A blog of the Kennan Institute
The question of Ukraine’s next presidential election has emerged as a key issue in discussions about the country’s future governance and stability. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was elected in April 2019, with the next presidential election initially scheduled for March or April 2024. However, martial law—imposed after Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 and still in place as the war continues—has prevented elections from taking place. Under Ukrainian law, elections cannot be held while martial law is in effect to ensure continuity of governance and support the nation’s defense. While some Western leaders, including US President Donald Trump, have called for elections, polling data within Ukraine shows the war-torn nation's deep uncertainty regarding the feasibility and consequences of holding a vote at this time.
Public Opinion on Elections During Wartime
Polling data consistently indicates that a majority of Ukrainians oppose holding elections while the war continues. A September-October 2024 survey conducted by the Rating sociological group for the Centre for Analysis and Sociological Research (CISR) of the International Republican Institute (IRI) found that 60 percent of Ukrainians did not support elections under current wartime conditions. By February 2025, this figure had risen slightly to 63 percent, according to a survey by the Sociological Center “Sotsis.” Conversely, only 15 percent of Ukrainians surveyed by Sotsis supported holding elections during the war, underscoring broad public concern over security risks and the logistical difficulties of organizing a fair and transparent vote.
Challenges of Organizing Elections Under Martial Law
Ukraine’s constitution forbids elections during martial law for very good reasons.1 While martial law provides the government and armed forces with essential legal mechanisms to manage the ongoing conflict, lifting it to allow elections would introduce several critical vulnerabilities. First, conducting elections would require significant adjustments to Ukraine's military command structure, including the dissolution of local military administrations. This could severely disrupt wartime logistics and security efforts, making the country more susceptible to external threats.
Moreover, lifting martial law could weaken control over strategically important regions. Key practices, such as document verification, curfew enforcement, and the safeguarding of vital infrastructure, might be compromised, leaving opportunities for Russian sabotage and hybrid warfare tactics. Beyond these immediate risks, the removal of martial law could inadvertently empower pro-Russian political factions and actors within Ukraine, creating conditions that could facilitate greater foreign interference in Ukraine's internal affairs.
Russian Interference and Information Warfare
Elections conducted under wartime conditions would be highly vulnerable to Russian interference through disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and efforts to destabilize the political landscape. Previous instances of electoral meddling in countries like Romania, Germany, and the United States illustrate the strategic advantage Russia could gain in influencing Ukraine’s political processes. One major concern is the potential for cyberattacks on electoral infrastructure. Russia has a history of targeting Ukrainian government institutions with cyber operations, and a national election would present an appealing target for disrupting vital systems such as digital voter registration, election commissions, and media outlets.
In addition to cyberattacks, disinformation and psychological operations would pose significant threats to any election. Russia has the demonstrated capacity to manipulate public perception through social media campaigns, fabricated polling data, and even deepfake technology—all aimed at discrediting candidates and fueling societal discord. Furthermore, lifting martial law could pave the way for pro-Russian political parties and figures, previously banned, to re-enter Ukraine’s political arena. Moscow would welcome the chance to disrupt and influence a Ukrainian presidential election to win at the ballot box what it could not win on the field of battle.
The organization of elections in wartime presents additional significant logistical and legal hurdles. As of February 2025, approximately 6.9 million Ukrainians remain displaced globally, with an additional 3.7 million internally displaced within Ukraine. Ensuring their ability to vote would require a substantial overhaul of Ukraine’s voter registration system—a task that Ukraine’s government lacks the resources and the bandwidth to accomplish as it fights for the nation’s survival.
Ukraine’s Central Election Commission (CEC) faces major challenges in maintaining an up-to-date electoral registry. Following the full-scale invasion, the CEC restricted access to voter registration data to protect citizens’ personal information. However, after nearly three years of war, these records are outdated. Addressing these gaps would require extensive resources and international assistance to verify the status of millions of voters.
Moreover, according to a by the Council of Europe, only 1 in 16 Ukrainians abroad is formally registered with a consulate, meaning the vast majority of refugees abroad lack the necessary documentation to participate in an election. Without significant legal and procedural adjustments, millions of displaced citizens could be disenfranchised.
Media and Political Competition in Wartime
The media landscape in Ukraine has undergone significant changes since the war began. The “United News” telemarathon (Ukraine’s state news framework consisting of 11 TV channels), launched in February 2022 to consolidate war coverage, has been widely criticized for perceived editorial bias and government control. A 2024 USAID-Internews study found that while 86 percent of Ukrainians were aware of the telemarathon, only 47 percent actively watched it, with many preferring unregulated platforms such as Telegram (73 percent). This shift in media consumption complicates efforts to ensure fair political discourse, as social media remains more vulnerable to disinformation.
Political competition has also been affected. Ukraine maintains a multi-party system, with 370 registered parties as of 2022. However, the war has marginalized opposition figures and limited campaign activities. Sanctions against former President Petro Poroshenko have further disrupted the opposition landscape, raising concerns about political pluralism in the event of an election.
Recent polling data from the National Democratic Institute (NDI) sheds light on current party support in Ukraine. The European Solidarity party, led by Petro Poroshenko, holds a 23 percent approval rating, with 47 percent of respondents expressing disapproval. The UDAR party, headed by Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko, has an approval rating of 18 percent, with 34 percent disapproval. The Servant of the People party, the incumbent party led by Olena Shuliak, sees a 13 percent approval rating, while 48 percent disapprove. Batkivshchyna, led by Yulia Tymoshenko, is faring even worse, with only 9 percent approval and 57 percent disapproval. Interestingly, a hypothetical party led by TV presenter and activist Serhii Prytula, despite not existing, has garnered a notable 28 percent approval rating. These figures suggest that voters are increasingly disillusioned with traditional political parties, further complicating the prospect of fair elections during wartime.
Conclusion
While elections are the cornerstone of democracy, Ukraine faces profound challenges in organizing a credible vote in wartime. The risks associated with lifting martial law—including security vulnerabilities, logistical difficulties, and heightened Russian threats—outweigh the benefits of holding an election at this time. The winner of any such election would have less legitimacy than Zelensky does now, even if the winner is Zelensky. These are risks that the Ukrainian public does not want to take, with a majority of Ukrainians prioritizing national security over immediate political transition.
For Ukraine’s democratic future, the focus should remain on maintaining institutional stability, ensuring the integrity of governance, and safeguarding against external interference. Postponing elections until conditions allow for a free and fair process is not a rejection of democracy but a necessary measure to protect it.
The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.
- [1] The Ukrainian Constitution bans parliamentary elections during martial law. However, two legal acts prohibit other elections—presidential and local—under martial law.
Author

Kennan Institute
The Kennan Institute is the premier US center for advanced research on Eurasia and the oldest and largest regional program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The Kennan Institute is committed to improving American understanding of Russia, Ukraine, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the surrounding region through research and exchange. Read more
Explore More in Focus Ukraine
Browse Focus Ukraine
Music as the Rocket Fuel of Odesa

Ukrainian Society Under Occupation: Hardship and Civic Resilience

Creating Rules of the Game for Contemporary Ukrainian Theater
