Hamas faces an uncertain future post-ceasefire, grappling with leadership losses, declining foreign support, and strained relations with Palestinian factions. Amid pragmatic concessions and resistance rhetoric, its role in Gaza’s governance and broader Palestinian politics hangs in the balance.
Reaching a ceasefire and a potential end to the fifteen-month Gaza war, a weary and more pragmatic Hamas is facing an increasingly uncertain future.
Isolated, besieged, without foreign backers, and its core leadership assassinated by Israel, Hamas’ show of strength with military rallies and policing the streets in the first days of the January 2025 ceasefire-hostages release agreement did little to mask the doubt surrounding the militant Islamist movement’s near- and long-term future in Gaza and beyond.
With Iran’s axis on the decline and Arab states unwilling to host or engage the movement, Hamas finds itself geopolitically adrift as its popularity remains high in the West Bank and dips in Gaza.
January’s ceasefire agreement culminated in an increasingly pressured and pragmatic Hamas attempting to stake out its post-war future. In talks in Cairo and Doha from November 2024-January 2025, the post-Yahya Sinwar Hamas has shown willingness to work with its rival Fatah, cede control of Gaza, and make concessions to Israel in hostage-ceasefire talks.
Yet the question of disarming and its refusal to abandon armed resistance—along with its toxic international reputation after the October 7 attacks—has left the movement with few allies abroad or Palestinian factions willing to engage it in post-war Gaza governance and reconstruction.
The decisions Hamas makes next during the six-week ceasefire may determine whether it can transition into a Palestinian political movement taking part in a wider political process or will be reduced to an armed insurgency group in Gaza.
The ceasefire came one month after concessions Hamas made in December, when it agreed to an Egyptian proposal for a committee of independent community leaders to govern the post-war Gaza Strip, with the coordination of the Palestinian Authority and rival Fatah.
Pivotal to agreeing to a ceasefire, a key turning point for Hamas came on October 16, 2024 after Israel’s killing of its political and military leader Yahya Sinwar, architect of the deadly October 7 attacks.
Mr. Sinwar’s hardline positions, along with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s refusal to agree to anything more than a temporary ceasefire, reportedly prevented breakthroughs in multiple rounds of ceasefire-hostage release talks throughout 2024. Palestinian sources say Sinwar’s refusal to grant concessions also hindered separate Egypt-brokered talks on post-war Gaza governance with the Palestinian Authority and rival Fatah.
Mr. Sinwar’s killing in October shifted the power base in Hamas’ decision-making from inside Gaza to its more pragmatic politburo abroad; this shift coincided with multiple concessions made by the movement. Although Hamas has not named new leaders of the movement’s political and military branches to protect the individuals from assassination, it is widely believed that the movement’s arm abroad is making key decisions.
In December ceasefire talks, reportedly for the first time, Hamas expressed willingness to accept Israeli military presence in Gaza in the first round of a ceasefire-hostage exchange and Israeli control of key corridors trisecting the Strip until the final day of the first phase. Even without guarantees the ceasefire will enter the second phase and lead to a full Israeli withdrawal and cessation of hostilities, Hamas agreed to the deal.
The ceasefire came one month after concessions Hamas made in December, when it agreed to an Egyptian proposal for a committee of independent community leaders to govern the post-war Gaza Strip, with the coordination of the Palestinian Authority and rival Fatah.
After months of refusal, the movement agreed to the proposed governing committee falling under the Authority’s auspices—effectively allowing the Fatah-dominated Authority’s return to the Strip—a previous red-line for Hamas. By February 3, talks over the ceasefire’s second stage and post-war Gaza governance are due to begin—and the Egypt proposal remains Hamas’ preferred scenario.
Yet there are signs that Hamas’ pragmatism and concessions have come too little, too late. The Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), the umbrella organization comprising all Palestinian factions sans Hamas and Islamic Jihad, have both rejected the Egyptian proposal for a governing committee. Instead, the Authority announced on January 17 that it was prepared to “take full responsibility for the Gaza Strip” alone. Arab states have begun to urge the US to press Israel to allow the Authority to govern Gaza.
In the early days of the Israel-Hamas war in 2023, the PLO offered an exit ramp for Hamas: disarm, officially accept the two-state solution on 1967 borders, agree to its signed treaties with the international community and Israel and join the Organisation. A PLO-led political reconciliation was reoffered in Beijing in July 2024. The PLO is now firmly against any association with Hamas.
