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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL REFORM IN BAKU:
THE RESPONSE OF THE AZERBAIDZHANI BOURGEOISIE

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I. Introductory Remarks

"There used to be a proverb among the Russian businessmen: 'Whoever lives a year among the oil owners of Baku can never again be civilized.' Thus spoke the honorable merchants of St. Petersburg. They always made their wills when they had to go to Baku." ¹

This description, like many other more serious accounts, emphasized that natural resource of Baku for which the city is most widely known -- oil. It is part of the romantic image which has pervaded accounts of the city's industrial empires and revolution in both fiction and scholarship. Baku is indeed a city worthy of attention -- once the center of Zoroastrian worship, for centuries a commercial port, finally an industrial enclave of the Russian Empire. This paper deals with yet another aspect of this city's development -- its thriving commercial Muslim bourgeoisie, active in the pre-industrial period of Baku's lifetime and growing and adapting itself as the city industrialized.

Along with the industrialization of Baku came Westerners and Westernization, from which no current concept of "modernization" can be divorced.² In the blast-furnace of modernization and industrialization new conditions were forged for the city and its multi-ethnic population. The Azerbaidzhani community with its tightly organized structure, remained largely insulated from this change. But those who were most exposed to the changes and who came to have an important stake in the new order were the commercial bourgeoisie, an important component of pre-industrial Baku's society. The growth of industry and trade coupled with political reform which gave the Azerbaidzhani industrial-era bourgeoisie a role in the official administration of the city created new conditions in which branches of the economy became interdependent and in which the local commercial bourgeoisie had a voice in making decisions which would affect the city. As an outgrowth of this development,

the Azerbaidzhani entrepreneurs were forced to focus their attention on local issues, and added to their traditional religion-based identity a new dimension -- that of territorial-based economic and political interests, thus laying the groundwork for the development of a national consciousness.

Before describing the structure of the paper, a few words about its theoretical underpinnings are in order. Much work has been done in nationalism. One scholar has written:³

Nation means individuality of a people; this cannot come about without a stable geographical contiguity, a historical and cultural tradition, an economic interest. When to these preliminary conditions is added an awakened consciousness on the part of the people of one of those sociological syntheses which only great ideas, such as religion, liberty, and independence, can bring about, then there develops the collective personality which we call nation. For us, the individuality of a people means only the de facto differentiation between one ethnical group and another. On the other hand, the personality of a people indicates the active consciousness which springs out of the differentiated group, giving the latter its own cultural and political stamp. Hence the starting point in the formative process of a nation is one of the distinction between contiguous and even related ethnical groups.

The elements touched on here by Sturgo are those most generally agreed upon by students of this question⁴ -- the aspects of common territory, of shared history, culture, and economic interest. A common language is often shared by members of a nation.* Most recently, Karl W. Deutsch, in his efforts to analyze nationalism with the tool of communications theory, has emphasized that members of a nation can communicate with each other better than with members of other nations. As a basis for this communication, the nation shares common points of reference, understandings, experiences, and symbols.⁵ For the case of Azerbaidzhan, either terminology works: they shared a

* While this is often the case, in some examples -- notably Switzerland -- lack of linguistic unity appears not to be a divisive factor.

common territory, history and culture (based on Islam), and language before industrialization or even the Russian conquest. These factors facilitated intra-Azerbaijani communication.* Indeed, the Azerbaijanis had long distinguished themselves from their neighbors, but on the basis of religion -- the Muslim-Christian dichotomy, or the sectarian differences between their own Shi'ism and the Sunnism of Turkey, Central Asia, the Northern Caucasus, and scattered other groups in Transcaucasia. But this would not fit most definitions of "nationalism." Both economic unity, and an identification based on territory (as expressed in the concept homeland, patrie, vatan) were lacking. Both the economic unity and the locally-based identity grew in Azerbaijan as the 20th century approached. However, another factor, which acted as a kind of filter through which the Azerbaijani bourgeoisie viewed change, must be taken into account. This factor was Islam.

Islam sets parameters within which the faithful live their lives and conduct their affairs. Throughout the Muslim world, it is the basis of culture in conjunction with those remnants of the social order it succeeded. Thus Azerbaijan's culture in the 19th century, was a mix of pre-Islamic and Islamic elements. And just as Islam in Azerbaijan was tempered by pre-Islamic culture, so too nationalism for Azerbaijan would be tempered by Islam. Especially important in this regard is the Islamic view that all believers constitute a single community regardless of ethnicity, language, race, or other such "temporal" factors. In the development of a national consciousness, any Muslim people must reconcile the dictates of Islam to the concept of nation.

