THIS IS AN UNEDITED TRANSCRIPT
Hello, I'm John Milewski and this is Wilson Center NOW, a production of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. My guests today are Michael Kugelman, who is director of the Wilson Center South Asia Institute, part of the Indo-Pacific program here at the Wilson Center. And Xavier Delgado, who is a senior associate with the Wilson Center's Canada Institute.
They join us to discuss the ongoing conflict between Canada and India, a dispute that most observers describe as a low point in relations between the two nations. Gentlemen, welcome. Thanks for joining us. Good to be here with you for having us. Xavi, I want to ask you to start us off by taking us back to a year or so ago.
And when Prime Minister Trudeau first made the allegations during an address to the government in Canada. Give us the context for what we're talking about. So what we're talking about here, John, is about a year ago, Prime Minister Trudeau in September of 2023 took to the floor of the House of Commons to publicly allege that the Indian government was involved in the killing of a Canadian Sikh named Hardeep Singh in Niger, where the Indian government had alleged had been involved in criminal activities, labeled him as a terrorist.
But Canada disagreed with that assessment. He was a Canadian national and he had been killed by armed assailants in Surrey, British Columbia. So a Canadian national killed on Canadian soil that the Canadian government alleged had been orchestrated by government agents of the government of India. It's a very serious accusation. And the Indian government completely decried the allegations that they were bunk politically motivated, and refused to cooperate with any of the Canadian investigators efforts to look into the ties between New Delhi and the killing.
Fast forward to a year now. October 2024. The Canadian investigators at the RCMP are now alleging that actual diplomats based in the High Commission in Ottawa are connected not just to this killing, but to multiple homicides across Canada. Violent activities, including intimidation, harassment and extortion across an unspecified period of time. And I think it's important to say that because these are still just allegations, we can't say for certain that they're true.
The RCMP is taking an unprecedented step here to release these allegations and make accusations without having an official indictment or without bringing actual charges. They say that they're doing this not for political reasons, but because they believe there's a continued enduring threat to the public safety of Canadians. So it's a very unique situation, but it's brought this dispute back into the fold and brought Canada India relations to a new low.
Michael. Going back a year. Talk about the initial reaction from India and then as obviously fast forward to today, talk about what the arc has been since then in terms of lack of cooperation in the investigation and really their harsh and and consistent denials. Right. Well, it's exactly as you put it, John, the Indian reaction to these Canadian allegations starting with the ones that were made last year and then going up to the ones made just in recent days, angry, denial, rejection after rejection has been very consistent.
And I would argue that in more recent statements from the Indian government, the rejections have been have become very personal and that they're essentially targeting Prime Minister Trudeau himself and essentially blaming him and his government for making these incredibly damaging and false, in the view of Delhi allegations that have essentially destroyed the relationship with with India. Now, one thing to keep in mind here is that India's government, Indian governments, generally speaking, but particularly the current Indian government, are very sensitive about any type of external criticism of India's internal deliberations or actions or policies.
But in this case, what you have is a not just criticism, not just external criticism, but an extremely serious set of allegations leveled by the Canadian government at the highest levels. And we're talking about allegations that are extremely serious. Now we're talking about accusing Indian diplomats of being involved in a criminal racket that involves threatening and targeting at times Sikh separatists in in Canada.
So I think on on a number of levels, India's response is not surprising. But I think we also have to keep in mind the backdrop here. This is a relationship that has experienced significant levels of success. If you look at trade cooperation in recent years, if you look at a number of strategic convergences around the Indo-Pacific, particularly in terms of sharing a shared desire to counter China.
And, you know, there's a very large Indian diaspora in Canada. People to people ties have been very strong between the two countries. But, you know, this is this is a relationship that in recent years, particularly as India has grown increasingly concerned about what it views to be the Canadian government's unwillingness to address what India views to be a very serious threat to India on Canadian soil.
