The Middle East Program hosted a talk with Samer Shehata, Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center, and Assistant Professor of Arab Politics at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

Samer Shehata, at the very outset, outlined the three broad topics that he would address in the course of his remarks: (1) Egypt's positions and actions in the Gaza War (December-January 2008-09) and subsequent regional reactions, (2) Egypt's role in regional politics, or what he referred to as the "new Arab Cold War," and (3) Implications for the nature of future interactions between Egypt and the Obama administration.

Shehata proceeded to state five primary conclusions before delving into each of the above three topics. First, contended Shehata, Egypt's mediation efforts in the recent Gaza War were largely ineffective. In fact, Egypt failed even to effectively harmonize the bitter discord among the Arab nations and was thereby unable to represent a cohesive and coherent Arab reaction to the conflict. Second, Egypt's politicking during the war and its perceived anti-Hamas stance was distinctly unpopular in the greater Middle East as well as within Egypt. Third, and most importantly according to Shehata, the Gaza War demonstrated an immediate need to accurately understand the Egypt-Hamas relationship. Shehata asserted that Egypt was by no means a neutral mediator to the Israeli-Hamas conflict. Instead, he recognized that Egypt had significant political and national security interests directly related to this conflict. More specifically, he opined, the Hosni Mubarak regime's relationship with Hamas was even more complicated, especially given the Mubarak regime's domestic and regional unpopularity contrasted with Hamas' popular and electoral legitimacy. He also compared the ostensibly secular and authoritarian character of the Mubarak regime, allied with the United States, with the popular Islamist movement committed to resistance. Understanding the critical dynamics of this complicated relationship, said Shehata, would vitally inform policymakers of the potential effectiveness and credibility of Egypt as a mediator in the region. Fourth, Shehata concluded that Egypt's willingness to mediate in the region and to align its interests and actions to those of the U.S. and Israel would not come gratis. If Cairo is indeed "pivotal" to US/Israel interests in the region, as is seemingly projected, then Cairo, more specifically Mubarak, would no doubt try to gain and extract much in return—especially in terms of gaining external or international legitimacy for its undemocratic mandate. Finally, Shehata declared that given the realities of and reactions to the Gaza War and before that, the Israel-Lebanon War of July 2006, the major fault line dividing the region is not between Shias and Sunnis as many in the region and in the US have claimed. Instead it is between the so-called "moderate" Arab states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan), and countries and non-state actors such as Iran, Syria, Hizbollah and Hamas, which reject American hegemony in the region.

The rest of Shehata's talk focused on events surrounding or deriving from the Gaza War and how they contributed to the foundation of his five conclusions. Chiefly, Shehata underscored that the Egyptian stance and actions before and during the war, including holding high-level discussions with Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni in Cairo, its criticism of Hamas' role in prolonging the conflict, and its refusal to open the Rafah border crossing, were perceived to be distinctly pro-US/Israel interests, and anti-Palestinian and Arab interests. This led to uprisings and demonstrations against Egypt's role in the conflict in countries like Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Algeria and Yemen, but also, most importantly, within Egypt itself. This then proved to Shehata, not only that Egypt was an ineffective mediator in the conflict, but that the fault lines in the region do not reflect Shia-Sunni divides. Moreover, Egypt's growing unpopularity amongst Arab nations, and its blatant domestic illegitimacy undermined its and American policymakers' claims that Cairo was an effective conduit for Arab interests in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, despite this qualification, and despite Cairo's poor record in the recent Gaza War, Shehata concluded that it would continue to remain "pivotal" to the Obama administration, if for nothing else, for its willingness to comply with American interests in the region.


Drafted by Kanishka Bhattacharya on behalf of the Middle East Program.