* Deutsch based his own work on that of previous writers, and distinguished his approach as one in which performance was examined rather than composition.

In our examination and discussion of these processes of development and adaptation to change, we will look first at the growth of pre-industrial Baku as a commercial port with an active local Muslim bourgeoisie that was prepared to meet with change; second, we will discuss the role of the first generation of industrial-era bourgeoisie, descended literally from the pre-industrial bourgeoisie, under the new and fluid economic conditions of the late 19th century; and third, we will examine the Urban Reforms of 1870 and 1892 and the role of the Azerbaidzhani bourgeoisie in local politics as shaped by these laws. We will see deviations from tradition and forces fostering self-identification rooted to local concerns.

II. Pre-industrial development and the commercial bourgeoisie

The first three decades of the 19th century were violent times for Baku.⁶ The Russians occupied the city and took control by agreement with the local khan in 1805-6.* However, war with the Persian Empire soon followed and was ended only with the Treaty of Gülistan in 1813. During the period of peace that followed, residents were resettled, and grain, cattle, and silk industries gradually rebuilt. In the 1820s, the Baku shipowners already owned a total of 60 ships with a combined tonnage of 120,000 poods. Another war with Persia in the 1820s served to disrupt the area again, but the peace of Tür^kmanchai in 1828 ushered in a period of peace that would continue without any major disturbance until the 20th century. During this period of peace, both economic reforms and commercial growth drew Azerbaidzhan closer to Russia.

* Russian had had control of the area under Peter I until its return to Persia under Anne, in the 1730s.

During the 1830s, the currencies of the khanates were finally replaced by the Imperial currency.⁷ Russians began to found joint-stock trading companies in the Baku area to take advantage of the growing trade of its port. Local merchants and pomestniki often became major stock-holders in these companies. In 1834, the leasing (otkup) system was applied to the oil extraction industry. In the first 16 years of this system's duration, rents were paid directly to the Treasury.

In the 1840s, a uniform system of weights and measures was adopted in Azerbaïdzhan in conformity with the system in the rest of the empire. The first steamship appeared on the Caspian in the 1840s, and a lively trade is said to have developed between Baku and the interior of Russia.* Total trade in and out of the Baku port rose steadily, with some fluctuation, during this and succeeding decades as it had in the 1830s.

In the 1850s, the Baku port facilities were renovated, possibly to accommodate the new steamers and the increased volume of traffic. In 1859 the shipping line Kavkaz i Merkurii was established in Baku and, by the end of the century would have offices throughout the world including Singapore, Genoa, New York, Liverpool, and Copenhagen. This coincided with the moving of the Baku guberniia seat to Baku. The general picture of Baku that emerges shows a city enjoying economic growth and a political up-grading over a 30-year period. Yet Baku was a city of contrasts. Despite its commercial growth, it remained a rather small city with only 1270 buildings in 1856.⁸ When Alexandre Dumas visited Baku in that year, he likened it to entering a

*Shipping figures do not support this contention which is made both by Guseinov and in the Obzor Vneshnei Torgovli (in which the shipping figures appear). Although one would not expect Russian-Baku trade to appear in a foreign trade record, the keeping of figures on this do appear consistent. See Appendix 2.

fortress of the Middle Ages with its thick walls and narrow gates.⁹

A closer examination of the trade and the merchants of this period,¹⁰ from the 1830s to the early 1860s, supports the impression of a thriving and steadily growing trade through the port of Baku, especially with the Persian ports of the Caspian. Trade records show the value of trade through the Baku customs house growing from around 300,000-500,000 rubles per year in the 1830s to around 500,000 in the 1840s and 1850s, and rising to 700,000-900,000 rubles per year after the Crimean War. Baku was mainly an importing port, showing a negative trade balance in its customs house for each year of the period. Although the major export of the Caucasus as a whole was silk, the major exports from Baku during this pre-industrial period were iron, copper, and candles, though in certain years silk or oil might take first place among exports. The imports were mainly cloth of silk or cotton and fruits and vegetables.

