‘Social Engineering’ or ‘Forced Relocation’ in Ethiopia’s Lowlands

In 2010, the Ethiopian government commenced an ambitious villagization program to settle 1.5 million individuals, who primarily subsist on (agro-)pastoralism and shifting cultivation. This program is taking place in the four "emerging" regional states of Ethiopia: Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and Somali.

African States and Experiments of Population Relocation

Sparse population density constrains many African rulers' capacity to master state territory, control their population, and deliver social services. Indeed, Jeffrey Herbst's well acclaimed book, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, elucidates in greater detail the peculiar challenges faced by African rulers due to the political geographies of African states, i.e. primarily sparse population density and distribution.

In an effort to cope with these challenges, rulers of independent Africa have designed and implemented large and very costly resettlement schemes. A better-known example in this respect is the idealized ujamaa villages of Julius Nyrere's Tanzania. Ethiopia has its own history of attempts, human sufferings, and failures in population movements, especially in the 1980s. Yet, resettlement and villagization have been revived and have played a part in food security and development strategies of the Ethiopian government since the early 2000s. The government's stated objective is to ensure that local people acquire easy access to social services such as schools, health clinics, and veterinary clinics. Critics, however, find this hard to believe.

'Forced Relocation'

Critiques of the current villagization scheme in Ethiopia are skeptical of its co-occurrence with the rise of large-scale mechanized farms, and argue that what is taking place is a 'forced relocation' of indigenous people from their ancestral land. The intention, it is argued, is to give way to further commercial agriculture interests in Gambella, South Omo, and other lowlands of the country (especially in Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Somali).

The US Congress has subscribed to this argument. The Appropriations Bill of January 13, 2014 imposes checks to ensure that US funds are not used for 'forced evictions' in Gambella and lower Omo. The bill also stipulates that "the Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States executive director of each international financial institution to oppose financing for any activities that directly or indirectly involve forced evictions in Ethiopia." Additionally, the World Bank is investigating whether its financial support was indirectly used to fund villagization in Gambella.

Progress on the Ground

While resistance against villagization was mounting in the U.S. (by the Ethiopian, particularly Anyuak, diaspora and international organizations - the Oakland Institute, Human Rights Watch, and Inclusive Development International), the Ethiopian government was accelerating its implementation. What began as a feasibility study in 2009-2010 was followed up by three consecutive years of villagizing the local population. In mid-2013, the government declared the villagization targets meet in Gambella, with more than 90% of the 45,000 households relocated into new villages. Furthermore, the government perceives 2013-2014 as a year to consolidate the "recorded success" by fulfilling unmet social service provisions in new villages.

Villagization as 'Social Engineering'

States, more or less invariably, prefer settled forms — be it farming, livestock rearing, or a mix of the two — rather than transient forms of agriculture. The Ethiopian state is no exception. Despite differences in political philosophies and perspectives, the imperial, military, post-1991 governments have been arguing against (agro-)pastoralism and shifting cultivation, and have pursued policies encouraging the population subsisting through these livelihoods to settle. However, there were no meaningful large-scale efforts, let alone successes, before the second decade of the 21st century.

Reports on the villagization program usually focus on how it is being implemented and its relations with the ongoing land deals. As is the case in most social and political processes, the means do not necessarily determine the end. This should not be construed to mean that actors should simply plough through their plans without due consideration to the rights of local people, along with the ethical and moral dimensions of their actions. Here I want to focus more on the long-term implications of the villagization scheme. I do not want to get bogged down in the already over-contested procedural issues, i.e. whether it was forced or voluntary. Rather, I take an analytical, not an evaluative approach.

The villagization plans of the Ethiopian government have the intention of 'transforming' local people into surplus producers. This intention is best captured by the term utilized by implementers of the scheme in reference to the new villages: "development centers." Shifting cultivators and (agro-)pastoralists are not commercially oriented, and their socio-economic organization and resource use regime is geared toward risk aversion through expansive natural resource use. This has meant that these people groups never engaged in intensive and efficient natural resource usage in the past. The viability of the livelihood systems was considered only within each group, thus not contributing as much to the national economy as the vast land resources would allow.

Re-skilling local people

The goal of the planners and implementers of the villagization campaign is to de-skill local people and re-skill them in techniques of 'modern' settled agriculture (although often the view held by implementers is that these people groups have no prior skill, thus negating the need for the de- and re-). They intend to accomplish this through intensive agricultural extension service provision. In what seems to be a proper appraisal of the challenging task at hand, the proposed household-to-agricultural extension agent ratio in Gambella is 19:1, while in the Ethiopian highlands one would get no more than three agricultural extension agents per Kebele, the lowest administrative level with hundreds of households.

Transient forms of agriculture are geared toward exploiting the variegated resources, over space and time, through seasonal migration. Thus, the agricultural tools used, if any, are tailored to this effort and are not fit to make the land reach its potential productivity. To reverse this discrepancy, the villagization scheme incorporates the dissemination of various agricultural tools, starting from the simplest spade and hoe. Furthermore, crop varieties and livestock breeds that are well adapted to the transient form of livelihood will be ill-suited to thrive in settled 'intensive' farming, leading to the incorporation of plans to promote the adoption of improved seeds and livestock breeds.

Creating 'governable units'

In addition to aspirations of economic 'transformation,' the villagization scheme will turn local people into 'governable units.' John Markakis succinctly summarizes the challenges which barred Ethiopian rulers from effectively governing the lowland territory. Deadly tropical diseases, the hot climate, the sparse density of the armed population and cultural barriers restricted the extent of influence the center could impose on the lowland periphery. The villagization scheme will solve most of these bottlenecks, as local people will have permanent residency which will be serviced by a Kebele and a police station. The congregated nature of settlement will also make governance of the lowlands economically justifiable.

Fana Gebresenbet is a member of our Southern Voices Network and research fellow here at the Wilson Center. He is a Lecturer at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa University (AAU), and a PhD candidate in Global and Area Studies, offered jointly by AAU and Leipzig University, Germany.

Photo taken in Gambella, Ethiopia last year.  Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons user russavia.