Book Launch&#8212;<i>Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose</i>

Professor Pyle stated that Japan is making an historic, almost revolutionary change in its foreign policy as a result of changes in the international situation since the end of the Cold War. He described this process as "organizing internally to succeed externally." This, he said, was one of the main themes of his recent book, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose.

During the Cold War, noted Pyle, Japan relied on American security guarantees as it focused its energy on building up its economic strength. It used its MacArthur-drafted constitution as a pretext for self-imposed restrictions to avoid any political-military responsibilities in international affairs. Pyle listed these restraints as: no overseas deployment of Japanese troops; no participation in collective defense arrangements; no power projection ability; no nuclear arms; no export of arms; no sharing of defense-related technology; no spending over 1 percent of GDP on defense; and no engagement in arms in space.

This, concluded Pyle, allowed Japan to stay on the sidelines during the Cold War. However, when the Cold War ended, Japan's economics-first policy, with its institutions geared to adapt in a bi-polar world, immediately became outmoded. This was manifest when Japan received bitter criticism for lack of active engagement in the first Gulf War, and with the occurrence of the first nuclear crisis with North Korea in 1994, the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, and the North Korean missile test over Japan in 1998. Japan today is facing a rising China and a belligerent North Korea. Concentrating on building up economic power alone will no longer suffice. Japan's ruling elite began sensing the need to readjust to its changing external environment, as it had done so many times over the past century and a half. Japan has, asserted Pyle, step by step and almost imperceptibly begun to undo its Cold War strategy and restrictions.

Professor Pyle gave the following examples. Japan has modified its restriction on sending military forces abroad. Since 1992, Japanese forces have been involved in UN peacekeeping efforts around the world. Japan has sent tankers and Aegis destroyers as back-up support to coalition forces in Afghanistan, and dispatched ground forces to Iraq for humanitarian purposes. Prime Minister Abe has made clear he wants to do away with limitations on collective self-defense. He has appointed a blue-ribbon panel to study the issue. The power projection restriction is being modified as well. Japan has purchased Boeing refueling tankers, and has plans for developing helicopter-carrying aircraft carriers. Japan has also made a decision to tighten its relationship with the United States, agreeing in 2003 to cooperate in missile defense and share technology. Since the North Korean missile test in 1998, Japan has sent four spy satellites into space.

Japan is busy reorganizing its institutions to adapt them to its changing strategic policy. The paradigm for this, noted Pyle, is the Meiji era, beginning in the mid-19th century, when Japan revised all its domestic institutions in an effort to catch up to the West in strength and power. Presently, Japan is engaged in serious discussions to revise its U.S.-drafted constitution. It has never been amended. Japan's weak prime-ministership is being strengthened to that of a stronger executive, to give the prime minister a greater role in foreign policy and national security issues. A Japanese national security council is being created to assist the prime minister. The Japanese Defense Agency has been upgraded to a full Defense Ministry.

Finally, the political system is beginning to realign itself in favor of a consensus for a new, more active foreign policy. Prime Minister Abe is the youngest prime minister in 65 years, and the first born since World War II. At the same time, as a grandson of a prime minister, he reflects the continuity of the ruling elite. Abe and his generation are prepared to be much more politically assertive. They view China as a rival; there is little feeling of war guilt.

In terms of the U.S.-Japan alliance, Japan has made a decision to tighten the relationship, which has been much closer over the past decade. However, cautions Pyle, this does not mean that all will be smooth sailing. Japan will seek to assert maximum autonomy, and will not wish to be hostage to U.S. global policy. Japan is an Asian nation, and will continue to see its basic priorities as originating in Asia. Its definition of strategic interests will also differ from Washington's, especially with regard to oil and the Middle East.

Drafted by Mark Mohr, Asia Program Associate
Robert M. Hathaway, Director, Asia Program. Ph: (202) 691-4020