Figures on the number of ships in and out of Baku show a growth of trade overall, but more with Persia rather than with other Russian ports. Of all Russia's sea trade with Persia, by far the largest part is accounted for by ships between Baku and Persia with a much smaller number running between Persia and Astrakhan. While the number of ships between Baku and Russia (i.e. Astrakhan) shows an irregular pattern (See Note on Page 5), data definitely show an increase during the 1850s, while trade with Persia increased steadily from the 1830s into the 1860s. All but 3 or 4 of the ships conducting the Baku trade sailed under the Russian flag rather than the Persian flag. Hence their origin was most likely Baku.

The growth of the value of trade, the growing number of ships in and out of Baku under the Russian flag suggest the growth of a commercial bourgeoisie to handle the business of Baku. Because the Obzor Vneshnei Torgovli mentions a relatively small number of large merchants operating in Baku,* this indicates that the bulk of the trade (over half and sometimes up to 75 or 100 per cent) was in the hands of merchants doing each under 50,000 rubles worth of business per year. As trade grew and other Caspian ports in Russian Azerbaidzhan opened facilities, they were able to draw enough trade to grow while Baku's Russian trade declined only slightly and its trade with Persia increased.

It is clear from these data that the City of Baku had an active and expanding commercial life. Based on both secondary sources and the lists of merchants for all Transcaucasia and Astrakhan, it is also evident that an Azerbaidzhani commercial class was prospering in the growing trade and taking a more active role compared with its earlier "middle-man" position in Russian-Persian trade. Baku's importance as a port was responsible for the growth of a pre-industrial commercial bourgeoisie before the burgeoning of the oil industry and its supporting infrastructure. Among these merchants¹¹ were Adbulaev, Ramazanov, Useinov, Adzhi Agalusein-ogly, Baba Gadzhi, and others, including members of Baku-area families operating in nearby towns, or even farther away in Tiflis or Astrakhan. The oil industry's development accelerated the pace of change and would lead to quantitative and qualitative alterations both in the city as a whole and its economic and political life. The Azerbaidzhani bourgeoisie would grow with industry and participate in the new industrial order.

*The Obzor Vnesh. Torg. lists only those merchants controlling 50,000 rubles or more of trade per year.

III. The Azerbaïdzhani bourgeoisie in the industrial era

The dawn of the industrial era of Baku's development is marked by the beginnings of rapid growth of the oil industry in the 1870s. A combination of factors contributed to this remarkable growth -- the successful drilling of oil wells, beginning in 1871, and the gushers these produced; the end of the leasing system and the beginning of an auction in 1872 and 73; and also the growing demand for petroleum products in the Russian Empire. Later the purchased of lands and the establishment of a refinery by Robert Nobel led to many technological advances by the Nobel company such as the first pipeline connecting the oil fields to the refineries in the city, and the first modern oil tanker and railroad tank cars for the transporting of oil.

It is fair to say that from the 1870s to the 1900s, and even to the eve of the war, the growth of the oil industry was directly responsible for the development of the city and the pace of that development. Foreign investment was especially important in bringing into Baku large sums of money and in establishing links to the world banking and finance system. Oil output rose at a time of increasing demand produced by the industrialization of the empire, and many were drawn into the adventure of searching for oil. Jobs were available for local people and for anyone who was willing to make the trip to the oil city. A labor force was thus rapidly built up both of local people and transients -- a factor which would be significant in the development of the labor movement in the 20th century. The oil industry also required a transportation network for people and products. Oilmen used steam power, then electric power and the telephone. Nobel became Russia's largest manufacturer of Diesel engines. Financing was needed for the building of new industries such as machine-building which grew into Baku's second largest industry in the 20th century.

Banks opened and linked Baku to the financial networks of central Russia and Europe. More commercial agents were needed to handle trade. The population grew and with it the need for housing and industrial buildings, for greater police, fire, and sanitary services, for schools, libraries, and a wide variety of other institutions to accommodate the population of the oil center.