Things have gotten really bad and it's just been very difficult to expect, you know, any type of understanding from India, so to speak. And, you know, a final point I'll make is that India has been particularly unhappy about the way in which the allegations have been leveled against it, India. India's view is that, you know, if there are allegations to be made, don't put them out in the public domain.
Keep it quiet. But, you know, we've seen that these allegations had been put in the public eye quite frequently in Canada. That's a problem for New Delhi as well. About that lunch thing that you said, Michael, I want to ask Ravi about it first and then come back to you. It seems unusual that allegations would be made while an investigation is ongoing and not yet reached the point where charges are ready to be levied.
How does Canada discuss that, Xavier? How does it defend that approach? Well, the Canadian defense is that they brought these charges privately to New Delhi with the evidence that they had collected from their investigations and were completely rebuffed and turned away, that India completely rejected the evidence that Canada brought to the table, leaving the Canadians with no other option but to publicly make the allegations.
And again, these are all just claims at this point. They haven't released any evidence. While with all we can do is speculate. But I think it's worth noting that Canada is reckoning with a larger question of foreign interference. The Canadian government at a scandal some years ago where it was found to be sitting on evidence that the Chinese government had pressured and tried to harass and intimidate members of Parliament's families, especially those who had ties back to China.
And when they were found to be sitting on this information, there was a whole inquiry and plenty of questions about why they didn't act on it. The part of that could be the Canadian domestic politics of not wanting to be caught flat footed with intelligence that they had about threats to Canadians again. But I do think a significant part of it is how the Indian government may have reacted behind closed doors and the Canadian government feel like the only way that they could move forward or move towards a productive resolution to this situation would be to make the allegations public and try and exert that pressure on New Delhi.
Michael, also the Canadian position, they had no choice. I'm guessing India obviously not buying that. Right. That's because India's position is that there's no there's no evidence to back up the allegations, only raw intelligence. I mean, this is this is India's public position. India is not sympathetic to the argument also made in in Canada that for reasons of public safety and the national interest of the country, it was important to bring out these allegations in order to try to disrupt possible additional future plots that could target additional Canadian citizens.
You know, India's view is that the allegation is nothing to the allegation. So why are we even hearing this justification made related to the public public security? So, yeah, India is simply not sympathetic to any of these justifications.
I mean, I want to go back to you on the where the allegations are originated based in part on intelligence from the Five Eyes Alliance, the U.S., Canada, Britain, Austria, Australia, I should say, and New Zealand. Is this what Canada has been relying on primarily, or is it also their own investigation? Well, it's certainly their own investigation, but, John, you're right to mention and this is where the US comes into play, is that we know that the Canadian authorities are acting on information and intelligence that they've gotten from American authorities.
There was a Department of Justice indictment for an Indian national last year almost coming up on a year now, a man named Nick Hill Gupta, who was coordinating with somebody in New Delhi to assassinate a Sikh activist in New York City. And we know from the information in that indictment that they were sharing information from their own investigation with Canadian authorities about an attack that was going to be taking place in Canada, which we now know is the successful assassination of Hardeep Singh Jha.
At their press conference last week, the RCMP also reveal that they've been cooperating with the FBI in receiving information from them. So there's a really strong chance that American authorities are seeing at least the evidence and the intelligence, at least some of it, of what the Canadians are seeing when they make their assessment that New Delhi is to blame, at least partially for what's been going on with these attacks on Sikhs, not on Sikhs in Canada.
Michael. The a similar situation, minus the actual assassination take place has taken place between the United States and India. An arrest warrant has been issued, but India's reaction to the U.S. investigation has been very different than its reaction to the Canadian situation. Any insight into why that is the case? Yeah, I think there's several reasons. One is just that the nature of the US-India relationship, it's it's in a much better place than India, Canada relations.
You know, we've seen this relationship grow in a big way, I'd say exponentially for a number of decades. Whereas, you know, with Indian Canada it's been several years of significant tensions, mainly because of this issue of Khalistan, the Sikh separatism issue. I would also argue that going back to what was noted before, the way in which U.S. officials have gone about public messaging vis a vis the allegations that this has been quite different from what we've seen on the Canadian side.
