Operationalizing the Africa Standby Force and Streamlining Regional Security: A New Purpose for NATO

On April 3, 2019, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg visited Washington, D.C. to plead his case. Mr. Stoltenberg insisted on the continued importance of his organization to the collective security of European and North American states. Under pressure from forces on both sides of the Atlantic that claim the alliance to be obsolete, Mr. Stoltenberg stood before Congress and declared that "it is good [for America] to have friends" like those in NATO. To bolster his case, he also cited increased defense spending by member states to the tune of $41 billion — a clear gesture of goodwill and reassurance to U.S. President Donald Trump, who has lambasted NATO allies that do not meet the defense spending target of 2 percent of GDP and has openly questioned the value of the alliance. Since Mr. Trump's election in 2016, NATO has come under increased scrutiny from many in the United States, threatening the near-universal support enjoyed by the alliance since its creation in 1949. As the world's largest and most powerful military alliance, NATO maintains a unique capacity to shape international security efforts. Since the end of the Cold War, however, experts have wondered how to adapt NATO to a geopolitical landscape without a rival of comparable military power. As the alliance turns 70 and the US enters another election year, this quest for reinvention and recalibration remains salient, if not imperative, for leaders — on both sides of the aisle and the Atlantic — who are determined to cement NATO as a cornerstone of collective security.

Nowhere can NATO better revitalize its mission than in Africa, where security is currently addressed by a patchwork of ad hoc regional security arrangements, African Union (AU) Peace Support Operations (PSOs), UN-mandated peacekeeping missions, and French, British, Russian, Chinese, and American military forces. Efforts at constructing an Africa-wide security apparatus have floundered amid lack of cohesion among AU member states and overlapping mandates granted to different organizations. Instead, regional coalitions of willing countries, like West Africa's Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), and AU-sanctioned operations, like the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), perform the stated functions of the military organization designated by the AU to carry out PSOs and crisis intervention on the continent — the African Standby Force (ASF). Despite progress in recent years to operationalize the ASF, there are key areas — such as capacity-building, institution-building, and establishing a more streamlined command hierarchy — where NATO may lend its expertise. Such engagement could mold a more cohesive, effective fighting force with the institutional capability to ensure civilian oversight and eventually replace today's makeshift approach to African collective security. In turn, a more secure Africa would stem illegal migration from the continent to Europe, a source of political unrest and conflict between many of NATO's European member states. What's more, fewer Africans fleeing violence on the continent would face the harrowing journey across the Mediterranean to Europe, a voyage that cost thousands of lives in 2018 alone.

A Long Wait

The ASF was created in May 2003, when the newly-formed AU agreed to a dual-phase framework to establish "regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution." The original ASF mandate called for the formation of five regional 'brigades' that would, among other responsibilities, conduct PSOs, de-escalate conflict zones, enforce post-conflict disarmament, and launch interventions into ASF member states in the case of war crimes or genocide. The body could also act at the behest of member states struggling to contain instability within their borders. In practice, regional brigade forces would remain standing until it received either a request for military engagement by a country in need or an AU mandate to that effect. Yet over a decade and a half later, not enough progress has been made to advance the operationalization of the ASF, perhaps due to the lofty goals set by the 2003 framework; it is clear that the ASF's stated mandate exceeds the political and financial resources devoted to its operationalization.

To further complicate matters, the AU created a separate intervention force designated for ad hoc security contingencies, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises, or ACIRC, which also has yet to be deployed. Founded in 2013 amid continuing unrest in Mali and a hesitancy of West African states to engage in that conflict, the mandate of the ACIRC stipulates that it will embrace many of the responsibilities of the ASF until the latter becomes operational — at which time, the ACIRC would be phased out. Many observers, however, contend that the ACIRC simply absorbs resources destined for the ASF, further prolonging its readiness. Indeed, the European Union (EU), which is the main donor for the ACIRC, also bankrolls many of the ASF's training exercises. All of this becomes further muddled when one considers that France, the former colonial power, unilaterally intervened in Mali in 2013 with Western backing, obviating the need for ACIRC or ASF involvement. If Western powers seriously support a continental security apparatus by Africans for Africans, such unilateral action must cease and full support instead be lent to strengthening African security institutions.

