The Middle East and North Africa faced “an unprecedented level of crises, with millions caught in the grip of relentless conflict, political turmoil, staggering refugee crises and a deepening economic downturn.”

The longstanding balance of power in the Middle East shifted in 2025. Long-dominant parties and militias have been marginalized. Alliances have evolved; so, too, has the political spectrum. Among parties and militias, Sunni groups and leaders have witnessed a resurgence. Shia factions, especially the “Axis of Resistance” tied to Iran, have lost influence and momentum. Islamist parties made gains in Jordan (in elections) and Syria (through a military coup). Militant movements have also inspired a new underground generation of “teenage terrorists,” according to the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point.

Violence in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, and Yemen has spawned greater instability—diverting governments from development and charting a sustainable future, according to the World Bank. Regionally, prospects for a sustainable peace deal between Israel and all 23-members of the Arab League diminished, at least short-term. Tensions among pivotal players, notably Israel and Iran, have deepened the potential for a wider war.

Amid political and military changes, several countries have faced debilitating economic challenges. Development—and any sense of a viable or stable future—stagnated. The Middle East and North Africa faced “an unprecedented level of crises, with millions caught in the grip of relentless conflict, political turmoil, staggering refugee crises and a deepening economic downturn,” the World Food Program reported in November 2024.

Internal political shifts

Major political parties that had won elections over the previous decade have lost popular support or been sidelined. In Turkey, the Justice and Development Party of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan lost several local elections—for mayors and city councils—to the opposition Republican People’s Party in March 2024. “We lost momentum throughout the country,” Erdoğan acknowledged afterward. The vote was telling because the opposition won the largest number of votes nationally for the first time—and less than a year after Erdoğan’s victory in a presidential contest left the opposition scrambling politically. In March 2025, the Turkish government detained Imamoglu just two days before he was expected to be nominated to run against Erdogan. Imamoglu faced multiple charges ranging from corruption to alleged links to a terrorist group. The CHP called it “a coup against our next president.”

In a major upset, Iranian hardline candidates lost the presidency to reformer Masoud Pezeshkian in June 2024 elections, amid signs of growing disillusionment with theocratic rule. An internal poll carried out by a government agency in 2023 showed that more than 90% of Iran’s 90 million people were dissatisfied with the government. Some said the regime was “beyond repair.” The regime’s escalating domestic vulnerabilities grew as it “doubled down on a risky regional and global strategy that has produced more economic hardship and isolation,” the Middle East Institute warned in January 2025.

In Tunisia, the government of President Kais Saied escalated the crackdown on Ennahdha, with new arrests of the opposition party’s senior officials. In early 2025, Tunisia extended the sentence of Ennahdha leader Rachid Ghannouchi—a former member of parliament and Saied’s main political rival—by 22 years. “Tunisian authorities intensified repression of political opposition and other critical voices by carrying out mass arrests, imprisoning journalists, and targeting civil society groups,” Human Rights Watch reported in January 2025.

Other leaders in the region were ousted. In Syria, the Assad dynasty—which had ruled for more than seven decades—was toppled in a lightning offensive by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, took over the presidency in December 2024. HTS, a Sunni movement, quickly exerted its newfound control across the country. It sought vengeance against minority Alawites, an offshoot of Shia Islam, who formed the base of Assad’s Baath Party. The fall of Assad’s government “created a momentous opportunity for Syria to break with decades of repression and turn the page on human rights,” Human Rights Watch said in December 2024. Yet, Assad loyalists fought on in the northwest. They triggered clashes with HTS forces. In March 2025, hundreds were killed in what increasingly played into sectarian rivalries between Alawites in the old government and Sunnis in the new government.

 Sectarian Shifts

All the Shia groups survived politically but appeared unlikely to regroup, rearm, or win back control of territory militarily anytime soon.

Across the region, Sunnis gained more political prominence and leverage. Saudi Arabia gained greater influence in both regional and international affairs. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the de facto head of state, hosted the first US-Russia talks on ending the war in Ukraine. He also offered to host new diplomacy between the United States and Iran on terms to ensure that Tehran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. “To buttress his newfound authority, the crown prince oversaw the worst period for human rights in the country’s history, embarking on a vast and violent crackdown on civil society, dissidents abroad, religious conservatives, regime rivals, and prominent businessmen,” Human Rights Watch reported in January 2025. The crown prince “now enjoys uncontested authority over the most vital political, security, and economic state organs.”

As Sunnis gained leverage, Shia militias—including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq—suffered unprecedented losses after repeated airstrikes by Israel and the United States. All the Shia groups survived politically but appeared unlikely to regroup, rearm, or win back control of territory militarily anytime soon.

“Despite decades of investment and rhetorical commitment to the ‘axis of resistance, Iran has begun to distance itself from its proxy groups,” the Arab Gulf States Institute reported in January 2025. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei countered that Tehran did not have nor need a proxy force to operate beyond its borders.

Conflicts

Ending regional conflicts grew more complicated, amid “a wider trend of increasing violence in the Middle East.”

Ending regional conflicts grew more complicated, amid “a wider trend of increasing violence in the Middle East,” the World Bank warned in late 2024. “There has been more than a twofold increase in conflict episodes and a sixfold increase in MENA’s share of global fatalities since the 1990s.”

Diplomacy to end the Gaza war, free Israeli hostages, and provide more humanitarian aid to Palestinians repeatedly stalled. The first of three phases, a US-backed deal faced setbacks as both Israel and Hamas accused the other of violations. In February 2025, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed that Israel would “open the gates of hell” if the Palestinian extremist movement did not return the remaining hostages.

Hostilities between Israel and Iran also intensified. Both countries threatened to destroy the other after months of direct attacks. In October 2024, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei vowed that attacks by Tehran and its allies “will grow stronger and more painful against the worn and decaying body of the Zionist regime.” Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu countered that Israel had dealt a “mighty blow” to Iran’s “terror axis,” notably Hezbollah and Hamas. In collaboration with the United States, Israel “can and will finish the job,” he said.

Missile and drone attacks by Houthi rebels in Yemen disrupted international shipping in the strategic Red Sea. Traffic through the Suez Canal dropped by 42% in 2024. Roughly a third of the world’s container ships had transited the Suez in 2021. A UN resolution in 2024 warned that the increasing costs to transport essential goods “will have a negative impact on the economic and humanitarian situation worldwide.” 

Internal conflicts also divided the region. In Libya, the longstanding conflict between rival regimes—over political power and oil revenues—appeared even more entrenched. The divisions reflected disparate interests within the Arab world. The Government of National Unity led by Abdul Hamid Debibeh ruled in western Tripoli; it has been backed by Turkey and Qatar as well as the UN. The Government of National Stability, led by General Khalifa Haftar, has ruled in eastern Benghazi; it has been backed by Egypt and the UAE.

“The dream of a civil, democratic and prosperous Libya remains unfulfilled 14 years after the revolution that led to the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime,” Rosemary DiCarlo, the head of UN Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, reported to the Security Council in February 2025. “The country’s leaders and security actors are failing to put the national interest ahead of their competition for political and personal gain.”

The views represented in this piece are those of the author and do not express the official position of the Wilson Center.