You know that the Biden administration has been relatively restrained in its comments and no public messaging about the allegations. It's really let the Department of Justice do the talking through the release of, I believe, two separate indictments which have come. One just came out in recent days. The other, as noted before last year. And I think that India, as I said before, India prefers that when there's going to be serious criticism or serious allegations, that all be handled privately, not in not in public.
And then the other reason I think the Indian reaction has been so different in the U.S. case is that, you know, the indictments that had been unsealed by the by the DOJ lays out a lot of details. And what one could describe as pretty significant evidence to back up the US allegations. Whereas, you know, as we discussed, Canada's government has to this point not put any type of anything out in the public eye that could be viewed as as clear evidence to back up the allegations, Not to say the evidence couldn't have been conveyed privately, but it's not in the public eye.
So I think these are all reasons that explain why in this reaction has been so different. SBY Is there any timeline for Canada to release its evidence publicly? No, there is no timeline. All that we know is that these investigations now not only span or they'll only entail the killing of Hardeep Singh Jha, but they entail a whole network of criminal activities outside of British Columbia to encompass other regions of Canada.
So this is not just a single investigation anymore. This is now a large scale investigation that fired up six very senior Indian diplomats, including the High commissioner of India to Canada himself, who have now been expelled from the country, or rather Canada, conveyed that they planned to expel them and India recalled them. So both sides will claim victory on that.
That being said, it's there is no timeline. We have no sense of when this investigation will wrap up. We have no sense of where this investigation is now. It's not RCMP procedure usually to even make claims like this, much less release information before the investigation has been concluded. So until that day comes and we have actual proper indictments, we likely won't see the evidence that they've collected, which, as Michael notes, is frustrating for those on the outside who are hearing these claims and yet aren't actually seeing evidence to back it up.
This just this week, Prime Minister Trudeau said that and I'm quoting directly he used the term in India has made a horrific mistake if it thinks it can violate Canada's sovereignty. You know, I'm putting words in his mouth and saying that's that. There's a certain thread aspect to that. And I'm asking you perhaps maybe to speculate on what what can Canada do beyond what it's already done as far as expelling diplomats?
And what does this portend as far as potential future moves by Canada? It's a great question, John, and I think Canada's grappling with this as well. As I mentioned earlier, there's an ongoing foreign interference inquiry in which the the commission heard that not just China, but also India are the two biggest threats in that realm. So not just a major adversary to the West, but also one that has been largely embraced as the bulwark to China.
I don't think Canada has the right answer for this right now. It's a real question about how do we get foreign interference out of our politics, whether it be election interference, whether it be intimidation and harassment of specific communities. But it is an ongoing political dialog right now ahead of what's anticipated to be a very hotly contested election.
All polling right now pointing towards a possible change in government, if it's called anytime between now and October 2025. So these are all ongoing questions. I think what's important to note, though, is that across the political spectrum, whether it's a conservative member of parliament, the leader of the Green Party, someone from the Bloc that acquire the NDP or the Liberals, there's there's a consensus of concern for foreign interference.
This isn't a political issue, although some people may try to position is blaming certain parties or certain politicians for ruining the relationship. There's genuine concern across the political spectrum for foreign interference in Canada, whether it be from China or India. Michael, there have been many reports where Western officials have been quoted as saying that they are considering India's activity as transnational repression, a tactic more commonly associated with authoritarian regimes.
You mentioned earlier that they are a bit thin skinned about criticism when it comes from other nations. What does this tell us about India, its role in the world, and are they sensitive to these types of criticisms? Yeah, yeah, they're extremely sensitive. You know, if you have a fairly routine thing like the State Department releasing its annual report on religious freedom around the world, and there's some criticism about India that in of itself will trigger, quite frankly, angry statements from the Indian Foreign Ministry.
