"What is the nature of the U.S.-Georgia relationship one year into the Obama administration?" asked Cory Welt, Associate Director, Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES), Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. At a 19 April 2010 Kennan Institute lecture, Welt described relations between the two countries over the past decade and the current challenges and opportunities facing the Obama administration.

Since the Clinton era, Georgia has enjoyed bipartisan support and high levels of foreign assistance from the U.S. Congress and both the Clinton and Bush administrations. After the events of 9/11, Georgia requested U.S. participation in its dispute with Russia over the presence of Chechen militants in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge. The U.S. becoming directly involved in Georgian security was a "watershed moment," said Welt, "which put Russia on notice."

However, the U.S. began withdrawing support from Georgia in 2002-2003 when it felt the country was near the brink of collapse. In light of those setbacks, the Rose Revolution in November 2003 stands out as an important milestone in the U.S.-Georgian relationship. The revolution provided justification for the U.S. to rebuild relations and subsequently was extolled by President Bush as a "success story" of "regime change without recourse to force" even if the transition was really "quasi-democratic," according to Welt. President Bush ignored certain faults of Saakashvili's government due to the symbolic significance of the Rose Revolution to Bush's foreign policy. Nonetheless, the U.S.-Georgian relationship showed signs of strain in November 2007 when the Georgian government used excessive force against protestors calling for early elections. In addition, U.S. recognition of the newly independent Kosovo at the start of 2008 made Tbilisi wary with respect to its own republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

When Obama assumed the presidency in 2009, the relationship between the U.S. and Georgia was rhetorically strong despite the strains. Since then, there have been several indicators of solid ties between the two states, including a bipartisan decision by Congress to grant one billion dollars of aid to Georgia and the contribution of over 900 troops to Afghanistan by Georgia (the second largest per capita contribution of troops after the U.S. and the second largest non-NATO contribution). In addition, the U.S. has been fervent in insisting that its "reset" with Russia will not come at the expense of its relationships with other states in the region, and the Obama administration has made sure to maintain frequent communication among various levels of officials between the U.S. and Georgia. Indeed, Georgia is one of the few countries to have a strategic partnership agreement that formally outlines the parameters of their relationship.

At the same time, complications still exist. Since the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, Georgia's potential NATO membership has "gone out the window and nothing has arrived to take its place," said Welt. Moreover, while the U.S. cannot do anything about the presence of Russian soldiers on Georgian territory (including those in violation of the cease-fire agreement), it has also not exhibited any great moral outrage towards Russia, much to Georgia's chagrin. It has also been wary of Georgia's efforts to pursue defensive capabilities and has not approved requests for private arms sales to Georgia. In the end, Welt noted that the reset between Russia and the U.S. can only go so far in creating a European security architecture that includes Russia before it runs into the issue of Georgia.

Georgian actions have also led to challenges in the relationship. Georgia's candidacy as a responsible security partner for NATO was jeopardized by its actions in 2008 against Russia. "Regardless of what version you believe, the fact remains that you can still fault the decision-making process in Georgia," said Welt. In addition, the country's approach to democratization is to a certain degree rhetorical. While some reforms have been made, Welt argued that Georgia's commitment to full scale democracy remains unclear. Compared to its neighbors, it has indeed progressed, but Georgia still does not resemble a "proto-EU, proto-Western ally."

Welt concluded by questioning the true role of these issues as impediments to progress. "All the problems the U.S. has with furthering the relationship are not really about Georgia but about Russia," said Welt. Even if Georgia were to become a perfect democracy and exhibit fully professional and responsible military capacities, the U.S. would still be faced with difficult tradeoffs between supporting Georgia and maintaining a positive relationship with Russia, a task the Obama administration has set as a high foreign policy priority.


By Larissa Eltsefon
Blair Ruble, Director, Kennan Institute