Azerbaijanis were involved in the oil industry, but did not comprise the main group of oilmen. From the first assignment of tax-farming for the leased oil in 1850, the Armenians dominated and developed the industry. Ter-Gukasov was the first tax-farmer for the oil lands, and was succeeded by Mirzoev, who would drill the first successful well, and become one of the major purchasers of oil-bearing lands once the leasing system was replaced by the auction. In that first auction, Armenians and Russians acquired most of the petroliferous lands -- only 5 percent of the money paid for lands had come from Azerbaijanis.¹² Nor did the situation change as time passed. A list¹³ of Baku oil-extracting companies for 1888 shows the largest companies were owned by foreigners, Russians, and Armenians. The largest Azerbaijani concern -- that of the millionaire G.Z. Tagiev -- in spite of its relatively large size, was not in the same class as the Nobels' company or Gukasov's Kaspiiskoe Tovarichestvo. However, what is more significant in terms of the growth of a modern commercial-industrial bourgeoisie is the number involved in entrepreneurial activity, not the size of the enterprises that existed. In looking at oil refining, we see¹⁴ that of 162 refineries, 73 were Azerbaijani-owned. These were mostly small and medium-sized enterprises (only 7 had 15 or more workers), but the extent of involvement by Azerbaijanis is the significant point. Many of the smaller companies, like the larger refineries, had their own railway tank cars for the transportation

of oil. The larger companies owned by Tagiev, Musa Nagiev, Asadulaev, and others, had 80, 100 or more tank cars. But there were also owners of tank cars who were not involved in oil, including Shagidanov, the largest, but including many more on a smaller scale -- Rzabekov, Aliev, Amirov, and over a dozen others.¹⁵

Azerbaidzhanis dominated shipping rather than oil or machine-building. They constituted 80 percent of all shipowners in Baku, among them many of the oilmen (Tagiev, Nagiev, Dadashev, Useinov, Manafov) but also many not involved in oil (Ashurov, Zeinalov, Buniatov).¹⁶ The volume of shipping was growing rapidly -- between 1887 and 1899, the number of ships on the Caspian increased 4.5 times and the total tonnage, 6 times.¹⁷ That the Azerbaidzhanis maintained their dominance in this expanding industry attests to their vitality. As shown in the previous section, commerce had long been the preserve of the local Muslims and, in fact, the same family names of Azerbaidchan's merchants of the 1830s and '40s reappear on lists of oilmen, shipowners, and entrepreneurs of other industries.

That the Azerbaidzhnais did not give up their previous positions in commerce and industry, but further developed them and modernized is attested by their participation in the tobacco industry (the largest company was owned by Mirzabekov)¹⁸, flour-milling and rice-processing (Agabeli Guliev, Ziurigarov, Sattar Kerimov), and even had substantial holdings in the Armenian-dominated fishing industry (Tagiev, Sultanov, Ahmed Mustafa-ogly).¹⁹

It is noteworthy that many of the same names appear not only in connection with the previous generation of Azerbaidzhani merchants but that for the industrial era, many reappear in connection with more

than one industry or branch of the city's economy. There were several major figures with large investments in a variety of industries, and Tagiev is, of course, an extreme example with interests in oil, shipping, fishing, and later textiles (his factory was the area's first), and even a theater. But other names such as Musa Nagiev, Manafov, Sultanov also appear to have had varied business concerns, and, not surprisingly, will appear again as we examine Baku politics. But, again, the breadth of Azerbaidzhani involvement is most significant, and the many smaller businessmen of Baku represent the extent of involvement by Azerbaidzhanis in the industrializing city.

Thus we can conclude that a substantial portion of the Azerbaidzhani bourgeoisie, already an important economic factor in the pre-industrial period, was able not merely to cope with the changes of rapid industrialization and maintain a hold on its role in commerce, but also to involve itself in the new industry and to play an important part in many branches of the city's economy. The vigor of this bourgeoisie is striking. A significant aspect of the industrial period is that the bourgeoisie of other groups, both local and foreign, grew and were visible and strong in the major industry of the area and controlled its largest enterprises. This state of affairs may lead to the conclusion -- if one examines only this one industry -- that the Azerbaidzhanis were declining overall in their economic power. This was not true. In spite of the size and impact of the oil industry, it was not the only industry or the only source of wealth in Baku. It acted as a catalyst and became the hub of the city's economy, but that economy had many other aspects. The linkages it fostered led to interdependence within the city -- a mark of economic maturity --

and this interdependence helped the existing industries grow and created a demand for new goods and services. Azerbaidzhanis were involved in oil production on a relatively small scale, but their participation in other parts of the economy was significant. The commercial bourgeoisie of the pre-industrial era had produced the bourgeoisie of the industrial period and this "generation of sons" successfully adapted to the new context into which they were born.

