Four months after the military ousted President Mohammed Morsi, what is the status of political Islam in Egypt? Who is out? Who is in? And are the Islamists still a political force?
Political Islam in Egypt has suffered a tremendous blow, its biggest setback since its emergence as a formidable ideology and political movement in the early 20th century. The Muslim Brotherhood is now out: Former President Mohamed Morsi was removed from power on July 3, 2013. He is now on trial for inciting violence and murder, which carry a possible death penalty. The Brotherhood has been declared illegal. And its leaders arrested and its assets confiscated. But it is not yet clear if other Islamist groups, particularly Salafi groups such as the Nour Party, are in or have benefited from the Brotherhood’s declining fortunes.
But it would be extremely premature to declare the end of the movement, let alone the death of political Islam.
As the government trial of former President Morsi begins, what is the status of the Muslim Brotherhood? And what actions are the military-backed government taking against it?
The Muslim Brotherhood is in tremendous disarray. The movement is facing greater repression today than in all of its 85-year history. Several thousand Brotherhood members have been arrested, including Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie, Deputy Guide Khairat El Shater, and the majority of the group’s governing Guidance Bureau. The leadership of the Freedom and Justice Party, which is the Brotherhood’s political arm, has also been arrested. Among those detained are party chief Mohamed Saad El Katatny, the FJP’s second-in-command Essam El Erian, and other prominent leaders such as Mohamed El Beltagi.
The new Egyptian government has also taken a number of legal steps against the movement. In September 2013, Egypt’s State Commissioners Authority, which advises the government on legal matters, recommended that the Brotherhood be dissolved. On Sept. 23, 2013, a Cairo court banned its activities and authorized seizure of its assets. In early October, the Ministry of Social Solidarity, the government agency that licenses and regulates non-governmental and civil society organizations, ordered the dissolution of the movement. State and private media outlets have also engaged in a relentless media campaign against the organization.
Egypt’s military backed government has arrested dozens of Muslim Brotherhood leaders. But it is also apparently trying to dismantle the basic unit – the usra – of the biggest Islamist party in the Middle East. What is the usra, and why is it important?
The usra, which means “family” in Arabic, is the smallest unit and the basic building block of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is the base of the movement, or the bottom of its chain-of-command. Usras are small groups -- typically about seven members -- who meet regularly to study religious lessons and discuss political and social issues. Each usra is headed by a leader, and members develop close relationships based on familiarity and trust.
The security forces are reportedly trying to dismantle the Brotherhood’s usra structure, a tremendously ambitious undertaking. If the usra structure is significantly disrupted, the Brotherhood’s ability to effectively organize on a large scale and maintain discipline and coherence would be seriously threatened. Egyptian analysts have speculated that the current scale of repression against the movement could lead to radicalization among some Muslim Brotherhood members, encouraging some to take up arms, as happened in Algeria in the early 1990s.
What is the grandfather of Arab Islamist movements doing to survive? How has its strategy evolved? In what locations or institutions do the Brotherhood still have influence? Are new voices emerging? What are the Brotherhood’s future prospects?
The Muslim Brotherhood continues to reject the legitimacy of the military-appointed government and its transitional road map. It declared that the military ouster of President Morsi on July 3, 2012 was an illegal coup against the country’s first democratically elected civilian president. Since then, Muslim Brotherhood supporters have frequently staged protests of various sizes after Friday prayers, mostly in public squares and on many university campuses.
Egypt has been unable to stabilize the country, entice tourists or lure foreign investors on the scale needed to promote economic recovery and growth. The Brotherhood’s rejection of the interim government and the transition roadmap has further complicated the military-backed government’s efforts. So has the spike in violence in the Sinai and other parts of the country, including attacks on military installations and security personnel, Coptic Christians, and the attempted assassination of the interior minister in early September.
So far, the ultraconservative Salafi parties have cooperated with the military. What is the status of the Salafis? On what do they agree and disagree with the military? What influence do they have in drafting a new constitution?
The Salafi Nour Party supported the military ouster of President Morsi. The Nour Party played an important role in justifying the coup providing legitimacy to the move and implied that not all Islamists supported the Brotherhood. Salafi support for Morsi’s ouster symbolized the extent to which Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood had become unpopular—even among fellow Islamists.
But Salafi groups such as the Nour Party face a basic dilemma because, like the Brotherhood, they believe that Islam should play a role in politics. Salafis are actually more socially and politically conservative than the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Nour Party has a representative on the 50-person constitution drafting committee, but the group’s influence appears minimal. The new draft constitution includes an article that prohibits any political parties based on religion, which would apply to the Nour Party (among others) and almost certainly make it illegal. The party quickly condemned the article. Other Islamist parties have rejected Morsi’s ouster and have called for his reinstatement.
How is a new constitution likely to handle religious parties? What are the ramifications for Islamist groups and – and for changing Egypt’s political map?
Egypt’s current political environment is generally hostile to all Islamist politics, and Islamists are likely to face difficulties participating in politics for years to come. The military, secular and “liberal” political elite reject Islamist politics, although public sentiment about parties such as the Nour Party are still unclear, especially on questions of whether they will be allowed to participate in the parliamentary and presidential elections.
Samer S. Shehata is Associate Professor of Middle Eastern Politics in the Department of International and Area Studies at the University of Oklahoma.
Click here to read his chapter on the founders of political Islam in Egypt.
Photo credits: President Mohamed Morsi via his official Facebook page.