be given a chance to put on the table what their interests are. But more most importantly is getting the Sudanese civilians who, if you don't have their backing, you're not going to have stability in Sudan. The country is going to continue to be at war. This was a point that I made when I was special envoy in 2019, trying to convince the regional states that the generals could not control Sudan.
Sudan is not Egypt. 90% of the population does not live within ten miles of the Nile River. It's a very diverse, spread out country. This is why the attempts by the Sudanese military to control rebellions in the past have failed and why I think there will be no military solution to the current conflict. So it would be great if civilians could truly articulate a vision for both a transitional period and a political end state for Sudan and a path to getting there that the international community, those who really want to see stability and peace return to Sudan, could get behind.
So those are the critical things, the external actors engaging them, bringing them together, and then making sure that Sudanese civilians are unified. Sudanese civilians, Their disunity actually undermined the transitional government between 2019 and 2021. So it's very important that they not repeat that mistake. But the final round of questions for each of you and I think, you know, I realize, Ambassador Booth, that if we continue to go in the order of introduction, you always are batting cleanup and have to hear the brilliant analysis of your colleagues before you get to go.
So we'll begin with you. This time, we'll reverse the order. And what I want to ask is both of you and a best seller, Saudi is on those list of recommendations that your group has developed. Are there any things we haven't spoken about yet that haven't emerged of organically? I didn't ask you to list them in any kind of linear fashion, and we've talked about a lot during our time, but are there any things that we haven't touched on yet that you think are critical to the discussion that you would like to bring up?
Well, there are two key issues. One, we actually had an entire session about, which is security sector reform, the current conflict, the approximate cause of kicking off the fighting last April was disagreement about security sector reform, how long it would take to integrate the SAS and and the rapid support forces. So civilian involvement in security sector reform is absolutely essential because in effect, you have to have a national security strategy.
That's what drives what your security forces are and how much of your national budget you're providing to them. The other issue, and I think this is one that needs to be considered more is the role of the military in the economy. And this is something that I think is a problem in many countries where longstanding military, strong militaries have woven themselves into the economy and have basically excluded others.
As a result, you have monopolies. And this is why this sort of this this view that the center has kind of sucked the resources of the country and left most of the periphery of Sudan as second class citizens. So that's another issue that will need to be addressed going forward. But again, the critical thing is the end state.
What is the exit strategy for the combatants? Now? You you have to give them a way out of this that they will find acceptable. And what they will find acceptable is a combination of what the Sudanese people are demanding, but also what they're hearing from their international backers. Thank you, Ambassador. Sorry. They are, of course, in addition to what Don has just said there, this issue of the role of the military and now we do not have one army, We have many armies, but the main belligerents of the aggressive and in the south, the rapid support forces and the Sudanese armed forces, while working on the security sector, reform.
There are a number of issues that we we took into consideration. The first one is the role. How can you bring those two to to accept the fact that they are not going to play a major role or a key role or a commanding role in the transition and in the future, the constitution and future of Sudan? And this is an issue that is really now being debated, you know.
The second issue is the link to that is the issue of transitional justice, of the issue of accountability, how to address accountability in a context like the Sudan is one. Many crimes have been committed not only during this war, but since independence. The crimes have been committed. So how are we willing to deal with the issue of accountability while at the same time trying to convince the belligerents to play a role, a role, a constructive role in what's going to happen in the future?
Another open question in the Sudan is a case is that of the diversity and diversity. As mentioned by Anonymous, we have a diverse country. The regional issue has been with us for a very long time a struggle, a tug of war between the various parts of Sudan. Failure to manage that diversity has brought this, brought us to this situation.
How are we going to see that diversity from a political and constitutional point of view and what kind of constitution we can work together to to create for Sudanese? So these are set of issues that we will need, you know, to to reflect on. And in order to bring those who are fighting the two belligerents to accept certain, you know, resolutions that would be taken within what we call now Sudan is Sudan is inclusive dialog that would include everybody, but while at the same time seem to it that spoilers are not part of this game.
Thank you. Ambassador, Sorry. Okay, you get the last word. And if you would, give us a sense of what's next, what's next for the working group, What's next for the Africa program's continued focus on Sudan and South Sudan? Thank you very much. And I think, you know, just to pick up on what the two coaches have have already outlined over here in terms of some of the recommendations that have come that are listed in the policy briefs, which we really encourage everyone to pick up a copy and read because there's so much more in there.
I think we're looking forward to think about a next step of conversations now coming from the recommendations, at least those that have been really highlighted, thinking about how we can move those forward with policymakers and with different actors, stakeholders within the US and internationally too, as well. There are some key recommendations along the parts of security sector reform, along the parts of really thinking about how we engage civilian voices, really thinking about the end game.
These are key points that we saw discussed throughout our working group discussions. So we'll be looking at the next phase of moving this forward and also thinking about other examples that can be learned from elsewhere on the continent too as well. When we think about Liberia, when we think about Sierra Leone and the role that African mediators played in those in those conflicts, really think about how we can bring those examples to bear.
I think as we move forward, we always hear about how come how complex the conflict is in Sudan. Things are complicated when you think about the history, but that shouldn't be an excuse. That shouldn't be an excuse for us to really prioritize what is really the world's largest internal displacement crisis. I think at this point a few months back, we hosted a conversation with the new U.S. special envoy to Sudan, Ambassador Perriello.
And I think what came out in that conversation from civil is from the civilian actors, Sudanese civilian actors that we engaged was that at the end of the day, people want the fighting to stop. People want to see peace in Sudan. While the avenues to get to it. There might be different views on how you achieve that peace, but at the end of the day, they want peace.
And I think that's in itself should be a driving force for us that the majority want to see an end to this. And the international actors, Wilson Center, others who are working on these issues, we have to start thinking about how we bring together different actors to the table to achieve that peace. We've already looked at all the recommendations that have come out from the four sets of working group discussions that we've had and moving forward.
The Africa program will continue to serve as a space of convening where we bring where we try to highlight the recommendations and bring key voices from within the administration, from the international community, and most importantly, civilian voices to as well to move some of these recommendations forward. So definitely encourage people to continue to watch our space on on with the Africa program, Sudan's working group.
We will be updated with more information as things come together. But we're really looking forward to driving these conversations forward. Well, I really want to thank all three of you. And if I'll I'll grant myself a moment to editorialize when I say that what the three of you represent in this work is the Wilson Center at its best, right?
Often people think of think tanks and they think of abstractions and theoretical discussions. But you're engaged with real people in ways that can change real lives. And it's both a daunting task, but it's inspiring to see you stay at it. So thank you for today and for your ongoing work into all the things you mentioned. If people come to the website, if you come to the Wilson Center dot org at the top of the page, you'll find a programs tab where you can find the Africa program and then all of these resources and more of the the the conversation.
The event that I mentioned with the representative of the U.S. government is on there. Also, the policy briefs from the Sudan Working Group, all available to you as a public service. So we hope you all those of you who care, we'll check it out. Thanks to all of you again today. Continued good luck in your work and thanks for joining us.
My pleasure. Thank you. To our viewers and listeners. Hope you enjoyed this edition of Wilson Center now and that you'll join us again soon. Until then, for all of us at the center, I'm John Milewski. Thank you for your time and your interest.
