The Struggle for Syria Returns

With the fall of the Assad regime, the Middle East is now on the cusp of the most consequential geopolitical changes since the Iranian revolution of 1979. How these changes unfold will depend, in large measure, on the political transition now underway in Syria—on the transition framework the caretaker government puts in place and the ability of the country’s new leaders to meet the daunting economic, social, and strategic challenges they confront. 

Challenges ahead

The scale of these challenges becomes more apparent with each passing day. Little more than a week since the regime’s collapse, post-Assad Syria bears a troubling resemblance to the country captured in the classic 1965 work of journalist Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria. The country’s sovereignty has been shredded, and its territorial integrity fractured. Regional and global powers jockey for influence with the economy in a state of collapse and society traumatized and splintered by six decades under a ruthless dictatorship and more than 13 years of violent conflict. As Syrians celebrate the end of Assad’s rule, developments on the ground are unfolding at a dizzying pace. Joy and anticipation at the possibilities that have suddenly become real are matched by grief and dismay at the losses so many have suffered and uncertainty about what lies ahead. 

Thus far, the United States has done little more than lay out criteria that Syria’s interim government must meet to secure Washington’s recognition and support. These include an open, inclusive transition process and commitments to combat ISIS and prevent the misuse of chemical weapons. US leverage and influence in Syria are limited, yet in the absence of proactive US engagement with the interim government, now drawn entirely from the governing arm of the Islamist militia that led the overthrow of Assad, Hayyat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), obstacles to an inclusive, sustainable transition will amplify. 

While the US debates whether to lift the terrorist designations of HTS and its leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, the struggle for Syria is gaining momentum. Domestically, al-Sharaa oversees what amounts to an HTS takeover of key political positions, installing conservative Islamist loyalists to key positions in ministries, the judiciary, provincial governorships, and so-called “popular organizations” such as the Lawyers Syndicate. Positive statements affirming the new regime’s commitment to pluralism, women’s autonomy in matters of dress, minority protections, amnesty for most Assad regime forces, and the initiation of security sector reform have been widely welcomed. They offer grounds for optimism about Syria’s future. Yet HTS’ refusal thus far to open the transition process to a wider range of voices, its near exclusion of civil society, and its lack of transparency about the work of the transitional government and what it will deliver at the end of its three-month mandate are undermining confidence among some Syrians about HTS’ intentions.     

Syria’s outlook is further complicated by external intervention and competition among regional and global powers.

External actors, competing agendas

Syria’s outlook is further complicated by external intervention and competition among regional and global powers. Turkey is moving quickly to position itself as the leading patron of HTS and essential broker of a future government, even as it pursues its longstanding aim of destroying the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdish-led, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the country’s northeast, elevating uncertainty about the fate of 40,000 ISIS detainees now under SDF control and, potentially, marginalizing Kurds in Syria’s transition. 

Governments in the Gulf, including the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, were among the backers of rebel armed groups from 2011 to 2016 when their support began to ebb. More recently, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, together with Jordan, were ardent supporters of normalization with Assad, encouraging his reintegration into regional initiatives in the hope—never realized—of inducing cooperation on narcotics smuggling, refugee return, and reducing his dependence on Iran. 

Yet Gulf regimes have never seen eye-to-eye on Syria or HTS, and their differences could well play out in the course of Syria’s transition. Qatar has been more supportive of HTS and resisted normalization with Assad. Saudi Arabia and the UAE—as well as Egypt—have kept HTS at arm’s length, viewing it as an extremist Islamist group and a potential threat. Since the formation of an interim government, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, along with several other Arab states, reopened their diplomatic missions in Damascus, viewing engagement as offering them the best chance to influence Syria’s transition. However, statements from Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been virtually silent on HTS. They have focused instead on concerns about instability and chaos and look warily at the possibility of an Islamist government consolidating its power.

In southern Syria, Assad’s fall sparked the most far-reaching Israeli incursion since the 1973 October War, with its troops positioned some 25 kilometers from Damascus. Since December 6, the day Assad fled to Moscow, it has preemptively struck more than 500 targets across the country, destroying 90 percent of Assad regime military stockpiles. Claiming it is acting to prevent a post-Assad power vacuum from posing a threat, Israel’s government unilaterally terminated the Golan separation of forces agreement reached after the October war. It has also backed away from statements affirming that its occupation would be temporary but has offered no guidance about conditions that would persuade it to return to the ceasefire lines negotiated in 1974. HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa has said that Syria has no interest in a conflict with Israel, yet Israel’s strategy of militarily preempting potential threats will almost certainly cement an antagonistic relationship with a future Syrian government. 

Western governments, including the US, are also responding cautiously to regime change. Officials from France and Germany have met with al-Sharaa and have apparently laid out conditions the interim government will need to meet with respect to human rights, women’s rights, and inclusiveness before it can expect additional support. The European Union is reopening its delegation in Damascus while cautioning against the “resurgence of hardline Islamists.” The Biden administration, is now in direct contact with HTS and participating in the coordination of international and regional responses to Syria’s transition. In addition, it has announced that Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf will lead a small delegation to Damascus to discuss the fate of U.S. hostage Austin Tice and other matters. The delegation’s agenda offers an important opportunity to convey the terms on which additional support will be forthcoming in person. The US has also joined with the EU and the UK government in opening the door to removing the terrorist designations of al-Sharaa and HTS. Making clear the priority the U.S. attaches to an inclusive transition should be high on its agenda. 

HTS’ lack of transparency and inclusiveness and the appointment of hardliners to key positions are appropriate reasons to hold off on embracing the interim government. Yet caution on the political front does not require that the US hold off on support for the Syrian people. In the struggle for Syria’s future, the most immediate and pressing concern today is the desperate state of the Syrian economy. After more than a decade of war, more than 90 percent of Syrians live in poverty, 70 percent of the population requires humanitarian support, and more than 50 percent of Syrians have been displaced. For most, what will be decisive in determining how they view a new government and whether Syrians achieve tangible improvements in security and stability in the near term is whether they see relief from crippling economic conditions that could easily deteriorate further. Leading backers of the Assad regime, Russia and Iran, have announced punitive economic measures: Russia has halted grain shipments, and Iran is cutting off shipments of oil.

If the United States and its European counterparts are serious about supporting a new Syria, the most important contribution they can make now is to help reverse the country’s economic free fall.

If the United States and its European counterparts are serious about supporting a new Syria, the most important contribution they can make now is to help reverse the country’s economic free fall. Expanding humanitarian assistance will be needed. Far more consequential, however, will be lifting economic sanctions that were imposed on the Assad regime—keeping in place sanctions on regime figures complicit in war crimes and crimes against humanity. Lifting sanctions would not only jump-start the Syrian economy by lifting constraints on the private sector; it would pave the way for urgently needed investments in reconstruction and revitalize an oil sector that provided a quarter of state revenue before 2011. 

Even as the US and EU hold the line on an inclusive, rights-centered political transition, contributing to economic conditions that will give all Syrians a better chance at a brighter future will ultimately increase both the likelihood that such a transition will succeed and place the US and EU in a stronger position to influence how it unfolds. 

The views represented in this piece are those of the author and do not express the official position of the Wilson Center.