Joe Biden’s first presidential visit to the Middle East is shaping up as a potential game-changer in American actions and attitudes towards the region.  Just a few months ago, the cover of Foreign Affairs proclaimed, “The Middle East Moves On: In Search of a Post-American Order.” Well, a fair interpretation of the run-up to the July visit is that much of the Middle East would actually prefer to stick with Washington. And the administration, at first hesitant about engagement there beyond returning to the JCPOA nuclear agreement with Iran, clearly is listening.

The president’s ambitious program between Israel, the West Bank and Saudi Arabia will culminate in a meeting between him and leaders of nine Arab states, four of which (UAE, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt) already have relations with Israel. He will also meet with Iraq, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, and hold an innovative virtual summit with US, Israeli, Indian and UAE leaders, which underscores the administration’s “by-with-and-through” security relationships with key regional players, while ensuring that Israel is included in them. 

Meanwhile, the likely final collapse of the JCPOA talks motivates everyone to seek a more tightly woven regional security architecture.

This apparently significant shift in the administration’s thinking has been prompted by the Ukraine conflict, which underlined both the indivisibility of global security and the threats to it. The US has specific need for regional states’ support in that conflict, be it in the form of oil exports or UN votes, and those same states demand that Washington in turn take their security needs seriously. Meanwhile, the likely final collapse of the JCPOA talks motivates everyone to seek a more tightly woven regional security architecture. In the end, however, while the visit will advance the message of cooperation, a revitalized collective security arrangement between Washington and the region will hinge on the following key issues.

Israel

The trip builds on the 2020 Abraham Accords, which the Biden administration recently has begun touting enthusiastically. Further integration of Israel into the region, with its extraordinary military, diplomatic, intelligence, technological and energy resources, strengthens overall collective security.  It could also temper traditional Arab caution concerning Israel stemming from its policies on the Palestinian issue: first, by focusing on even more pressing security threats, which Israel is well-placed to counter; and second, by opening the door to further collaboration on Palestinian issues, as seen by the UAE’s successful advocacy against Israeli territorial annexation.

Simply the optics of the visit, with Biden traveling directly from Israel to Saudi Arabia, underscores the progress made with the Abraham Accords in addition to the early 2022 follow-up meetings in Israel, first of regional foreign ministers (including Tony Blinken), and then of military commanders to discuss missile defense not only from those states recognizing Israel, but Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

King Salman has made it clear he wants more progress on the Palestinian question, given his kingdom’s role in the Arab and Muslim world.

That said, a real breakthrough, such as Saudi recognition of Israel, is unlikely during the trip. King Salman has made it clear he wants more progress on the Palestinian question, given his kingdom’s role in the Arab and Muslim world. The Saudi position thus remains explicitly: ‘we won’t be the last to move on Israel,’ but, implicitly, ‘not just yet.’ The visit could see a breakthrough in the four-way discussions on two Red Sea islands being transferred from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, but requiring coordination with Israel and the US to ensure Israel freedom of navigation. Various other steps discussed below should further the already well-advanced overt regional military cooperation and more covert intelligence sharing.

United States 

The biggest question related to the visit remains: Is the Biden administration truly committed to lead regional collective security against myriad threats, from Iran and its numerous surrogates to Russia, Syria, and terrorist groups? The administration’s regional force presence and military-to-military relationships remain robust. However those are not enough, as national will is required in order to do more than pledge vague commitments to stability and react rhetorically to challenges. Given that strong military foundation, this is more a question of political signaling, using military, sanctions, counter-terrorism and diplomatic tools, than major resource-intense actions. But after years of Washington calling for a ‘pivot to Asia’ and the chaotic Afghan withdrawal, the US must more convincingly, and  predictably,  contest Iran’s seemingly inexorable march through the region, which is the most pressing concern for its partners.

Iran

The administration argues that it is pushing back against Teheran’s actions in the region, citing those strong defense ties, particularly a maturing regional defense against Iranian missiles and drones, and its role in the current Yemen ceasefire.  These are significant, but do not yet amount to effectively contesting Iran. The reality is that Iran and its surrogates have rained missiles and drones on Israeli, Emirati, Iraqi, and Saudi targets, and according to NBC News, launched twenty-nine attacks on US facilities since October. Apart from the so-far limited damage those attacks do, the seeming immunity of not just Iran but its surrogates to any response is widely seen as American weakness. Passive American presence certainly is better than retreat but will not deter new provocations, reassure partners, or minimize chances of escalation.

The Yemen ceasefire is a plus, but it was brought about largely by concessions from Saudi Arabia, and not so far from Iran or its Houthi allies. It was also enabled by unexpected success of the Yemeni government, Saudi Arabia and the UAE in holding the strategic city of Marib and intercepting Houthi missile strikes.

Washington has done little to push back against Iranian diplomatic, economic, political and military steps to weaken American partners in both countries and pressure the US directly.

The administration, beyond providing humanitarian assistance, has seemingly yielded Lebanon to Hezbollah and thus to Iranian control. On the other hand, it is maintaining its overall presence in Syria and Iraq, ostensibly against the Islamic State but secondarily denying terrain to Iran and its allies. Yet Washington has done little to push back against Iranian diplomatic, economic, political and military steps to weaken American partners in both countries and pressure the US directly. The Iran-inspired dangers to Washington’s (and Turkey’s) key Iraqi ally, the Kurdistan Regional government, from military strikes and support to the PKK to legal assaults on the Kurds’ vital oil production, are particularly acute. 

Any more aggressive shifts against Iran by Washington and its partners likely would not be formalized in trip documents or proclamations. Some of Washington’s partners at the Jeddah summit, including Qatar and particularly Iraq, will not formally collude against their dangerous neighbor. But general steps including missile defense and sea lane protection, including at least informal Israeli participation, are possible and welcome; still, it’s the President’s body language and commitments behind the scenes that will shape the region’s assessment of his vigor to contain Iran.

JCPOA

The fate of the nuclear agreement with Iran will be an important sub-theme in the Iranian discussions. If a return is imminent, the region will simultaneously breathe a sigh of relief and tremble with concern. Holding a possible nuclear, or nuclear-threshold Iran back by a few years is well worth the effort, but regional leaders, especially many in Israel, will fear that it will use the oil export earnings which the JCPOA permits to advance its regional aggression; more generally, they will worry that acceding to the accords will have the White House see itself as ‘off the hook’ with Iran, despite its rhetoric. If, on the other hand, the JCPOA appears definitively dead, regional leaders will demand how Washington will deter Iran from a nuclear weapon and bluntly ask if the US will destroy any verified weapon.

Diplomatic and Economic Issues

Much media focus here has been given to the President allegedly yielding to the Saudis by urging more oil sales and granting Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ‘persona grata’ status. These issues however are overblown. The Saudis have already made some concessions on oil increases, but their oil business model will limit new ones.  Further, the administration has already signaled clearly that it appreciates the Crown Prince’s work on Yemen and other issues and will do business with him at all levels. Of more import if less drama will be the advancement of the Abraham Accords spirit through  economic, technical and cultural integration in the region, building on recent trade and investment initiatives involving energy, IT, and tourism between Israel, Morocco and the UAE.    In particular, progress on the UAE-Jordan-Israel water/electricity deal, and at least acknowledgement of the plight of the Palestinians, would increase the Accords’ appeal among regional populations.

The views expressed in these articles are those of the author and do not reflect an official position of the Wilson Center.