In January 2025, the United States halted its nearly $1.5 billion annual assistance to Jordan as part of its 90-day worldwide foreign aid pause. That same month, President Donald Trump called on Jordan to absorb Palestinian refugees from Gaza. King Abdullah visited the White House in February to present the Hashemite Kingdom’s case and rejected Trump’s plan. Although the president later said Abdullah is “one of the true great leaders of the world,” it remains unclear whether Washington will permanently sever aid to Jordan when the three-month reassessment period ends as the US president seeks drastic budget cuts. 

With the Kingdom’s relationship with the Trump administration uncertain, Jordan could alternatively boost ties with Russia, Iran, and China. The United States had long discouraged Amman from establishing strategic relations with its adversaries, but should Washington end aid to Jordan, Abdullah would have greater flexibility to chart out an independent foreign policy. 

Russia and Iran 

At first glance, Russia could be an attractive candidate for Jordan’s top ally if Washington seeks to focus inward. Moscow possesses the largest nuclear arsenal worldwide and has a long history of Middle East political involvement. Yet, the December 2024 downfall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad demonstrates the limits of such an approach. Assad was Russia’s top regional ally, and when rebel forces led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) mounted an attack against Assad, President Vladimir Putin did little to halt the offensive.  

Given that Russia continues to drain massive resources in the Ukraine war, the Kremlin likely has little interest in replacing the approximately $1.5 billion in annual aid that Washington provided Jordan until January 2025. 

It would not be appealing for Abdullah to rely on Moscow should a future security threat arise, given the Kremlin’s recent abandonment of Assad. Furthermore, cash-strapped Amman desperately needs significant financial support, with its national debt at around $62 billion. Given that Russia continues to drain massive resources in the Ukraine war, the Kremlin likely has little interest in replacing the approximately $1.5 billion in annual aid that Washington provided Jordan until January 2025. 

Iran theoretically could be an alternative strategic partner for Jordan due to its near-nuclear status and the Islamic Republic’s regional proxies, allowing it to project power across the Middle East. But Abdullah has a long history of tensions with Tehran. In December 2004, the Hashemite ruler warned against a Shia “crescent,” citing Iran’s influence spreading across Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. That same month, a bomb exploded at Jordan’s Embassy in Baghdad, killing nine.  

Abdullah later blamed a “well-known” Shia political group with backing from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for the 2004 attack. More recently, in 2024, Jordan’s Air Force shot down Iranian drones and missiles over the Kingdom. The Jordanian government later criticized Tehran for violating its sovereignty. The Islamic Republic would also be a problematic partner for Abdullah because it would probably work to establish militia groups inside Jordan—like in nearby Lebanon and Iraq—to strike Israel in exchange for increased financial assistance. Such non-state armed groups may draw an Israeli military response inside the Kingdom and provoke instability similar to what King Hussein faced during Jordan’s 1970 civil war.  

 A third possibility for Jordan among Washington’s adversaries is China, the world’s second-largest economy.

Third option: China 

 A third possibility for Jordan among Washington’s adversaries is China, the world’s second-largest economy. China shares Jordan’s view on the importance of establishing an independent Palestinian state. However, a dispute over the Attarat shale oil plant in southern Jordan illustrates the difficulties with Beijing’s interventions. In 2023, the Associated Press reported that the Kingdom owed China billions of dollars for constructing the Attarat project even as it provided Jordan with limited benefits. Unlike Washington’s assistance to Jordan, which primarily comprised grants, China provided loans to Amman and demanded payment. Amid such distrust, Jordanian telecom firms decided in 2023 not to partner with Chinese tech giant Huawei for 5G networks despite previous work together. In addition to US economic help for Jordan, Washington has offered billions of dollars for Amman to purchase advanced military weaponry and boosted its border security with Syria.  

In contrast, China’s defense ties with its Jordanian counterparts have been limited. There are few signs that Chinese President Xi Jinping would post thousands of his troops in Jordan to strengthen Abdullah’s security should the US troops exit the kingdom (Last month, the Trump administration drafted plans to withdraw all US troops from neighboring Syria). Finally, after attending high school in Massachusetts and training alongside US soldiers in Kentucky during his military service, the English-speaking Abdullah has established a unique cultural connection with Americans. It would be difficult for the Jordanian leader to replicate such ties with Jinping as he does not speak Chinese and has visited Beijing far fewer times than Washington.  

Since ascending the throne in 1999, Abdullah has centered his foreign policy on a strategic alliance with Washington. Trump’s temporary suspension of aid to the Hashemite Kingdom, along with his call for the desert country to absorb a new wave of Palestinian refugees, shocked Jordanians. In this challenging context, it may seem natural for Jordan to look to the traditional rivals of Washington—China, Russia, or Iran—to replace the United States as Amman’s most crucial ally.   

Nonetheless, the Hashemite Kingdom is unlikely to receive billions of dollars in regular aid or reliable security guarantees from Moscow, Beijing, or Tehran. It’s a gloomy prospect as Abdullah seeks to salvage his relationship with the Trump administration.

The views represented in this piece are those of the author and do not express the official position of the Wilson Center.