Q&A with Maria Herminia Tavares de Almeida | Polarization in Brazilian Foreign Relations

1. Brazil’s Itamaraty has historically been seen as the core of the stewardship of the country’s foreign policy. Do you think this dynamic has changed in recent years? If yes, to which factors do you attribute this change?

It is true that Itamaraty has been playing this role for a long, long time. Its prominence is due to three different factors. The first is the knowledge and expertise accumulated by a professional bureaucracy with high levels of “esprit de corps”. 

The second is its bureaucratic insulation from domestic politics, which was possible in the past due to Itamaraty’s strong institutional culture and the Brazilian elite’s low levels of interest in foreign issues. Since the demise of the authoritarian regime in the late 1980s, the bureaucratic insulation has been shrinking. Interest groups, politicians, and organized civil society have shown increasing interest in foreign policy and tried to influence governmental decisions. The Ministry of Foreign Relations was - and is, today – obliged to acknowledge them and consider their views. 

The third factor is the importance attributed by presidents to foreign policy.  When presidents were willing to have active presidential diplomacy, Itamaraty’s autonomy to define the country’s stand on international issues diminished. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Lula have been deeply involved in foreign policy, both enjoyed international politics, and have dedicated a lot of their time to presidential diplomacy.

Therefore, there are structural and contingent conditions that influence Itamaraty’s stewardship of Brazil’s foreign policy. But undoubtedly, it continues to play a central role in defining our international strategy and in making things happen.

2. What are the main differences between Lula 1, 2, and 3 regarding foreign policy strategy? In the current administration, Lula has been criticized for focusing on foreign policy at the expense of domestic issues, especially his relationship with the National Congress. How do you view those criticisms?

There has not been a radical change of strategy, which, on the other hand, was not so different from the previous government. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Lafer has said that, for a long time, Brazil’s foreign policy has been - and should be - a tool to benefit the country’s growth and socioeconomic development. Peaceful relations with neighbors, multilateralism, and active participation in multilateral international regimes are values embedded in the country’s diplomatic tradition. A positive relationship with the U.S., respectful but not unconditionally aligned to the American international goals, is also part of that strategy. 

During Lula’s first and second terms, there were three international fronts based on the idea of coalition building to soft balance what was seen as US predominance. The first was creating some kind of South American forum to negotiate the regional problems and find solutions. The other was coalition building with other emerging countries embodied in the BRICS initiative. The third has been coalition building inside UN-Bretton Woods institutions with the same purpose of enlarging the space for emerging countries.

The conditions under which that strategy seemed plausible have changed dramatically. Political instability and an increase in political polarization in South America undermined the possibility of institutionalizing regional tools for political coordination among neighboring countries. The rise of China has completely changed the nature of the BRICS coalition that increasingly looks like a tool of that country economic and political goals. Finally, the crises of the UN and Bretton Woods institutions have reduced the space for the coalition-building strategy to reform them.

Lula 3 began with the idea of reenacting the previous strategy and is very slowly acknowledging that it is no longer feasible under the present international circumstances. This explains a lot of President Lula’s erratic speeches about major international crises and the impression that the country lacks a coherent and feasible strategy.

Anyway, at present, it seems that Brazil is trying to gain space and legitimacy at the G20, the sole forum that allows for a conversation between rich capitalist countries and emerging ones. It is also trying to use the stakes it has on climate issues to redefine its international protagonism.

Criticism of a supposed excessive focus on foreign policy should not be taken too seriously. It is part of the domestic petty political debate, idle talk. Presidential diplomacy is well-rated in Brazil.

3. How does the polarized political landscape in Brazil and the US affect their bilateral relations?

I think the Lula administration is trying to depolarize the domestic political landscape. It is difficult to say what will happen in the US. Anyway, fortunately, bilateral relations are not exclusively between governments. There are strong and enduring ties between the two countries at different levels. Trade, investments, scientific and cultural cooperation, tourism, and very sensible and experienced officials on both sides will do their best to keep things going despite the electoral results.

4. Has polarization (or calcification as some authors say) of our societies reached our foreign policies?

In Brazil, there is no evidence of political calcification. Here, polarization seems to involve a minority of radicalized activists from the extreme right and a tiny group on the left, both overrepresented in social media. The federal government does not encourage polarization. Polls show that public opinion is not polarized and that there are points of convergence among those who voted for Bolsonaro and Lula in 2022. There is a conservative majority, but not a polarized public.

Under Bolsonaro, there has been an essay on radical change in foreign policy with then Foreign Minister Ernesto Araujo. It lasted around two years and was defeated by Itamaraty’s deep state and by the actual interests of important economic groups. After that, the country came back to foreign policy as usual, at a lower key level, lacking a great strategy or active presidential diplomacy, since the president did not have the interest or the skills for presidential diplomacy.