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U.S.-Iran Normalization? Don’t Hold Your Breath.

Haleh Esfandiari headhsot

"President Barack Obama‘s announcement last week that the United States and Cuba would restore diplomatic relations has spurred some to suggest that relations should be restored with Iran after a 35-year rupture...For a number of reasons, Iran is not next in line, even if there is a positive outcome to the negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program." writes Haleh Esfandiari.

President Barack Obama‘s announcement last week that the United States and Cuba would restore diplomatic relations has spurred some to suggest that relations should be restored with Iran after a 35-year rupture.

True, Iran has cautiously welcomed the U.S.-Cuba rapprochement; and the Obama administration would welcome a similar rapprochement with Iran. But Iran is not Cuba; and unlike Cuban President Raul Castro, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has no interest in relations with the United States. For a number of reasons, Iran is not next in line, even if there is a positive outcome to the negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program.

Sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its partners have wreaked havoc on the Iranian economy. In the past two years Iran’s currency has dropped sharply in value; oil exports have been halved; and the country is struggling with the consequences of the drastic decline in oil prices, which have fallen from $110 a barrel to less than $60.

Despite these problems, Iran’s supreme leader is unlikely to allow, let alone seek, formal ties with the United States. He remains deeply suspicious of U.S. intentions and shares the view of his intelligence and security agencies that American objections to Iran’s nuclear program and human rights record are a mask for a hidden U.S. agenda to bring about regime change in the Islamic Republic.

The U.S. and Iran are on opposite sides of a number of hot-button regional issues. Iran supports embattled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whose ouster the U.S. seeks. Tehran continues to treat Israel, a U.S. ally, as an illegitimate state that does not deserve to exist, and it funds and supports with arms Israel’s most inveterate non-state enemies: Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza strip. Iranian backing helps explain the growing success of the Shiite Houthis in the civil war in Yemen, a development unwelcome to Saudi Arabia, another U.S. ally in the region.

Iran and the U.S. did indirectly join sides to secure the selection of Haider al-Abadi as Iraq’s prime minister this year. But they compete for influence in that country, as they do across a large arc of the Middle East. Iran’s leader seeks to undermine and weaken the U.S. presence in the region, not enhance it.

For years, Ayatollah Khamenei has fulminated against hegemonic U.S. intentions in the Middle East and warned of “the cultural onslaught” from the West that threatens not only Iran but the entire Islamic world. He takes pride in what he believes is Iran’s readiness, among regional states, to stand up to American bullying. He has tied his regional influence and standing to opposing the United States. A U.S. embassy, flying the American flag, in Tehran is simply not in the cards. It would negate everything Ayatollah Khamenei has stood for in more than two decades as supreme leader.

And the ayatollah is not the only one opposed. Commanders of the Revolutionary Guards, senior officers of the intelligence and security agencies, and many conservative politicians and clerics share the view that friendship with the U.S. would betray their cause. These same groups wrecked the attempt of reformist then-President Mohammad Khatami to engineer a rapprochement with the U.S. in the late 1990s.

Ayatollah Khamenei has allowed President Hasan Rouhani and his foreign minister to explore the possibility of a nuclear agreement with the West but has made clear to them his “red lines.” He, too, wants sanctions lifted. If there is a deal and sanctions are lifted, other steps may follow; but diplomatic relations would not be among them. If a nuclear agreement is reached, the U.S. would be wise to pursue a more limited agenda and focus, instead, on expanding trade and economic relations and discussing–provided that Ayatollah Khamenei is willing–the many regional issues that divide the two countries.

The opinions expressed here are solely those of the author.

This was originally published in The Wall Street Journal's Washington Wire.

About the Author

Haleh Esfandiari headhsot

Haleh Esfandiari

Distinguished Fellow; Director Emerita, Middle East Program 
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Middle East Program

The Wilson Center’s Middle East Program serves as a crucial resource for the policymaking community and beyond, providing analyses and research that helps inform U.S. foreign policymaking, stimulates public debate, and expands knowledge about issues in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.  Read more