At a 25 October 2010 Kennan Institute seminar examining U.S. policy in the post-Soviet realm, Grigory Ioffe, Professor of Geography, Radford University, examined the overall credibility of U.S. policy in the region. Ioffe asserted that American foreign policy makers do not pay adequate attention to the perceptions of popular audiences abroad. In the former Soviet Union, for example, American democracy promotion is demonstrably secondary to America's geostrategic interests.

In his talk, Ioffe contrasted democracy promotion in different parts of the former Soviet space. He argued that in Azerbaijan and Central Asia, the U.S. placed greater emphasis on access to energy resources and on its broader geostrategic interests in Iran and Afghanistan than on human rights. Alternatively, with respect to Ukraine, Ioffe recognized that democracy promotion had been front and center in U.S. policy. He added, however, that this policy was still perceived by some regional analysts as a vehicle for NATO expansion and the means to create a Baltic-to-Black-Sea axis to envelop Russia. According to Ioffe, Belarus represented the missing link in that axis, which had resulted in strong criticism of Belarus's anti-democratic policies despite the fact that more egregious violations of democracy were recorded in Azerbaijan and Central Asia.

Ioffe asserted that America's apparent double standard on democracy has been particularly vivid in U. S. relationships with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Both regimes exhibited similar political traits, including unlimited presidential power, vote rigging, squelching the opposition, and the polarizing effect of national leaders now running for president for the fourth time. And yet, while there was a Belarus Democracy Act, no such thing as a Kazakhstan Democracy Act existed. Moreover, President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan was welcomed by Bush, Cheney, and Obama. According to Ioffe, these two alternative approaches were largely explained by the fact that Kazakhstan was oil-rich and perceived by the U.S. as an independent player on the world scene, while Belarus does not have oil and until recently it was perceived—inaccurately, Ioffe insisted—as being under Russia's thumb.

As soon as tensions between Russia and Belarus came to a head, however, not only did the EU suspend its travel sanctions on Lukashenka, but the IMF set up a credit line for Belarus of $2.5 billion and then increased it to $3.6 billion at exactly the time (June 2009) Russia reneged on transmitting the final portion of its own loan to Belarus. No one in the entire post-Soviet space, Ioffe claimed, believed that such a change of strategy could have happened without a nod from Washington. Likewise nobody believed that the three Baltic States acted solely on their own initiative when they offered Belarus transit routes for transporting Venezuelan oil to Belarusian refineries. Ioffe contended that some foreign policy realists in Washington D.C. drew a lesson from the March 2008 diplomatic row with Belarus, a dispute that ended on Belarus's terms. Cleaning up the mess created by foreign policy idealists is indeed the realists' innate preoccupation. Fortunately, according to Ioffe, this particular mess was not nearly as costly to clean up as some others but enough to dent America's credibility once again. Lukashenka cheered and Belarusian "democrats" cried foul as they were crushed by a palpable sense of betrayal by the West.

Instead of prioritizing democracy in foreign relations with post-Soviet states, Ioffe argued that the U.S. should acknowledge that geostrategic motivations guide U.S. interests in the region, particularly as these interests relate to energy. Ioffe further advocated that the U.S. should directly engage with countries, rather than use them as bargaining chips in geopolitical games with Russia. Ioffe suggested that the U.S.'s rhetorical emphasis on democracy promotion is rooted in moral supremacy, "like a never-ending Colbert Report," but is understood within target countries as bravado, resting on the U.S.'s status as a rich and powerful nation.

Looking ahead, Ioffe indicated that U.S. foreign policy towards post-Soviet spaces should not only be rooted in hard realism but also should openly express these interests. America's credibility will only grow as a result, concluded Ioffe.

By Lauren Crabtree
Blair Ruble, Director, Kennan Institute