Zimbabwe: An Update from the Ground

On September 18th, the Africa Program hosted an event titled "Zimbabwe: An Update from the Ground." The featured panelists were Isabella Matambanadzo, Harare based Zimbabwe Program Manager for the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) and Deprose Muchena, Economic Justice Program Manager for OSISA based in Johannesburg, South Africa. The event was moderated by Dave Peterson, Senior Director for the National Endowment for Democracy's Africa program.

Deprose Muchena began his remarks by stressing that he would be speaking in his capacity as a Zimbabwean citizen rather than a scholar or expert. He identified the current Zimbabwean crisis as having national, regional and international implications. He expressed a belief that the current contestation of ideas about the future of Zimbabwe has become nothing more than "political theater" to the detriment of Zimbabwean citizens.

He identified four major deficits which he believes are preventing progress in Zimbabwe:

1) A democracy deficit which began eight to nine years ago, and manifests itself as a crisis in governance and unchecked political domination. The ruling party, Muchena says, is bereft of any ideas and resorts to "force, fraud and fiction" in the execution of its decisions. He emphasized the fraudulent nature of elections held in 2000 and 2005. He criticized in particular the passage of the Public Order and Security Act which has been invoked to arrest over 1,000 perceived political dissidents. Muchena noted that, although those arrested are often incarcerated in inhumane environs for lengthy periods, once they are processed through the judicial system, many of these cases are being thrown out by judges who are defying the current regime.

2) A leadership deficit also plagues Zimbabwe, according to Muchena. The country has become "the albatross of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)." There is no discernable difference between the government and the ruling ZANU-PF party, that is to say, any political opposition is impotent. He characterized politics in Zimbabwe as paralyzed by factionalism. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party is splintered in two and the ruling ZANU-PF party is also paralyzed in a chaotic search for a successor to President Robert Mugabe. Muchena sees no semblance of a socio-economic framework to serve as a foundation for sustainable development; rather, he sees the economy as being driven by the narrow economic aims of special interest groups.

3) A macroeconomic deficit. The ZANU-PF party has implemented no less than nine unsuccessful economic instruments in the past decade in an attempt to control the deteriorating economy. Zimbabwe's inflationary pressures are so immense that they are difficult to estimate. Official government figures, which are vastly understated, peg the figure at 7,500% annually. In practice, Muchena said, this has meant that basic items such as toothpaste are rarely found on store shelves and must be purchased via informal economic transactions. Unemployment hovers around 80%. As an example of Zimbabwe's financial crisis, Muchena explained that a recent supplemental budget was passed, which was in fact six times as large as the annual budget it purported to supplement. Muchena said that 90% of the budget is simply expenditures, with only 10% going toward capital investment. Zimbabwe was once the breadbasket of Southern Africa but agricultural exports have recently fallen by 40%. Muchena feels the decline in agriculture was compounded by ZANU-PF's contentious land reform measures. Muchena identified a complete lack of foreign direct investment as a direct backlash to the current regime; however, he observed that Angola and South Africa have agreed in principal to provide around $1 billion for the purposes of macroeconomic stability.

4) The final deficit discussed was a deficit of truth in the Zimbabwean discourse. Muchena portrayed the government as disseminating propaganda which romanticizes the ruling party's actions with anti-colonial rhetoric. The government accepts no responsibility for the current crisis, blaming it entirely on external actors. According to Muchena, Mugabe has propagated a myth of oppressive Western sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe; while in fact, Zimbabwe benefits from a 26% trade surplus with the United States. The major restrictions levied against Zimbabwe, Muchena noted, are simply US and EU travel bans which apply only to about 100 ZANU-PF leaders.

In closing, Muchena identified the next six months as critical for the future of Zimbabwe, especially with respect to preparedness for upcoming elections. He expressed concern over the closed-door nature of SADC's attempts to deal with the Zimbabwean question.

Isabella Matambanadzo echoed many of her colleague's sentiments. She opened by saying that having a hot shower, a warm breakfast and the ability to easily pay cash for a taxi fare while in Washington D.C. starkly dramatized for her how critical the situation in Zimbabwe has become. She concentrated her remarks on the status of Human Rights Defenders (HRD) in Zimbabwe. She reported that over 1,000 people have been harassed or arrested this year, simply because they were suspected of being political dissidents. Matambanadzo compared the draconian laws of the Ian Smith regime and those of Mugabe's administration. Not only HRD themselves, but their families are targets of intimidation.

Public assembly has become probable cause for arrest under laws such as the Miscellaneous Offenses Act. Matambanadzo expressed a belief that legal structures such as this effectively outlaw basic freedoms and rights, which are otherwise guaranteed. She believes that instances of intimidation and harassment will increase as elections draw nearer. The freedom of expression is curtailed in Zimbabwe by the Media Commission which often revokes the registration of any media outlet publishing material seen as against the government's interests.

She elaborated on Muchena's concern for jailed political opposition leaders, accusing the government of denying food, water and basic medical care to detainees. She described the plight of NGOs and trade unions operating in Zimbabwe, who she said receive anonymous threats regularly. She detailed continual harassment of the National Constitutional Assembly, which is a non-governmental organisation formed in 1997 as a grouping of individual Zimbabwean citizens and civic organisations that call for the replacement of the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution which they consider to be outdated. Matambanadzo expressed concerned over restrictions on the freedom of movement and increased militarization of the state as embodied in the Joint Operations Command, which is an advisory body comprised of the heads of Zimbabwe's military police and intelligence services.

Matambanadzo ended by recommending the UN send a Senior Special Advisor for Human Rights and Special Rapporteurs on Violence Towards Women to Zimbabwe in order to pressure the government for reform. She also urged that SADC efforts to deal with the Zimbabwean question become more overt in nature.

The event was co-sponsored by the Wilson Center and the Open Society Institute.

Drafted by Robert Hurtekant, Intern and Roseline Fodouop Tekeu, Program Assistant, Africa Program.