Another aspect of the Azerbaidzhani bourgeoisie was involvement in political power. In a traditional Islamic context, one would expect the commercial bourgeoisie to play an active role in the community, having many "clients" for whom they might intercede with higher authorities, to be closely associated with the upper clergy, and to provide, in time of declining central power, leadership for the city. While the bourgeoisie of Baku in the last quarter of the 19th century was not "traditional," it is unlikely that this first generation of bourgeoisie to live with industrialization would or could have cut its traditional ties with Islamic practices or with the community that embodied Islam, despite some degree of assimilation into the Western medium of the city's economy. More likely is the case of continuity from the pre-industrial era in the maintenance of linkages with family and associates of the family that characterizes many pre-industrial societies and especially urban Islamic societies of the Middle East.

Keeping in mind this traditional role of a long-established group, we turn now to examine the participation of Azerbaidzhanis in Baku politics during a period of economic change and political reform.

IV. Political Reform in Baku

During the first years of Russian rule in Azerbaidzhan, a purely military administration governed the area -- the komendant system. The system was abolished in the late 1830s and was replaced the gubeniia-uezd system that prevailed throughout the Empire. One effect of this change was the replacing of Azerbaidzhani bureaucrats that had served in the old system with Russian bureaucrats. Baku, being a small town, had no municipal administration, but was governed directly by the uezd police.²¹ Courts were established to decide cases on the basis of Imperial law, and only family matters including divorce settlements and inheritance were technically left in the hands of the clergy.²²

While this arrangement might seem like very close oversight and control, the nature of the "typical"^{22a} Muslim community would have largely insulated most Azerbaidzhanis from the Russian bureaucracy. Grievances would have been settled within the community along traditional lines, and when contact with the official authorities became necessary, those contacts would have been with representatives of the community linked to the people by a client-patron network so common among urban Muslims. Furthermore, it is unlikely the police would have readily interfered with a system that meted out justice and maintained peace among Muslims -- at least as long as only Muslims were involved.²³ In a case involving non-Muslims, it would be more likely to be dealt with by authorities and the Russian court system.

The Urban Reform of 1870, promulgated on the eve of Baku's industrialization, but not applied to Baku until 1878, represented

a sharp break with the previous pattern of administration. In its creation of city councils (gorodskaiia дума) it had enormous significance -- it relaxed control by the central government. It gave the local taxpayers a voice in the governing of their city. It gave the Azerbaidzhani as well as other businessmen the chance for political participation, although in close conjunction with the police, in the city where some made their fortunes and many had their roots. It admitted the possibility for criticism, for opposition, and for conflict in local government.

As the population of the Caucasus was considered inadequately prepared for self-government, the Urban Reform was applied only 8 years after its promulgation, and the place where it was first applied was Baku.²⁴ Elections were indirect, and ^{the law} granted suffrage only to those owning a specified amount of immoveable property or controlling a certain amount of trade, to those who paid taxes, and even to businesses that paid taxes. All electors were divided into 3 categories according to the amount of the city's revenue their taxes provided. Those who provided the first 1/3 of the city's revenue constituted the first group which elected 1/3 of the city council. Those whose taxes provided a second 1/3 of the revenue formed the second group and elected another 1/3 of the council, and so on for the third group. In this way, the top group of only a few men were represented equally with the other two, substantially larger, groups. In the first election for the council that would sit from 1878-81, the first group had 10 electors, the second 155, and the third had 3,234. These voted for a council having 24 members. In the case of the council for 1886-89, the first group grew to 13 electors, the second dropped to 80, and the third rose to 4,180.²⁵

Non-Christians were limited to no more than half the council regardless of the number of non-Christians in the population.²⁶

Despite the restrictions, this institution provided a forum and a medium of political contact for the multi-ethnic bourgeoisie of Baku.

The Urban Reform of 1892 tightened property qualifications, thereby reducing the electorate, and restricted non-Christian representation to no more than 1/3 the total council. The division of electors into groups according to tax payment was abolished, but the new system had its own interesting features: electors voted for each candidate separately, casting a vote either for or against. To be elected, a candidate had to receive a majority of votes cast, so that it was possible to elect any number of the candidates, none or all of them. In case too many people were elected, the excess would be eliminated by lot. In case too few were elected, a second election would be held in order to add to the number. If after the second election, there was still not a sufficient number to fill the seats, the remaining seats would be filled by members of the previous council.

