Kazakhstan in the Context of the War in Ukraine

Video Transcripts

• Aizada Nuriddenova - Domestic Factors Behind Kazakhstan's Equidistant Diplomacy

  The transcript has been lightly edited for clarity.

  Domestic Factors Behind Kazakhstan's Equidistant Diplomacy

  Aizada Nuriddenova, Assistant Professor, Suleyman Demirel University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

  I think in evaluating Kazakhstan’s foreign policy since the start of the war in Ukraine, we cannot isolate Kazakhstan’s foreign policy and its diplomatic actions from its domestic context, especially within the last two and half years. And I think we should pay closer attention to the role of public opinion in shaping Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. 

  Since February 2022, it can be observed that Kazakhstan has been conducting an equidistant diplomacy within its larger hedging strategy that Kazakhstan has been relying on even before the start of the war in Ukraine. And according to the literature, equidistant diplomacy is a diplomatic tactic aimed at achieving the state’s objective by signalling its neutral position, neutral image, to domestic audiences and to external actors.

  The conventional wisdom on the role of public opinion in conducting foreign policy, in international relations and foreign policy scholarship, has predominantly focused on democratic countries in which the public can punish leaders in elections for failing to deliver a successful foreign policy. This concept is also known as audience cost. However, recent scholarship on audience cost has revealed that public opinion matters in authoritarian settings as well.

  I rely on three major public opinion polls that were conducted in Kazakhstan in building my arguments. These polls were conducted by the Bureau for Express Monitoring of Public Opinion, DEMOSCOPE. They took place in April 2020, December 2022, and May 2023, with a pool of 1,100 respondents from 17 provinces and three cities of national importance in Kazakhstan.

  According to these surveys, the perceptions of the people in Kazakhstan on the war in Ukraine is subject to change over time, demonstrating that the perception tends to worsen towards Russia. For instance, the percentage of respondents who think that Russia is waging a war against Ukraine with the aim of its occupation and further annexation has been on the rise; in April 2022, only 13% of the respondents held such views, while in May 2023, after a year, it went up to 28%. 

  Additionally, we can observe the emergence of deeper public reflection and open discussions in Kazakhstan in regard to decolonization and the role of Kazakh language. In May and June 2022, the Kazakh government officially expressed its position on the war in Ukraine by stating that Kazakhstan respects the territorial integrity of Ukraine and that it neither recognizes the annexation of Crimea nor the independence of separatist entities such as Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, by referring to the UN Charter’s territorial integrity principles. 

  Moreover, Kazakhstan abstained from the United Nations General Assembly votes on Ukraine to signal its neutrality. So political observers in Kazakhstan argue that these statements and actions positively affected the current leadership, and President Tokayev’s approval ratings went up after these statements. Although there is no official presidential approval ratings data in Kazakhstan, the May 2023 DEMOSCOPE survey shows that 75% of the respondents in Kazakhstan like their president and 61% thought that Kazakhstan was developing in the right direction.

  So what Kazakhstan has been trying to do since the start of the war in Ukraine is to reduce dependency on Russia while maintaining the existing relationship. And it has also been trying to increase economic cooperation with China. And we can see some results already. In 2023, China became Kazakhstan’s largest economic partner (trading partner), replacing Russia. 

   

• Gulnash Askhat - The Role of National Identity in Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy

  The transcript has been lightly edited for clarity.

  The Role of National Identity in Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy

  Gulnash Askhat, Associate Professor, Head of the International Relations Department, Kazakh Ablai Khan University of International Relations and World Languages, Almaty, Kazakhstan

  The disintegration of the Soviet Union caused the Central Asian nations to grapple with the question of who they are as nations. For Kazakhstan, a country with multiple confessions [religions] and ethnicities, defining a national identity became a complex process and a task that required so much research, because you know that Kazakhstan differs from other post-Soviet countries by its ethnic diversity, that counts nearly 130 different ethnicities, and the religious tapestry of Kazakh society. 

