Charting a Path Forward: Policy Response to Sudan War and Its Multifaceted Impact

By Veronica Coffey and Julia Davatzes

Described as the world’s largest humanitarian disaster and fastest growing displacement crisis today, the conflict in Sudan that began in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has forcibly displaced more than 11 million people. Despite its magnitude, it does not receive proportional attention compared to other similar crises. With the recent determination of genocide in Sudan by the US government, it is more important than ever to chart a path forward for the new administration and Congress.

On January 30, the Refugee and Forced Displacement Initiative (RAFDI), in partnership with American Friends of the Episcopal Church of the Sudans (AFRECS), hosted a public event to examine the dynamics of the Sudan war and its interrelated consequences—human displacement, hunger, and famine. The event brought together different experts to discuss the urgency of the situation, the inadequacy of current global response, and actionable recommendations on a path forward to find lasting solutions. The event was moderated by John Thon Majok, Director of RAFDI at the Wilson Center. Other speakers included Ambassador Dane Smith, AFRECS Executive Director; Nisrin Elamin, Assistant Professor of Anthropology and African Studies at the University of Toronto; Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf, Professor of Anthropology at Georgetown University in Qatar; Rebecca Glad, Visiting Researcher at Makerere University in Uganda; Alex De Waal, Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation; Guy Josif, International Human Rights Law Student at Georgetown University; and Thomas Staal, Retired USAID Professional.

“Despite a clear understanding of the Sudan situation, the US has failed, along with other partners…to make progress toward peace,” said Ambassador Dane Smith. “So today we are bringing you a presentation by experts not only to spell out the horrors of Sudan and its multifaceted impact on the region, but also to try to identify policies to push Sudan toward a just peace,” he continued.

Triggers of the War

Guy Josif, a survivor of the 2003 genocide in Darfur, remarked that the crisis today is a result of unresolved conflict and should not be a surprise. “In my view, the war and genocide that is currently happening is not a surprise to me personally because I lived through it, I escaped from it, and I am still seeing it happening,” he shared. Nisrin Elamin agrees: “The trigger for this war is often reduced to a disagreement over security sector reform but its root causes are obviously much more structural and historical. In my view this is really an internationalized counterrevolutionary war as opposed to, say, a proxy war.” While disagreement over security sector reform has often been identified as the trigger for the current crisis, such framing ignores other factors. The proxy war labeling diminishes the role of Sudanese military and business elites in repressing civilians to thwart bottom-up calls for civilian-led democracy. It also minimizes the responsibility of the elites in causing and leading the war.

However, “if we understand this war as a counterrevolutionary war and in particular if we understand the counterrevolutionary element as being co-produced by Sudanese elites and their international partners,” Elamin theorizes, “then I think we can trace its origins back to the transitional period right when the backbone and sort of grassroots constituency of the revolution…were sidelined during the formation of a transitional government.”

The military elite preserves the status quo and flexes its prestige through monopolizing the majority of economic and political engagements. In October 2021, the SAF and RSF worked together in launching a military coup driven partly by their concerns that the companies they control would fall under civilian oversight. However, miscalculated international interventions have inadvertently legitimized war criminals. The international peace talks involving the US, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and the UK embraced the coup leaders, framing them as potential reformists, rather than heeding the call of the resistance committees, and rewarding them for the agreements that they had broken over the decades. This “lack of accountability and international diplomats prioritizing…stable military rule over revolutionary demands and popular democracies in my view…paved the way for this war,” Elamin concluded.

Other triggers can be traced back to international sanctions and land privatization policies, which repressed small farmland ownership. Government-led land seizure led to the rapid commercialization and privatization of farmland, creating a market for foreign and private investors to acquire agricultural land. This state intervention declared all unregistered land to be state-owned, allowing the state to evict small landowners and to transfer the land to private commercial interests and local elites. Essentially, decades of government-forced evictions of small farmers through land privatization created a system that permitted military elites to control most land, making politically motivated famine an effortless feat and commonly utilized war strategy against civilians.