The first election under this new law deserves closer examination both for its own results and for the participation of the Azerbaïdzhani bourgeoisie in it.

Kaspii²⁷ covered the first elections held under the 1892 reform with a list of candidates for office, advice to the electors, then election results, and a postmortem. The candidate list, as one would anticipate from the election laws, looked like a list of "Who's Who in Baku Business." Of the 167 names on the list, there were 60 Azerbaïdzhanis (27.3 percent) including Dadashev, Ashumov, Shagidanov, Musa Nagiev, Ashurov, Asadulaev, and the ubiquitous Tagiev.²⁸ When

the election took place, however, most of these men were excluded and of the 7 new Muslims elected to the council, the names Ashurov and Asadulaev were the only ones associated with major enterprises,²⁹ suggesting that council seats were not the exclusive preserve of the wealthy.

Overall, however, the outcome of the elections was almost predictably -- the first round of elections yielded only 19 new council members for 52 seats; the second round added only 2, and the remaining 31 seats -- over half the council -- were filled by members of the previous council. Of the total 52 finally chosen, 19 were Muslims -- 2 more than the allotted 1/3. These two were subsequently eliminated by lot, as prescribed in the reform.

The 1870 Urban Reform had opened the door, so to speak, to official power for the urban elites, and the door remained open. For the Muslims of Baku, however, the reform of 1892 was certainly a setback. Charges of Muslim "domination" of elections and the council must be recast in terms of the likelihood of unity among Muslims and their voting for each other in elections as well as aligning themselves for and against the same issues in the council sessions. While under the 1870 law, non-Christians were prevented from holding over half the council seats, any faction that could control half the votes in any such assembly would be quite powerful. A mere abstention, to say nothing of a "defection" from the other side, would mean victory in any vote. And it is always a simple matter to "detain" a representative or two on their way to the council meeting. While the Azerbaidzhani bourgeoisie no doubt shared many points of view with the Christian businessmen, in a dispute, the Muslims might well muster the votes for a victory.

However much power Tagiev and the other wealthy Azerbaidzhanis might have had in the 1892 elections, the outcome conformed to the

law -- 17 Muslims on a 52-man council.³⁰ While the Christian and Muslim bourgeoisie may have voted together on some issues, there is no reason to assume that the Muslims bourgeoisie had control over the Christian members of the council. The influence of Muslims was probably exerted over other Muslims assuring unity among their faction and giving them considerable power while they comprised half the council. Thus the 1892 law indeed restricted Muslim power in official politics, and reduced the number of voices who would speak for their interests. Such a change could not have gone unnoticed among the populace.

The city had already become something of a social pressure-cooker. Under the conditions of the growth^{of} urban population that went along with rapid industrialization of the period and the seemingly disproportionate advantages to Christians (from the Muslims' point of view) of both upper and lower classes,* tensions were bound to increase, city services strained to their limits, and contact with others in the population -- and in the case of Baku this usually meant others from ethno-religious groups other than one's own -- intensified; and this created a greater need for official mediation and intercession. The fact that it is in the mid-1890s that the first reports of inter-ethnic urban violence occurs suggests that tensions grew and were not resolved by existing institutions. It further supports the contention that the lower number of Muslims on the city council meant a lack of Muslim influence in local affairs and rendered more difficult control of the Muslim community at a time when it perceived itself at a severe economic and political disadvantage

*Various studies of the labor movement by Soviet and Western scholars show that managerial and skilled workers positions were held by Christians, with Muslims forming the bulk of the unskilled labor force.

compared to other groups in the city.

V. Conclusions

On the eve of the 20th century, Baku had become a major industrial center in a developing Empire. The Azerbaidzhani bourgeoisie of this city had lived nearly a generation with the process of industrializing and had grown with the city where its roots lay. It had prospered in the new economic order and involved itself in the official government. During the process of industrializing, the Azerbaidzhani bourgeoisie were subject to economic and political conditions that drew their attention toward local issues that affected their lives and homes. The economic interests of the industrial bourgeoisie was intertwined with the advance of all the industries of Baku and the total economic development of the city. Thus the Azerbaidzhani bourgeoisie had a locally-based economic interest that depended not only on their own businesses, but on the overall economic prosperity of Baku. This was reflected in Kaspil's editorial³¹ calling for electors to vote for those best qualified to run the city regardless of their "nationality." The article also emphasized the importance of business training or experience for city council membership. Then the political reforms gave them both means and opportunity to affect policy in Baku where many had both business and families.

