The System Made Me Do It: Corruption in Post Communist Societies

Corruption has captured the attention of the international community as an urgent crisis in developing countries. Rasma Karklins argued that postcommunist countries have been particularly susceptible to corruption due to the legacy of the communist system. On the basis of her new book, "The System Made Me Do It, Corruption in Post Communist Societies," Rasma Karlins presented her typology of corruption and how the combination of systemic inadequacies and a culture of impunity have created an environment in which corruption can flourish unchecked. Moreover, as the title of her book implies, the ability to eliminate corruption becomes more difficult when there is no sense of personal accountability, but the entire system is blamed, as is the case in postcommunist Europe.

Certain legacies of communism have aggravated the situation in postcommunist Europe. For instance, ‘informants' who had been used by the state to compel adherence to communist ideology are still viewed negatively today. As a result, there is no cultural sympathy for whistle-blowers as there is in the West. Therefore, instances of corruption, though widespread, are rarely reported to officials who could prosecute the crimes. Also, the legacy of false collegiality, which in the communist system substituted for class divisions, means that people continue to support their colleagues by blocking investigations simply because they are in the same social caste.

Moreover, postcommunist Europe's economic transition and institutional vacuum provided ideal opportunities for state capture. The most attractive jobs sought by corrupt officials were associated with the privatization process, institutions that regulated business and the customs bureau. The dire economic situation and weak cultural and institutional structure to combat corruption meant that the costs for being corrupt were relatively low and the benefits impressively high. All of these factors compounded the problem: people believed that, since everyone was participating in corrupt behavior, they would be foolish not to, which in turn meant that corruption became even more pervasive.

Corruption is a problem in all countries, so while it would be foolish to suggest that corruption could be eliminated, Karklins offered suggestions for how it might be contained. First, institutional structure can be put into place to raise the costs associated with corruption, such as random audits, personnel rotation and whistle-blower protection policies. Second, efforts could be made to demonopolize decision making, such that individual discretion is limited and accountability is strengthened. This second strategy involves increasing media coverage of corruption and developing consciousness in civil society for how to combat corruption, particularly in the electoral process. Finally, Karklins argued that in any anti-corruption policy, it is important to consider how corrupt officials will react or adapt to the new policy and anticipate it so that it becomes more difficult to hide corrupt behavior.

To end the vicious cycle, Karklins explained that it is also helpful to create a "breakthrough" such that the entire society senses a systemic change and is therefore less likely to continue tolerate corrupt behavior. For example, the "big fish" strategy, in which one or several high-ranking officials are prosecuted for corruption, could end the widespread belief that corrupt officials operate with impunity. Similarly, a well-publicized policy of institutional change, complete with clear explanations of the new rules and practices could help. When rules are transparent, Karklins argued, people are less tolerant when they are transgressed. A third strategy is grassroots mobilization. Given the growing anger among over corruption, Karklins suggests that stake-holders could be organized and mobilized into taking legal action against corruption.