  Kazakhstan is still defining its identity as our nation experiments with various approaches to nation building. The challenge lies in maintaining one's identity while embracing multiple facets, as we belong to a Turkic nation, part of the Muslim world, and at the same time, a Eurasian multiethnic and a multi-confessional society. And one of the chief risks to stability in Kazakhstan is that the transition of political power will be accompanied by ethnic and identity conflict.

  With the new idea of building a new, progressive Kazakhstan, our country is trying to focus on the culture and language. You know that the Kazakh language was, and will be, one of the most important symbols of the ethnic identity which suffered through the Soviet intelligentsia, the extermination of the ethnic intellectual elite, who used Russian as their main tool of communication in professional activities. So there is resistance to the desire for a Kazakh language and other Kazakh symbols to dominate the hierarchy of symbols in the new Kazakh society.

  And this is not simply the prerogative of the state and government. Representatives of civil society, academia, think tanks, and media must take into account Kazakhstan's value and identity, accepting our past and moving forward. 

  Located at the crossroads of Russia and China, Kazakhstan maintains substantial ties not only with Central Asian neighbors, but also with a variety of countries, including the United States, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, India. Kazakhstan, since independence, has been trying to navigate through multi-vector, balanced foreign policy, emphasizing the country's strategic positioning between heavyweight players such as Russia and China. 

  I would also like to highlight the rich geography of Kazakhstan, which extends beyond [that of] Central Asian neighbors, including countries bordering the Caspian Sea, such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkmenistan, and Iran. We have a very pragmatic approach and one of the greatest successes of Kazakhstan development is peaceful and predictable relations with all partners, emphasizing the interaction of cultural norms, geopolitical strategies based on common values, and understanding beyond geographical boundaries.

  Of course, Kazakhstan's foreign policy trajectory embodies the nuanced balance between tradition and modernity, regionalism, and, of course, globalism as well. As a mid-level country, Kazakhstan is ready to use its unique opportunities to strengthen mutually beneficial relations for the benefit of all interested parties. In embracing its multi-identity heritage, Kazakhstan is paving the path towards a more inclusive and interconnected world. 

• Azhar Shaldarbekova - Dynamics of Central Asian Integration

  The transcript has been lightly edited for clarity.

  Dynamics of Central Asian Integration

  Azhar Shaldarbekova, Associate Professor, L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Astana, Kazakhstan

  The war in Ukraine, the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan, the water resource crisis, energy and logistic issues—these problems have brought the issue of close interaction and cooperation among Central Asian states to the forefront. Cooperation between Central Asian states occurs in both bilateral and multilateral contexts, with interaction within the framework of international organizations.

   [The] organization of consultative meetings of the heads of Central Asian states is of particular significance. The first summit was convened in March 2018 in Astana. [Nursultan] Nazarbayev, in his welcoming speech, noted that the summit was held on the eve of Nowruz, the New Year holiday common to all Central Asian peoples. Thus, the importance of common history, culture, and traditions was emphasized. Four countries—Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan—speak Turkic languages. Tajikistan, while speaking Persian, also shares the common cultural heritage with the Turkic people of the region.

  In bilateral cooperation, we can highlight three main directions. The first direction includes organizations: CIS, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Customs Union, Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). These organizations are engaged in the ongoing development of economic and political ties that were initially established during Soviet times. The initial group addresses economic collaboration founded on the political dependence of nations. From the perspective of the participants and member states of the organization, Central Asian people associate [it] with the colonial past, which restricts their autonomy to develop and modernize independently.

  Second is cooperation within the framework of the Shanghai [Cooperation] Organisation. CSO countries are economically unified by the New Silk Road, a transportation system designed to facilitate the movement of goods from China and Central Asian countries to Europe. 