The Azerbaidzhanis were certainly aware of their own separateness from the other people around them before industrialization. But, as we discussed in the introduction, the elements lacking in Azerbaidzhan.. were an economic unity and a consciousness of "oneness" associated with their territory. The economic development of Baku and the opportunity to participate in the local government created a local

focus for the bourgeoisie of Baku. This change in focus, this developing "localism" represented an essential first step toward the emergence of nationalism which would develop in the 20th century in a more complex environment of which social democracy, trade unionism, and revolution would be a part. Nationalism was not born for Azerbaidzhan in the 19th century, but the way was paved for a national consciousness.

NOTES

1. Essad Bey. Blood and Oil in the Orient (Translated by Elsa Tansey). New York, 1935, p. 3.
2. This opinion, which most writers on modernization would probably share, was expressed concisely by Professor Ilter Turan of Istanbul University in a recent talk on political opposition in Turkey at the University of Chicago.
3. Sturgo, Don Luigi. Nationalism and Internationalism quoted in Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (second edition). Cambridge, 1966, p. 25.
4. A good comprehensive treatment can be found in the introductory chapter of Deutsch, op. cit. and also see Hans Kohn, Nationalism ; Its Meaning and History, New York, 1955.
5. Deutsch, op. cit., p.97.
6. Guseinov, A., et.al. Istoriia Azerbaidzhana. Baku ,963, v.2, pp. 25-51.
7. Ibid, p. 50.
8. Ibid., p. 249.
9. Dumas, Alexander. Adventures in the Caucasus, New York, 1962, p.154.
10. Obzor Vneshnei Torgovli, 1831-1863.
11. Ibid.
12. Guseinov et.al., makes this calculation, op. cit., p. 255; it is confirmed by data in Gulishambarov, Obzor fabrik i zavodov bakinskoi gubernii, Moscow, 1890, p. 25.
13. Gulishambarov, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
14. Ibid., pp. 113-116.
15. Ibid., p. 99.
16. Guseinov, op. cit., pp. 257, 440.
17. Ibid., p. 234.
18. Gulishambarov, op. cit., p. 193.
19. Ibid., p. 257.
20. Hourani, A . and SM.Stern. The Islamic City. Oxford, 1970.
Both the introduction by Hourani and the first essay by Stern outline and describe the general traits of cities of the Muslim world. While the literature in this field is flawed, the Hourani and Stern book is quite carefully done, and I have draw on it as a general model, not as an absolute description of Baku.

21. Guseinov, op. cit., p. 153.
22. Ibid., p. 88.
- 22a. See note 20.
23. This analysis is confirmed in Mil'man, A. Politicheskii stroi Azerbaidzhana v xix-nachale xx vekov. Baku, 1966, p. 123.
24. Ibid., p. 208.
25. Ibid., p. 211.
26. The population composition ^{by language} according to the 1897 census is as follows:
- | | |
|------------------------|-----------------------|
| Russian and Ukrainians | 38,965 (34.7 percent) |
| Armenians | 19,099 (17.0 percent) |
| "Tatars" (locals) | 40,341 (35.9 percent) |
27. Kaspii was the Russian-language, but Azerbaidzhani-owned newspaper of Baku that was published from 1880 to the war.
28. Kaspii, No. 212 (29 September 1893) and 213 (30 September 1893).
29. Ibid., No. 215 (3 October 1893) and 217 (6 October 1893).
30. Ibid., No. 218 (7 October 1893).
31. Ibid., No. 214 (1 October 1893).