But we're talking about here is of a whole different order of of magnitude. So, yeah, and, you know, as I've said, we have to be careful here that when we talk about these allegations, you know, these are still allegations at this point. But if we want to assume that India is, you know, strongly and with credible reason suspected to be engaging in transnational repression in the West, in Canada, and through an attempt in the United States, then, you know, I think it says something very significant about the nature of of of the way India looks at its and its role in the world.
And that in that essentially entails, among other things, that it is not going to be afraid to carry out these activities on the soil of very close partners. And that certainly is the case with the United States. I mean, it's it's it's a very it's a strategic partner. It's about as close as you can get to a country without being a formal ally.
India doesn't do formal alliances. And I think this is why, you know, here in Washington, there has been a lot of concern about the, you know, the the alleged attempted assassination carried out by the Indian government, the fact that such a close partner, a partner that, you know, U.S. officials are sharing sensitive intelligence with transferring technology to could have carried out something like this.
And if we assume that India did indeed try to carry this out in the United States, I think that really suggests something about it suggests a number of things. Right. It could suggest that India doesn't doesn't care what its best friends might think. It also could suggest that India is going to do what it has to do to target threats that it really worries about.
And that's something that clearly could have domestic political benefits for for the Indian government. But, you know, on the whole, I think it reflects the fact that India is is not going to be afraid to do these types of things. So, you know, as we know, we live in a world where international relations are defined by interests and not values.
And you have a lot of democracies like India that have carried out repressive acts overseas. We know that. So and many would accuse the United States of carrying out acts like this as well, such as what happened to the Iranian leader, Suleimani, even Bin Laden. A number of critics in India have said, well, you know, you went after bin Laden.
If we go after someone like bin Laden, like Niger, what's the difference? So you see, it's a very complex issue. But, yeah, bottom line is that I think New Delhi feels that it's going to do what it needs to do to pursue its interests and to ensure that the threats that it worries about are tackled. What I want to get to your thoughts on the fallout beyond the diplomatic row.
You know, often when there are these maneuvers where a diplomat is expelled, there's a symbolic aspect to that. But then the machinery behind the scenes, whether it be trade agreements or other things, just keeps on rolling on. Is this a case in in this scenario or are we looking at a domino effect that could have serious implications on things like the economic interests of both countries?
Where do we stand in that regard?
John, I think it's somewhere in the middle. In the immediate aftermath of the accusations in September of 2023, Kennedy, India, any progress that was being made on Canada? India trade relations effectively froze. They were working towards a comprehensive economic partnership agreements. They were working towards an agreement for foreign direct investment. Both of those were tabled.
I don't anticipate there'll be a restarting any time soon. But the trade relationship didn't shrink. The trade relationship, I mean, it declined by about 1,000,000,000 CAD in 2023 from 2022 numbers, but that's just about 7%. It's not an enormous amount, and there's no evidence tying that specifically to the dispute. Both the Foreign Trade Minister in Canada and the Ministry of External Affairs in India have expressed a desire to contain any fallout to just the diplomatic relationship and not let it bleed over into trade relations.
I think that's really important. I think neither country wants to see investment or trade numbers decline, just as I don't think there's any desire to see immigration decline. One in five new Canadians coming from Indian descent, India foreign nationals make up the largest population, the largest group of Canada's foreign student population. So I think there's a desire to keep those two parts of the relationship separate from the diplomatic part of the relationship.
That being said, it's not always successful when we aspire to do something, especially when there's a war of words going on and sometimes emotions or hotheads can prevail. That being said, at least on paper and nominally, there's no desire to see this expand into other parts of the Canada. In your relationship. Thanks. I'll be Michael. Your thoughts? Yeah, I agree with Ravi and I would I would add that India is very willing to continue to carry out commercial relations with countries where there are tensions more broadly, not not now, but in the past.
India has had a pretty robust trade relationship with Pakistan. And and I think China is a very interesting example here. India and China have, you know, a very bitter competition. They fought a war. They've got a border dispute. But even over the last few years, with tensions, particularly difficult after a border clash several years ago, they've continued to trade and bilateral trade volume between India and China is actually comparable to India, U.S. trade volume over the last few years.
