Sudan's Ceasefire Talks: What Has Been Missing Thus Far?

The war in Sudan has taken tens of thousands of lives and resulted in one of our globe’s most pressing humanitarian emergencies, with over 10 million people displaced and over 2 million facing starvation. Fighting began on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo. Thus far, the international community has mainly pushed for ceasefire talks between the nation's warring factions, though they have been largely fruitless.  

Peace talks in May 2023 organized by the United States and Saudi Arabia stalled following the failure of both sides to implement an agreed declaration of principles – the “Jeddah Declaration.” The United States, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland initiated refreshed negotiations focused on a ceasefire and humanitarian access in Geneva in August 2024 that included Egypt, the UAE, the African Union, and the United Nations as observers.  While the RSF sent a delegation, the SAF did not, demanding the RSF go to cantonment sites prior to resuming negotiations. As a result, Geneva devolved into proximity talks, and while it secured commitments to facilitate greater access for humanitarian aid, no progress was made on a ceasefire.   

The US, Germany, France, and the EU organized a ministerial meeting on Sudan on the margins of the UN General Assembly, but progress on a ceasefire continues to be unlikely as both SAF and RSF believe they can secure victory over the other with both having solid and sustained external support.  To move toward peace, reviewing what has been missing from previous talks is critical to facilitate progress toward a stable, safe, and secure future for the Sudanese people.  

Identifying an endgame for Hemedti, Burhan and their supporters 

The general assumption in ceasefire talks is that a ceasefire must be negotiated between the belligerents. This may be true, but in the case of the ongoing war in Sudan, it is difficult to imagine the two warring parties concluding, much less implementing, a ceasefire agreement without first having a clear vision of what the political and personal endgame would be.

Defining an end game essentially involves addressing the fears, concerns, and expectations of Sudan’s armed protagonists and their external backers. It also involves dealing with thorny issues such as accountability, security sector reform, and the role of the belligerents in a future governance structure. Most Sudanese civilians, apart from Islamists of the former regime, insist that the military should not be allowed to be part of future political institutions. But that begs the question of how to convince the military leaders to play a constructive role in supporting, rather than opposing, a democratic transition. 

In the absence of a cohesive civilian camp, it is important to reflect on alternative ways and means of including them in the peace talks.

Accommodating the military on both sides of the conflict also involves dealing with their civilian supporters, who are equally concerned about their place and role in future governance institutions. For instance, Islamists and supporters of the former regime are advocating the continuation of the war and oppose any deal that would take them out of the political equation. There are equally deep divisions within the democratic civilian camp as to the issue of rewarding the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and the Islamists for their crimes by allowing them to be part of talks that would decide the future of the country.  However, excluding them will not bring about an end to the fighting. 

Including “middle powers” in the peace process 

Since the outbreak of hostilities, the US has been unable to convince regional states that fueling the conflict in Sudan is harmful to their interests in Sudan. The US and Saudi Arabia initially convened the Jeddah peace talks without giving necessary attention to the regional dynamics that impact the situation in Sudan. They have come to realize the necessity of greater inclusiveness.  

They convened the Manama talks in early 2024, which also included Egypt, the UAE, the AU, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). That forum reportedly made notable progress on some of the thorniest issues, but the effort was scuttled by disagreements within the ranks of the SAF’s Port Sudan government and its Islamist allies.  

The recent Geneva talks also included key regional players. However, the regional picture is getting increasingly complicated due to the involvement of a growing number of regional players such as Iran, Turkey, Qatar, and, further afield, Russia and Ukraine.  Reconciliation of all these external actors is unlikely, but ignoring their interests will result in continued support for conflict and suffering in Sudan. 

Securing civilians a meaningful place in negotiations 

The best-case scenario would be securing civilians a full seat at the negotiation table. Apart from SAF resistance to civilian inclusion in talks, the question remains: which civilians?  

In the absence of a cohesive civilian camp, it is important to reflect on alternative ways and means of including them in the peace talks. One option is to convene a civilian negotiating forum concomitantly with the military forum and create opportunities for discreet exchanges between the two. Another possibility is to arrange a diverse group of civilians that would play the role of ‘Resource Persons’ or ‘Friends of the Mediators’ to provide advice and help iron out differences and deal with contentious issues.  

Unless the above shortcomings are adequately addressed, the prospects for peace emerging from renewed negotiations will remain slim.