Iranian Domestic Politics and Relations with the United States

Nicola Pedde, the Director of the Institute for Global Studies in Rome, discussed Iran’s evolving domestic political situation and its relationship with the United States.

On January 15, 2015, the Middle East Program of the Woodrow Wilson Center hosted an event “Iranian Domestic Politics and Relations with the United States” with Pedde. Haleh Esfandiari, Director of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center, moderated the event.

Pedde opened the event by discussing how Western perspectives of Iran do not easily allow for a comprehensive understanding of Iran’s domestic political composition. He noted a gradual transition taking place in Iran that he believes encompasses three generations of Iranians. The first generation reflects the ideologies of the revolution of 1979 and its strong opposition to interaction with the West, in particular the United States. This generation opposes any nuclear deal with the West. Pedde noted this generation has not replicated itself politically and fails to represent the views of the majority of Iranians.

The second generation emerged out of the Iran-Iraq War. According to Pedde, this generation defends the ideals of the Islamic Revolution over the needs of the country. This generation has an intense mistrust of the United States yet believes in Iran’s ability to influence the outside world and deter foreign enemies. Both the first and second generations believe Iran remains a constant target of the West and United States.

The third generation, or the youth majority of Iran, lacks current representation and finds it difficult to engage in politics. Pedde summarized that the outlook for Iranian domestic politics is not positive. According to Pedde, domestic disagreement both scares those who have benefited from years of isolation and challenges the ideals of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. All of these factors show that the Western reading of a “monolithic” Iran no longer fully applies.   

On the topic of U.S.-Iranian negotiations, Pedde explained that regardless of Iran’s official status of non-cooperation with the United States, the two states’ views coincide when it comes to Islamist militant groups. Pedde said working together to eradicate ISIS makes sense, but Khamenei must deny any cooperative action, at least publically, in order to adhere to revolutionary ideology. Additionally, accepting an agreement from the West in the P5+1 talks poses a challenge within the ideological framework of the Islamic Revolution and with the current political perception of the United States. Pedde explained that Iranians often interpret the United States as only interested in fixing issues beneficial to itself and that a perpetual underlying U.S. goal is regime change in Iran.  

In response to Esfandiari’s question about public opinion, Pedde said public opinion is the most important issue in Iran and Khamenei’s reluctant acceptance of the nuclear talks stems from President Hassan Rouhani’s popular election and the notion that his decisions represent popular opinion. Pedde also explained there can be multiple outcomes from the nuclear negotiations, including a partial agreement in which Rouhani will emerge a winner and a failure of negotiations that would likely have domestic consequences. Lastly, Pedde commented on the potential effects of the oil price decline; Pedde stated that while there will definitely be an economic impact, Iran in the past weathered eight years of a low price of oil and believes Iran is better prepared this time for this issue than its neighboring states.

By Jessica Wisniewski