NATO's Reconciliation with the AU and Future Role

NATO engagement with the AU's various security structures would demonstrate the West's support for African collective security efforts and stress the importance of independent African security capability. What's more, NATO isn't unfamiliar to working with the AU or the ASF; NATO assisted the AU with its ad hoc Mission in Sudan during the Darfur Crisis and has lent logistical support to AU forces in Somalia, and the alliance has even opened a Liason Office in Addis Ababa to reinforce collaboration in areas of mutual interest.

There remain, however, major sticking points surrounding NATO engagement in Africa. In 2011, when Western governments sought to topple Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi, the US and EU (and by extension, NATO) and the AU disagreed on the channels through which such a resolution could be brokered. The impasse resulted in Western governments and NATO wresting control of the crisis in Libya, despite repeated attempts by the AU and individual African leaders to encourage a peaceful transition to democracy. In the early stages of the crisis, when peace talks between Gaddafi and the opposition National Transitional Council were most likely to bear promise, an ad hoc committee of African leaders attempted to travel from Mauritania to Tripoli. This attempt at diplomacy was stifled by NATO, which, on the same day, implemented a no-fly zone over the country pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1973. The EU during this time practically withheld funding for the AU's crisis response forces, preventing African leaders from taking security in Libya into their own hands. In the end, the AU could not prevent foreign intervention, and Gaddafi's regime fell to rebel forces, creating a power vacuum. Libya has festered since 2011 and remains a source of instability, as well as a source of illegal migration to Europe.

NATO's 2018 meeting with AU officials centered on 'the importance of trust' to effective cooperation. To truly foster confidence, NATO must acknowledge these past grievances, express regret for hastily deposing Gaddafi, and enumerate lessons it learned from its role in his ouster. Overcoming disagreements is conducive — even necessary — to future partnership, and NATO can still offer the AU's regional security structures valuable expertise in three key areas:

1. NATO could first assist with incorporating lessons learned from the AU's intervention in Sudan, as well as its ongoing Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), in which NATO has played a supporting role since 2010. NATO has already incorporated lessons from its rapid intervention and subsequent peacebuilding efforts in the Balkans, as well as those learned from asymmetrical conflict with pirates off the coast of Somalia. Perhaps better than any other organization, NATO can assist the AU in bringing its procedures in line with the current security environment.
2. Second, NATO should consider assisting the ASF's military-civilian cooperation, striking a balance between civilian oversight of operations and a streamlined, efficient military structure that can bring viability and efficacy to the ASF.
3. Finally, NATO could provide logistical support towards operationalization by providing transportation for brigade forces from their home countries to the battlefield, a role the alliance already plays in Somalia. This last, simple step could provide enough momentum to encourage more political support from countries unsure of the ASF's readiness.

Conclusion

The ASF's future ultimately relies on the political willpower of AU member states and their commitment to place collective security in the hands of the AU. But if African leaders choose to advance this pan-African solution to the continent's security issues, NATO should mend ties with the continent and offer its assets, personnel, and expertise. Streamlining international security commitments in Africa is bound to bring conflicting mandates into alignment and help international donors, on which many of these efforts rely, grant aid more efficiently. It will also allow for more efficient intelligence sharing and deployment capabilities, improving security for Africans and furthering political and military integration on the continent. Although significant obstacles to the operationalization of the ASF remain, such a step is crucial to foster trust between African states, break the cycle of ad hoc security arrangements, and ensure a more stable Africa in the future.

Cameron Fels is a former Africa Program intern during the spring 2019 term. He is a recent graduate from the University of California, Los Angeles, having received a bachelor's degree in Political Science.