APPENDIX I

Trade through Baku Customs House, 1831-1863

<u>Year</u>	<u>Outgoing</u>	<u>Incoming</u>
1831	536,016r.	1,564,970r.
1832	1,052,259	579,477
1833	340,452	1,774,408
1834	• 117,670	731,613
1835	470,793	1,166,342
1836	675,299	1,774,713
1837	487,528	1,328,250
1838	597,320	1,468,379
1839	530,808	733,329
1840	116,446	329,173
1841	108,351	320,378
1842	104,950	399,862
1843	109,706	447,543
1844	146,722	345,200
1845	109,508	358,227
1846	123,403	398,182
1847	175,635	323,504
1848	148,999	313,938
1849	112,792	312,479
1850	191,798	280,213
1851	173,487	363,755
1852	192,586	407,310
1853	150,317	347,065
1854	199,198	411,425
1855	158,382	446,136
1856	242,616	499,890
1857	-----	----- (volume missing)
1858	385,322	601,152
1859	-----	----- " "
1860	320,166	468,672
1861	443,510	529,819
1862	261,996	669,980
1863	303,219	741,756

Source: Obzor Vnesh. Torg.

Figures for 1831-1839 are in ruble assignats.

APPENDIX 2

Baku shipping, 1831 - 1865

<u>TO BAKU</u> Year	From Russia	From Persia	Sailing Under	
	(Ballast/Cargo)	(Ballast/Cargo)	Russ. flag	Pers. flag
1831	8/14	8/85		
1832	16/79	0/62		
1833	11/101	4/63		
1834	27/111	1/24		
1835	20/92	6/74		
1836	22/102	4/89		
1837	18/74	2/86		
1838	8/101	1/71		
1839	8/110	1/55		
1840	0/0	2/68		
1841	0/0	1/75		
1842	0/0	0/99		
1843	0/0	0/83		
1844	0/0	0/61		
1845	0/4	-/73*	0/56	-/21
1846	0/0	2/73	2/60	-/13
1847	0/0	-/67	0/54	-/13
1848	0/25	0/85	0/62	-/24
1849	0/18	0/84	0/85	0/17
1850	39/7	2/105	39/90	2/22
1851	44/0	0/125	43/101	1/24
1852	0/78	0/152	0/215	-/15
1853	20/0	-/108	20/90	-/18
1854	0/0	-/132	0/115	-/17
1855	-/60	5/168	5/220	-/8
1856	0/157	0/166	0/307	0/16
1857	-----	-----	-----	-----
1858	0/1	7/160	7/153	0/8
1859	-----	-----	-----	-----
1860	7/82	8/216	15/288	0/10
1861	8/57	3/246	11/301	0/2
1862	0/95	2/239	2/239	0/5
1863	4/105	0/242	4/341	0/6
1864	0/104	1/200	0/297	1/7
1865	3/143	1/146	4/288	0/1

Source: Obzor Vneshnei Torgovli

* a slash (-) means no data given, and probably indicates no ships in the indicated category

APPENDIX 2 (continued)

FROM BAKU Yr.	To Russia		To Persia	
	(Ballast/Cargo)		(Ballast/Cargo)	
1831	7/27		5/90	
1832	9/85		1/62	
1833	14/89		1/64	
1834	40/100		-/38	
1835	7/99		3/75	
1836	58/58		-/92	
1837	20/56		-/109	
1838	8/54		0/118	
1839	14/61		8/94	
1840	0/0		3/93	
1841	0/0		3/111	
1842	0/0		4/94	
1843	0/0		8/86	
1844	0/0		3/74	
			Sailing Under	
			Russ. flag	Per. flag
			(Origin not indicated)	
1845	0/1	2/88	1/69	1/20
1846	6/3	12/78	12/74	6/7
1847	0/0	6/93	6/83	-/10
1848	3/27	13/70	15/74	1/23
1849	4/22	8/65	11/72	1/15
1850	5/59	16/113	18/151	3/21
1851	11/103	12/104	21/182	2/25
1852	7/85	3/130	9/201	1/14
1853	10/93	9/133	19/251	22/19
1854	0/0	3/166	2/156	1/10
1855	18/79	3/111	49/184	2/6
1856	14/67	38/164	51/216	1/15
1857	-----	-----	-----	-----
1858	15/66	58/141	71/202	2/5
1859	-----	-----	-----	-----
1860	16/106	54/181	69/278	1/9
1861	28/100	58/133	86/230	0/3
1862	50/83	66/140	114/221	2/2
1863	26/83	86/161	110/239	2/5
1864	18/98	39/107	51/263	3/5
1865	17/71	37/191	54/261	0/1

Source: Obzor Vneshnei Torgovli