And what we've seen in recent months is Indian officials, including the chief economic adviser, making a pitch for efforts to no longer scrutinize Chinese investments to as much scrutiny. So that might provide a hopeful lesson for the India Canada relationship. But I would argue that given how bad things are in the relationship right now, one can't rule out things being affected in the trade side.
And I think the thing to watch here is, you know, we know that a number of senior diplomats in both sides have been sent home. If things get to a point where embassies and consulates in both countries are not operating on the levels that they would need to be, particularly with consular levels, if you have problems with getting visas issued, that's where you have to start worrying about possible impacts on people to people ties that could affect business exchanges and could affect trade as well.
Hopefully it doesn't get to that point. But, you know, I think that's sort of a worst case scenario to be looking out for a final time. Gentlemen, I'm sorry. Final thought, gentlemen, is about can someone play the role of peacemaker? Obviously, the United States has relations with both countries and a vested interest in seeing them get along. I don't know if it's just the US who you would mentioned as possible mediators, but is there a role for an external mediator to get involved and try to bring these countries back to a better place?
let's start with you and then Michael, we'll give you the final word. I think there is and I think that the United States could be a great leader just by nature of its relationship with the two countries. Canada historic ally, India, a very important strategic partner with whom it has a lot of trust. I think the more pressing question is whether this is going to be a priority for the United States that already has its hands full in Eastern Europe, with Ukraine, in the Middle East, with the ongoing situation with Israel and Gaza.
Not to mention the election coming up as really tie the hands of policymakers here in the US. I don't see it being a very high priority, but I think that the longer this goes on, the more difficult it becomes to resolve as Canada continues its investigation, possibly brings up evidence that more convincingly ties crimes committed in Canada, the high level people in New Delhi.
It's going to be harder for either country to disengage from this game of chicken. So I think there is an incentive for a mediator to step in and try and resolve this without embarrassing any country possibly behind closed doors. But the I don't see it being a high level priority for the United States anytime soon, even if it should be.
Thank you, Xavi. Michael, final thoughts? Yeah. Xavi wrote a great piece on this very issue. I think he made a great argument of how the U.S. can can play a mediating role. And, you know, on on the Wilson Center platforms. It's a great read, but, you know, I would provide, you know, offer a reminder, going back to what we said earlier, this is not a hostile relationship, Right?
I mean, these are not countries that have gone to war against each other. There is a you know, there is a precedent. There's been a fair amount of cooperation. So there's nothing to say. There's no reason why you couldn't have some type of negotiation. How do the outside of the public eye in which hopefully the two could agree to reach some sort of understanding that things don't get any worse than they already are?
Difficult to do that, given how high the tensions are. And when you don't have a a when you don't have the ambassadors in either country at the moment, that makes things even more difficult. But there is that final point I would make is if you're looking for a possible off ramp, you know, the G-20 summit in Brazil is happening in a few weeks.
If Trudeau and Modi are both there, it could be extremely awkward if they don't want to talk to each other at all. But if you look at this from a half glass full lens, maybe that could provide an opportunity for the two of them to have a very brief exchange and perhaps say a few words that essentially convey the idea of, okay, let's try to ensure that things get don't get too far out of control.
But honestly, given how bad things are now, there is an equal chance that they'll both be there and avoid each other. We'll have a couple weeks to cool off before we see if that happens. So gentlemen, thank you very much. And Michael, thanks for mentioning this obvious piece which may have influenced my question. And if anyone would like to read that, if you go to the Wilson Center website, there's a programs tab at the top of the page where you can find the Canada Institute and find that piece and many others by Xavier and his colleagues.
Gentlemen, thank you. Thank you, John. We hope you enjoyed this edition of Wilson Center now and that you'll join us again soon. Until then, for all of us at the center, I'm John Milewski. Thanks for your time and interest.
