Rising Tensions in the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia, Somaliland, and the Potential for Further Regional Instability

T

he budding partnership between Ethiopia and Somaliland risks destabilizing the Horn of Africa. On January 2, 2024, President of Somaliland Muse Bihi Abdi and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in Addis Ababa. This agreement grants Ethiopia access to Somaliland’s coast for a naval base, a move that the Federal Government of Somalia, the internationally recognized government of Somaliland, fiercely opposes. The deal risks exacerbating tensions in a region already facing multiple conflicts and geopolitical rivalries.  

As a landlocked country, Ethiopia has expressed dissatisfaction at its reliance on the Port of Djibouti for access to the Red Sea. Recently, Prime Minister Abiy stated that control of the Red Sea and the Nile is critical for Ethiopia’s survival. The MoU with Somaliland represents Ethiopia’s bid to secure a port in this strategic region. 

The deal with Somaliland is particularly contentious because it undermines Somalia’s territorial integrity and reconciliation efforts between Somalia and Somaliland following three decades of self-government and several failed attempts at reunification. Most recently, with the facilitation of President Guelleh of Djibouti, Somalia and Somaliland signed an agreement in December 2023 to revive diplomatic talks, implement past agreements, resolve continuing issues, and strengthen cooperation on security and criminal activity.  

Considering this context, Somalia has strongly condemned the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland, calling it an act of aggression. Somalia has received diplomatic support from the Arab League, led by Egypt, which has its own tensions with Ethiopia related to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and control of the flow of the  Blue Nile River. The United States, under the Somalia Quint, has also voiced support for Somalia’s sovereignty. Adding to the complexity, Eritrea, once an ally of Ethiopia during the Tigray War, has distanced itself from Abiy’s government and increasingly aligned itself with Somalia. 

Abiy’s government has shown a willingness to use force to achieve its geopolitical goals. In a July 2023 meeting, he warned that Ethiopia would pursue its port ambitions through peaceful means but would resort to force if necessary. This rhetoric has raised alarm, as it suggests that Abiy is prepared to escalate tensions into a military confrontation, with the potential to further destabilize the entire region.  

Most recently, talks facilitated by Turkey in December 2024 led to an agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia that would grant Ethiopia sea access while respecting Somalia's sovereignty. Although this marks a positive development for the region, Ethiopia has yet to rescind its MoU with Somaliland. For the December 2024 agreement to hold, terms must go beyond surface-level arrangements and present concrete measures to defuse tensions over the long term. The incoming Trump administration could play a pivotal role in supporting the extra-regional mediation that will be required to carry this out. 

Author

Africa Program

The Africa Program works to address the most critical issues facing Africa and US-Africa relations, build mutually beneficial US-Africa relations, and enhance knowledge and understanding about Africa in the United States. The Program achieves its mission through in-depth research and analyses, public discussion, working groups, and briefings that bring together policymakers, practitioners, and subject matter experts to analyze and offer practical options for tackling key challenges in Africa and in US-Africa relations.   Read more

Africa Program