Not only is the current famine in Sudan a result of failed land reform policy, but it is also a driver of genocide. It resembles the war famines in South Sudan in the 1980s and 1990s which also came about because of insurgency and the use of proxies to obstruct relief and humanitarian access. In the past cases, allowing the UN into Sudan to offer life-saving humanitarian aid stopped the famine. However, from the perspectives of current military generals, permitting access for the international aid organizations will limit their starvation control tactics.

Alex DeWaal reiterated this theme of starvation as a tool of military elites to exercise control over civilians. He stated that people need to “look beyond the term ‘genocide’ and look at what mass starvation means.” The implication of mass starvation, DeWaal explained, “is not so much actually killing people...but dismantling society, uprooting society, displacing people, internalizing and inflicting societal trauma so that society is dismembered and reconstituted in the images of those who are the perpetrators and beneficiaries of mass starvation.” This use of starvation to restructure society in the ideal image of the state threatens the lives and survival of the Sudanese.

Consequences of the Conflict

The impacts of war on the Sudanese people have been immense. In his introductory remarks, John Thon Majok emphasized that “the conflict is reigniting ethnic bloodshed in the Darfur region, killing people everywhere, forcibly displacing over 11 million people.” People affected and displaced by the crisis need shelter, water, and food. Providing the necessary assistance requires resources and access.

Darfur and other areas of Sudan have a history of “genocide, mass displacement, and senseless violence,” explained Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf. Sexual violence is a defining characteristic of conflict. The current scale of sexual violence against women is well-documented by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Al Jazeera, and other human rights and media organizations. Over 6.7 million Sudanese people, primarily women and girls, need gender-based violence support services. The ongoing displacement increases the risks of sexual violence, sexual exploitation, and abuse. Such experiences are further exacerbated by education gaps. Nearly three in four school-aged girls are not attending school, heightening their exposure to practices such as genital mutilation and child marriage. Despite these staggering numbers, “it is not a matter of numbers. It is not a matter of statistics. These are lives that continue to be devalued,” Abusharaf reminded the audience.

Damage to higher education infrastructure in Sudan and displacement of students and teachers are other effects of the war. Many universities are physically destroyed or nearly unreachable due to transportation disruptions and levels of insecurity. “Both faculty and students are facing massive threats to their safety and wellbeing,” said Rebecca Glade, who co-authored a recent report that assessed the impact of war on Sudan’s higher education. Some professors have transitioned to remote teaching strategies, using resources like WhatsApp to hold lectures online, but such strategies are often disrupted by internet blockades and unreliable connections. Students are struggling to complete exams and progress in their academic careers. Many testing sites have been moved to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, adding another financial and logistical barrier.

Sudan War Dynamics

In January 2025, the US Department of State determined that genocide is being committed in Sudan. While this determination is a notable signal of condemnation of the conflict, Sudan does not have the capacity to effectively address this crisis alone. Efforts to support democratic transition are vital to address the crisis. However, most recent diplomatic engagement with Sudan has been solely bilateral and too limited in scope to spur change.

Historically, Sudanese have prioritized dialogue. The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, 1988 Sudanese Peace Initiative, and 2019 Khartoum Declarationall demonstrate Sudanese ability to engage in dialogue, even if such engagements only result in temporary ceasefires and peace initiatives. However, this culture of dialogue and engagement is diminishing rapidly. At the August 2024 peace talks held in Switzerland, the SAF did not send a delegation. 

Experts warn of the drawbacks of international interventions. In the past, diplomatic efforts by international actors have been deemed inadequate, legitimized military elites, and in some cases perpetuated the conflict. Elamin said that there have been too many negative forms of external meddling and intervention. “And…even some of the more positive forms of intervention, whether they are sanctions against the RSF and the army [SAF]...or even attempts to broker peace, have been largely too late or ineffective.” Some international actors play a direct role in supporting one side of the conflict. For example, Russia’s military mercenary group trains RSF and the UAE sells arms to the RSF. Egypt and Russia are engaged in gold smuggling in Sudan. 

