Bolivia’s Catastrophic Stalemate

President Luis Arce of Bolivia after attempted coup

President Luis Arce came to power in 2020 under unique circumstances. The country was convalescing from the COVID-19 pandemic and recovering from intense political turmoil, including former President Evo Morales’s aborted, unconstitutional efforts to be reelected in 2019 that ended in his exile. Arce also inherited an economy in decline. Economic growth has fallen from 6% in 2021, a healthy recovery from the pandemic, to a projected increase of less than 2% this year. The budget deficit is high. International reserves, meanwhile, have seen a sharp drop, from a historical peak of $15 billion in 2014 to less than $2 billion today.

This reversal of fortunes has not gone down well with Bolivians, who had enjoyed a decade of healthy growth thanks mostly to natural gas exports. Bolivia is now a net importer of fossil fuels, buying from abroad an estimated 56% of its gasoline and 86% of its diesel. But surprisingly, Arce’s biggest challenge does not come from a political opposition seizing on growing public frustration, but rather from within the ruling Movement Towards Socialism, or MAS, party. Morales, Arce’s onetime political benefactor, intends to run for president for the 6th time next year, competing against Arce. In the meantime, he has been mobilizing his supporters, including in Congress, to undermine Arce’s administration.

Arcistas vs Evistas

Morales’s motivations for returning to active political activity are not entirely clear. His followers, the Evistas, see it as his civic duty to solve the country’s many ills. His detractors say he is guided by an obsession with power. Either way, Morales has been able to mobilize an important segment of the MAS, even though he is not in control of formal political institutions.

Surprisingly, Arce’s biggest challenge does not come from a political opposition seizing on growing public frustration, but rather from within the ruling Movement Towards Socialism, or MAS, party.”

This political divorce inside the MAS became public last year, when Morales accused Arce of planning to “destroy” him. Next, Morales, taking advantage of new electoral rules that require political parties to carry out primaries, sought to win the MAS presidential nomination, relying in part on support from his traditional areas of influence in coca-growing regions. Without the approval of Arce’s faction, Morales carried out and won a primary in Lauca Ñ, but the Plurinational Electoral Organ rejected the results.

Arce fought back, using tactics he learned from his time on Morales’s cabinet. Last December Bolivia’s Plurinational Constitutional Tribunal, the same institution that had authorized Morales’s controversial candidacy in 2019, ruled that Bolivia does not allow unlimited reelection and that it is not a human right, as Morales previously claimed. Nevertheless, in May, Morales announced his intention to run for office “a las buenas o a las malas” (by hook or by crook). The crossfire was briefly interrupted in June by a military commander who tried unsuccessfully to force his way into the presidential palace in a still murky episode. But the saga resumed in September, when thousands of Evistas joined Morales in a “March to Save Bolivia.” Their main demand: solve economic challenges, such as a scarcity of dollars and fuel, but the march also called for approval of Morales’s candidacy. Arcistas swiftly condemned the mobilization, labelling it a “March for Death” designed to force Arce’s resignation and eventually replace him with a Morales ally, Senate President Andrónico Rodríguez. The march did not come close to toppling the government, despite clashes, but it further divided Arcistas and Evistas and added to the sense of chaos in Bolivia, where forest fires have been raging for months.

What Now?

Bolivia’s troubles are perhaps best described by a phrase frequently used by Morales’s former vice president, a “catastrophic stalemate.” By holding power, Arce would seem to have the upper hand. But politics is also about charisma, and Morales has plenty of it. As a result, neither side has a definitive advantage and the impasse has crippled the government amid severe crises, leaving Arce unable or unwilling to take necessary action, such as spending cuts or painful but urgent steps to lower inflation. Congress is also paralyzed due to MAS infighting.

As a result, neither side has a definitive advantage and the impasse has crippled the government amid severe crises, leaving Arce unable or unwilling to take necessary action.”

Though dramatic, this is an old story in Bolivia. Before the MAS, which has dominated Bolivian politics almost uninterruptedly for the past two decades, the most successful political force was the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, or MNR. In all, it held power for 21 years–but it also suffered internal power struggles, including a leadership rift in the 1960s at a time of acute economic crisis that eventually split the party.

It remains to be seen whether the MAS avoids a similar fate. But it does not look good for the party, or for Bolivia. In the latest blow to the movement, both Morales and Arce have been accused of sexual misconduct, with the accusation against Morales involving a minor. Perhaps these allegations will force the MAS to find a new standard bearer who could unite the party. But for now, it has only further weakened the president and his chief rival, at a time when the country is in urgent need of strong leadership.

Author

Martín Mendoza-Botelho
Chair, Department of Political Science, Philosophy and Geography, Eastern Connecticut State University

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