With the prospect of an open-ended Israeli military occupation and growing frustration among Gazans with the destruction wrought by the war, there is a sentiment among Fatah and the Authority in the West Bank that they are now in a stronger position. There is awareness among the PLO and the Palestinian Authority that any cooperation with Hamas will hurt their standings with the international community and the US, particularly with the incoming Trump Administration. With talks on phase two of the ceasefire and Gaza’s post-war future to begin by early February, Hamas has been sidelined in post-war governance and reconstruction plans.
Another topic of contention as the ceasefire moves towards its second phase is the question of Hamas’ arms.
Hamas has stated it does not wish to wage a guerilla insurgent war in Gaza against whatever post-war governing entity comes in—but will do so if the entity is not Palestinian, comes “on the back of an Israeli tank,” or is seen as being controlled or influenced by Israel.
In April 2024, Khalil Al-Hayya, the hardliner Sinwar deputy, said in an interview Hamas would disarm, lay down its weapons and agree to a truce if a Palestinian state was founded on 1967 borders.
In a July 2024 interview, Basem Naim, a member of Hamas’ politburo abroad, said Hamas would not lay down its arms as there were no guarantees Israel would not attack it and the Strip again. Yet Naim had also expressed Hamas’ willingness to reconsider its commitment to armed resistance against Israel as part of a national Palestinian consensus or vote on the best path forward—and agree by large majority that non-armed resistance should be the future of the Palestinian struggle.
There are strategic reasons for Hamas’ unwillingness to disarm; its Al-Qassem Brigades have proved to be its largest leverage over Israel and rival Palestinian factions.
Despite various Israeli estimates of degraded battalions, Hamas retains fighting forces in North, Central and Southern Gaza. In early January 2025, Hamas resumed launching rockets into Israel and a resurgence of its units in the north intensified attacks on Israeli forces in the days leading up to the ceasefire, despite a two-month-long devastating Israeli military operations designed to clear the north—sparking concerns in Israel that it may face an endless “war of attrition.” In January, Secretary of State Antony Blinken shared US estimates that Hamas recruited “almost as many new militants as it lost,” replenishing its decimated ranks.
Hamas officials still consider the independent governing committee proposed by Egypt as its preferred option for post-war Gaza. It envisions a two-to-three-year reconstruction period, followed by elections for a new national Palestinian government governing the West Bank and Gaza.
In this scenario, Hamas would facilitate the independent committee’s work but not take part in governing or decision-making—allowing the movement to rebuild and, potentially, rebrand.
Post-war, the movement will likely attempt to convert the political capital it believes it had earned among Palestinians by withstanding the Gaza war and its commitment to armed resistance. By playing up its resistance credentials, contrasting its militantism with the Palestinian Authority’s insistence on negotiations with Israel and inability to protect Palestinians from deadly settler attacks, Hamas may attempt to launch itself from a Gaza-based movement to a position of power in the West Bank.
With an impasse over Gaza's governance and a lack of allies abroad, Hamas may remain a leading but weakened armed actor in Gaza.
Hamas’ future will also be shaped by the loss of the lynchpin of Sinwar’s strategy: support from Iran and its axis. Sinwar was one of the Hamas leaders who pushed for stronger ties with Iran, focusing on their shared enemy of Israel to heal a Hamas-Tehran rift over Bashar Al Assad in Syria.
With Iran’s axis of resistance disintegrating, Hezbollah degraded, and the weapons-smuggling link of Syria gone with the collapse of the Assad regime, relying on a weakened and inward-looking Iran is a less strategically viable option for the movement now than on October 6. Sinwar, the lead facilitator of Hamas’ tilt towards Tehran, is no longer alive.
Yet no other state or external power has stepped forward to extend its hand to Hamas.
Among Arab countries, only Egypt and Qatar have diplomatically engaged with the organization to end the conflict. No country has been willing to host its leadership outside of Qatar’s tenuous interim hosting of select Hamas leaders as part of an arrangement with the US, which reportedly ended in November. Doha has stated it will no longer host Hamas’ political office. No Arab country has made a gesture or statement to bring Hamas into the Arab fold.
Turkey, a NATO ally, has denied interest in hosting the movement, amid warnings from the US. Rather than inviting conflict with Israel, Ankara has been preoccupied with projecting its power into Syria.
With an impasse over Gaza's governance and a lack of allies abroad, Hamas may remain a leading but weakened armed actor in Gaza. Despite Hamas’ attempts to extend its influence beyond Gaza with its October 7 attacks, it is in the Strip where its future will likely be decided.
The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and do not reflect an official position of the Wilson Center.
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