Global and Local Response

The global response to the humanitarian crisis in Sudan has mostly overlooked the vital role of local community actors. Less restricted by bureaucracy than international organizations, the local response to the crisis has been essential in delivering humanitarian aid supplies on the ground. Elamin lauded the role of local aid networks. “One of the contradictions, at least in the international media response to this, has been an overemphasis on the humanitarian crisis the war has produced without ever mentioning the localized mutual aid networks that are leading these relief efforts,” she noted. 

Local Sudanese response networks, known as “emergency response rooms,” coordinate evacuation, provide rape crisis centers, operate mortuary services, provide educational support, and initiate urban gardening centers to fight food insecurity. These civilian actors will play an essential role in rebuilding Sudan. Thomas Staal emphasized, “Sudan has a long history of very strong civil society, especially women, and I think they can and will play a very important role.” This history of civil society action must be supported by the international community through funding, he added. 

Despite these local efforts, the magnitude of the challenges is overwhelming. There are nearly 26 million people who are still food insecure. The rise in food prices and recent political instability have increased food insecurity throughout the region. Both the RSF and SAF have routinely blocked humanitarian access, despite both signing the Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan in May 2023 to ensure the delivery of aid to civilians. These blockages primarily disrupt efforts by international actors, who require both physical access and permission by state leadership to enter the country. Additionally, relief workers face the threat of expulsion should they disobey the Sudanese state’s decisions. 

Sudanese refugees who have fled the country continue to face barriers in host countries. Refugees in Egypt, Tunisia, and Chad are at risk of deportation. In comparison to global efforts to establish expedited asylum processing for Ukrainian refugees, few expedited humanitarian pathways exist for Sudanese refugees. The US does still operate a Temporary Protected Status program for Sudanese asylum seekers, but the current ratio of displaced Sudanese to displaced Ukrainians in the US is 1:5. In Canada, the ratio is 1:100. Global efforts to welcome Sudanese refugees and asylum seekers have been inadequate.

Path Forward

International actors need to work more collaboratively with local actors to distribute supplies and find creative solutions to the issues of humanitarian corridors and access. Multilateral pressure is needed to help reengage Sudanese parties in diplomatic efforts. The African Union, European Union, and others can accelerate dialogue and help transition Sudan’s diplomatic engagements from bilateral to multilateral. The US should use its leverage to help stop the war. For example, it should pressure the UAE to halt arms sales to the RSF. 

All in all, experts offered the following recommendations for the new US administration and other stakeholders:

• Address Immediate Needs: Direct investment towards pressing humanitarian needs, including but not limited to food, water, shelter, sexual trauma recovery, education, and healthcare. Programs should support individual needs and develop critical institutions. 
• Facilitate Humanitarian Access: Lean into strategies that overcome bureaucratic impediments to ensure critical humanitarian corridors are established and maintained. This can be achieved through building stronger inter-governmental and local networks. 
• Funnel Assistance to Local Actors: Fund programming for local actors who are already supporting their communities and are responsive to local customs and needs. 
• Establish Special Sudanese Humanitarian Parole: Establish robust visa programs that are modeled after the Ukrainian humanitarian parole program. The international scale of resettlement for Sudanese refugees is inadequate, considering the scale of displacement.
• Rethink the Venue of Future Peace Talks: Consider holding future peace talks in the region. “It's important to actually hold any future peace talks in the region because the regional actors are more invested in peace given the spillover effect,” said Elamin.
• Re-engage in Effective Multilateral Diplomacy: Support multilateral efforts to promote peace agreements and facilitate humanitarian access. The US may be best suited to influence regional actors like the African Union and others, rather than Sudanese actors directly. Sudan should not be re-admitted to the African Union until stability is restored.
• Re-list Sudan as a State Sponsor of Terrorism: In 2020, the US removed Sudan from the terrorism list. However, because of the ongoing atrocities, including genocide and ISIS-style massacre of civilians in Wad Madani, Sudan should be re-listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. The “activities that are currently taking place in Sudan are completely terrorist activities and also those who are killing innocent civilians are people from ISIS and with help from the government of Sudan,” explained Josif, justifying Sudan’s re-listing.