During his inauguration speech at the National Assembly of Azerbaijan in February 2024, President Ilham Aliyev emphasized that “our family is the Turkic world and this is where we feel ourselves well.” It was an unusual remark, as no head of state had ever equated a regional integration project to a family. Earlier, after the Second Karabakh War, Aliyev challenged Azerbaijan’s intellectual elite to develop new thoughts in line with shaping new national idea. 

Similar discussions, with varying emphasis, are underway today in the capitals of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and Uzbekistan. Hungary and Turkmenistan participate in the OTS as observers, as does the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Hungary stands out in this group, as their prime minister, Viktor Orban, is well-known for his Euroscepticism and support for Turkic unity (Turanism). He has declared his country as “westernmost of the eastern people” and is a recipient of the OTS’s Supreme Order of the Turkic World. 

The Rise of Turkic Identity

Turkic nations of the former Soviet Union share a common heritage of history and culture, having gradually moved under Russia’s rule in the early 19th century. The fall of the Soviet Union opened a new page in the history of the Turkic nations, with Turkic identity becoming more tangible, especially with the support of the more economically advanced Turkey. While the overall process of integration has been slow and gradual, it gained greater prominence and urgency after the Second Karabakh War in 2020 and was triggered once again after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkey and Uzbekistan expressed their support for territorial integrity of Ukraine sending humanitarian aid and fuel. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also stated that they would not recognize Russian-supported breakaway republics in the east of Ukraine.  

After the start of the war in Ukraine, the Turkic region had emerged also as a transport and trade route (Middle Corridor) connecting Asia and Europe, an alternative to the northern Russian route. OTS now represents most of the nations along the Middle Corridor. In 2024, the European and international financial institutions have committed 10 billion euros in support and investments towards sustainable transport connectivity in Central Asia. With the EU currently assessing the need for greater self-reliance on matters of defense in response to US policy shifts, the Turkic regional integration project likewise increases in both probability and relevance. 

The OTS presents a good opportunity for both the EU and the US to mitigate against uncertainties generated by Russian aggression and influence across Eurasia. The US Helsinki Commission’s 2024 Contesting Russia report advises: “Since the start of the Russian war against Ukraine, Central Asian states have been steadily pulling away from the Russian orbit; however, they share security, economic and cultural ties with Russia that cannot be easily severed without an alternative partner. Türkiye [Turkey], due to the cultural and linguistic ties, can offer that alternative. At the same time, strengthened pan-Turkic cooperation enhances Türkiye’s political and diplomatic standing. US support for this initiative would achieve a dual objective of strengthening Central Asian sovereignty and supporting Türkiye’s regional aspirations.”

The increasing cooperation among Turkic states is also a “strategic regional response to intensifying great power competition and shifting geopolitical dynamics in Eurasia.” The main questions the region now faces are how independent OTS can remain vis-à-vis changing geopolitical dynamics, and to what extent it can compete against other regional projects such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). 

The Evolution of the Turkic Project

The key to understand the relative strength of OTS is to compare it against other regional integration projects. One aspect that sets OTS apart is that its integration strategy is designed around the unique identity and culture of the region. The other broader integration projects, such as CIS, CSTO, Eurasian Economic Union, and SCO have largely focused on political, military, and economic integration and cooperation. While CIS has some roots in the common history and culture of those peoples that were part of the Soviet Union, in the case of OTS the message of ethnic union of Turkic people is far clearer. The ideas of Turkic unity and Turanism persisted throughout the 20^th century in Turkey and the Turkic republics of the Soviet Union, despite being suppressed by the communists. These ideologies outlived the Soviet Union and gained more popularity starting in the 1990s. Nevertheless, today, the governments of countries that make up OTS cannot be considered nationalist, among other things because all OTS countries host include significant minority groups within their borders. 

Secondly, although OTS is based on ethnic identity, its focus is not on political or military issues, which makes it more attractive for regional countries to join without having to “take sides.” Instead, OTS focuses on “soft geopolitics” and aims to connect a diverse gropu of nations, from Europe (Hungary and Turkey) to the Caucasus and Central Asia—each with diverse political systems and traditions. Turkey may be the strongest among them in terms of economic and military power. However, it lacks the ability to project power across the region, and instead works to be more of a leader than a hegemon. Turkey understands that Russia and China have their own strategic interests and influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus, which certainly limits Ankara’s greater ambitions. Nevertheless, Turkey’s power definitely works as a security deterrent for Azerbaijan against Iran and possibly Russia. For the Turkic states of Central Asia, Turkey is an important trade partner, major investor, and both a large market itself as well as a gateway to other markets. 

Thirdly, the Turkic project is constantly evolving, gradually and cautiously asserting itself on the international stage. It originated in 1992 during summits of Turkic-speaking states, then emerged as the Turkic Council in 2009 to promote cultural, economic, and linguistic cooperation. The organization was eventually renamed as OTS at its 8th summit in 2021. Over the following years, the pace of integration intensified, with member states adopting the Turkic World Vision 2040, which outlined a strategic approach to make each “member state stronger on a national basis and as a group, without prejudice to its existing international commitments.” In 2024, most of the Turkic states agreed to use common Latin alphabet.

What is the way forward for OTS? 

Many observers agree that OTS has remarkable potential to exert considerable strategic, economic, and cultural influence in the Eurasian region in the medium-to-long term. However, possible challenges confronting it include sustaining unity within OTS, the issue of bilateral relationships among its member states, and OTS’s ability to compete effectively with rival regional frameworks. 

Eventually, the policies of Russia and China, as well as the timing and outcome of Russia’s war against Ukraine might become even more important factors. Conservative voices in Russia typically see the OTS project as an attempt to alienate and even cut the historic ties between Central Asian nations and Russia. The identity card will likely prove the most controversial issue for Russia, as was observed on several occasions in almost all Turkic countries. In Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, issues related to the contest between local and Russian identities and language occasionally resurface. Unlike Russia’s pressure campaigns, OTS offers an attractive ideology of connection to the Turkic world. Some in Russia consider this approach as nothing less than a campaign of political expansion by Turkey, with the goal of supplanting Russia’s Northern Corridor with their own Middle Corridor to link China and Europe, thereby undermining Russian power and influence: “But most importantly, this is a key project that contributes to the expansion of both the West and Turkey into Central Asia (where, let us recall, there are huge reserves of lithium and other critical minerals, in which Western countries are showing great interest). Incidentally, the European Union pledged to invest €10 billion in the project at the beginning of the year,” warns Russian political commentator Dmitriy Oleynik. 

However, other commentators, like Russian historian Alexander Knyazev, argue that Russia, China, Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan should, in fact, be part of the Turkic integration project, as they host millions of Turkic people. Integration could bring significant benefit to the economies of all countries in the region. 

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.