  The third direction of interaction between Central Asian countries, except Tajikistan, is cooperation within the framework of the Organization of Turkic States. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey actively began to promote the idea of the integration of Turkic peoples and countries. In the period of more than 30 years, the direction has changed in content. Turkic states don't accept any Big Brother concept now. Each country promotes its own political and economic interests. 

  Also at present, a number of international Turkic organizations are functioning. The Turkic Academy in Astana engages in scientific research on Turkic peoples, while the TURKSOY Foundation of Turkic Culture and Heritage has facilitated cultural events. And one of the most important Turkic organizations is TURKPA, which aims to unify the parliamentary system of the member countries of the organization.

  The principal challenge identified by Turkic Vision 2040 is that of political security. From an economic standpoint, the participating countries aim to develop a sophisticated logistics infrastructure that would facilitate trade and economic relations. To illustrate, the establishment of transportation and logistics system between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan was the trade of oil. The provision of transportation for Turkmen gas to Turkey is also a key objective.

  The next important issue is the development of military industry. All five Central Asian countries are actively acquiring the Turkish Bayraktar and the [TAI] ANKA [drones]. In Kazakhstan, the Azersun joint venture has started production. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are increasing ties with Turkey in the military industry [area]. In the context of the interaction of Turkic states in the expansion of geopolitical borders, it is possible to develop transport infrastructure for the functioning of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route.

  The Trans-Caspian Corridor or Middle Corridor is a proposed transportation route that would connect all the countries between China to Europe, Georgia, and Azerbaijan across the Caspian Sea. The seaports of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan will be the primary means of transportation. The development of economic collaboration within the framework of the OTS organization, with Turkey as a member of NATO, will contribute to the economic breakthrough, which will entail democratic transformations in the region.

• Karlyga Myssayeva - Russian Disinformation Efforts in Kazakhstan

  The transcript has been lightly edited for clarity.

  Russian Disinformation Efforts in Kazakhstan

  Karlyga Myssayeva, Associate Professor, Faculty of Journalism, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

  Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Kazakhstan has been targeted by various misinformation and disinformation campaigns. There are several factors influencing Kazakhstan’s perception of this war in Ukraine. Firstly, I think the Soviet legacy—shared historical, cultural, economic, and political ties with Russia—made Kazakhstan a crucial battleground for information warfare. Secondly, economic and societal factors play a big role.

  At the start of the war, as you know, an influx of people fleeing mobilization affected the emotional sentiments of the Kazakhstani population, especially among the young generation, due to rising rental housing prices, any kinds of issues. Additionally, Kazakh-speaking individuals aged 40 to 50 years old fear the arrival of Russian war supporters. And thirdly, ongoing political events in Russia. Many Kazakhstanis in the beginning of the war, who initially viewed it as a quest for justice, now see Russia as having crossed the boundaries of common sense. Since the invasion, discussions about the impact of Russian state propaganda on Kazakhstan through pro-Kremlin media have increased. 

  In 2023, DEMOSCOPE, the Bureau for Express Monitoring of Public Opinion, conducted a survey on Kazakhstan’s attitudes towards the war in Ukraine. The survey found that young people mainly supported Ukraine, while a third of respondents are influenced by Russian propaganda. Overall, the audience showed disinterest in this war. The survey results indicated that aggressive narratives from the Russian media shape Kazakhstan’s information field [more] than the official media of Kazakhstan. 

  The study revealed no dominant opinion among respondents regarding the nature [of the] conflict. For example, 36% believe it is a Russian military operation against Nazis; 26% think it is a war to prevent NATO deployment in Ukraine; and 13% view it as an annexation effort. It is important to note that only 39% of respondents primarily used Kazakhstani media, while 23% consumed Russian news, only 2% trusted Ukrainian media, and 1% of respondents trusted Western media; 35% received news from different sources.

  Over the past three years, some Russian media outlets have stopped broadcasting in Kazakhstan [because of] economic issues. Secondly, on June 19, 2024 (it was recently), the president of Kazakhstan signed a law on mass media, which increases the weekly volume of domestic TV and radio programs in the state language to 55% by 2025 and 60% by 2027. Experts suggest that Kazakhstan should move away from being an information colony. The new law reduced the retransmission of foreign programs from 20 to 10%. 

  Thirdly, according to the DEMOSCOPE survey, 73% of respondents do not believe Russia will attack Kazakhstan. Media experts noted that the Ukraine war is perceived [as problematic] mainly by a small, educated, urban, Russian-speaking population. Older Russian speakers actively supported Russia due to heavy exposure to Russian propaganda. Many Kazakh speakers are very wary of Russia, reflecting a trend toward decolonization. So as I said, the DEMOSCOPE survey showed that older people who are speaking Russian are more supportive of Russia.

  Disinformation tactics aimed at influencing Kazakhstan’s perception of Russia’s war in Ukraine include, first, pro-Russian narratives; second, false claims; third, historical revisionism; fourth, economic and social intimidation factors and the discrediting of Ukraine and the West. To combat local and international misinformation or disinformation efforts, in Kazakhstan,…I think the most important [thing] is promoting media literacy, educating the public on critically assessing new sources and identifying disinformation.

• Syrym Parpiyev - Kazakhstan's Education and Identity Politics

  The transcript has been lightly edited for clarity.

  Kazakhstan's Education and Identity Politics

  Syrym Parpiyev, Senior Lecturer, Department of International Relations, Al-Farabi Kazakh National University, Almaty, Kazakhstan

  Since Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Kazakhstan education policies have evolved through several changes to reflect the heightened sense of national identity and strategic realignment in response to shifting geopolitical dynamics. And especially after, when we speak about this, we can see the two directions of this national education policy. 

  The first is [that] after Kazakhstan gained independence, President Nazarbayev aimed to establish himself as a leader, or the creator of the new Kazakh state, and his historic narratives about Kazakh nationalism, Kazakh nationhood, focused on his own person. He aimed to establish himself as a leader and the creator of the new Kazakh state.

  However, these efforts were not widely supported by society, and political opposition from the intelligentsia hindered his plans in the early years. And this situation changed after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and Russian President Putin’s statement that Kazakh statehood was created by Nazarbayev. This prompted Kazakh ideologists to reassess their historical and ideological development, leading to a celebration of the 550th anniversary of the Kazakh Khanate.

  In 2017, Kazakhstan’s president Nursultan Nazarbayev issued a decree to transition the Kazakh language from the Cyrillic alphabet to the Latin alphabet by 2025. The main agenda of this project was to expand the influence of the Kazakh language globally, where information remains primarily in Latin. However, when Kassym-Jomart Tokayev became president in 2019, he postponed this project until 2031. 

  Tokayev has called this transition a key part of Kazakhstani spiritual modernization. But it was tempered by a renewed interest in Eurasianism, as evidenced by the elevation of the Golden Horde [which was] implicitly praised as a mighty and advanced civilization. Yet in this context, it represented more than just military power. It symbolized mutual tolerance and a symbiotic coexistence of different ethnicities and languages. It was that, rather than solely cultural or economic advancements, that elevated the Golden Horde as a great and civilized state.

  Tokayev is systematically trying to take over the so-called Eurasian agenda. In Russia, it is quite popular [to think] that Moscow is the heir of the Golden Horde and unifier of Eurasia, Alexander Nevsky was a relative of the Chingizids…and these two ideologies are now competing.

  By doing this, Tokayev is trying to consolidate the Kazakh people to avoid the jüz system’s negative consequences, like dividing the society. And by applying for the Kazakh version of Eurasianism, Tokayev is trying to implement a new project in [national] education, especially in historical studies and political studies: that Kazakh nationhood doesn’t start from the Kazakh Khanate; Kazakh nationhood starts from the Golden Horde.