After North Vietnam’s army launched an offensive against South Vietnam in early March 1975, it was clear by early April that the Saigon government would not survive. 

Henry Kissinger, then serving concurrently as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, desperately sought the assistance of Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin. As he recorded in his book Ending the Vietnam War, Kissinger categorized US-Soviet negotiations on a variety of issues in April 1975 as “stalemated,” but he believed that the Soviets “continued to have a stake” in maintaining cordial relations.[1] Consequently, Kissinger began to engage Dobrynin to gain his and the Soviets assistance in managing the American exit from Vietnam. Kissinger did not engage the North Vietnamese because he believed they would ignore his entreaty or use it against him in negotiations. 

Kissinger sought two specific things from Dobrynin. First, to arrange for the orderly evacuation of US nationals and Vietnamese who Kissinger knew were in jeopardy because they had worked with the United States. Second, and although not mentioned explicitly in his book, Kissinger was determined not to let the looming South Vietnamese defeat interfere with other important consultations between the two nuclear-armed superpowers.

The contents of Kissinger’s talks with Dobrynin were partially disclosed in Kissinger’s own book as well as through the Foreign Relations of the United States series. But there are still gaps in the documentary record – gaps which are now partially filled thanks to new set of translated Russian documents. Originally sourced from the Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF) in Moscow, these documents are now accessible in English translation on the Wilson Center Digital Archive

On April 3, 1975, Dobrynin noted that Kissinger, in a “somewhat philosophical and detached mood,” told him that the “North Vietnamese have been quite lucky,” that Congress had “passed a law prohibiting US military intervention in events in Indochina.” Foreshadowing his postwar defense of the Nixon administration, Kissinger  mused that “if it were not for Watergate and the subsequent sharp decline in government power and authority, North Vietnam would not have been able to disassociate itself as easily, given that their actions violate the existing agreement with the US.”

As North Vietnamese forces encircled Saigon in preparation for an assault on the city, on April 19, Kissinger relayed a crucial message from President Gerald Ford to General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. The note was carefully attuned to massage Soviet sensibilities while ensnaring them in big-power global politics. Kissinger began by asserting that US-Soviet relations since May 1972 had been  based on “restraint,” but that the “situation in Vietnam has now reached a point where the United States and the Soviet Union must consider the long-term consequences of the international situation as a whole.” Kissinger requested that Moscow exercise its relations with Hanoi to “facilitate a temporary cessation of hostilities [to] create controlled conditions that would save lives and facilitate the safe evacuation of American citizens and South Vietnamese individuals for whom we have a direct and special responsibility.”

Kissinger played on Brezhnev’s ego by noting that Ford was directly requesting the Soviet leader’s help to convince Hanoi to permit an orderly US evacuation. Moreover, Ford had not asked the Chinese for similar assistance since Beijing’s ability to “impact global events are vastly different and incomparable to those of the Soviet Union. The USSR and the USA stand as the key players determining the course of global events on a worldwide scale.” 

To arm Brezhnev with a compelling message, Kissinger confirmed that the US would not provide additional weapons to Saigon and that it would not undertake any military action unless its evacuation procedures were fired upon. Kissinger also reported that the US agreed to restart negotiations with Hanoi to find a political solution to the war. However, Kissinger revealed that if Washington was unable to evacuate its citizens in a safe manner, the “emotional turmoil” and damage to America’s “national pride” might force Ford into rash actions. 

Although Kissinger knew his message was a thinly disguised plea for Soviet help backed by an obvious military bluff, he nonetheless attempted to situate his request within the broader goals of the policy of détente with the Soviet Union. Détente would be severely challenged, he claimed, if the evacuation was a disaster. Yet if it could be achieved seamlessly, this would demonstrate to those in the US opposed to improving relations that “no major international issues can be resolved without the participation of the Soviet Union, let alone by bypassing it.” 

Although Kissinger’s report to Dobrynin was a masterful attempt at state manipulation, Dobrynin’s cable to Moscow containing his analysis of Kissinger’s request has not yet been obtained or translated. That cable, if it becomes accessible, will hopefully provide his analysis and recommendations, which should prove highly insightful into what the Soviets discussed with Hanoi. The next day, Dobrynin informed Kissinger that the Soviets had passed Ford’s note to North Vietnam. 

While waiting for the Soviet response, US intelligence noted that the People’s Army was marshaling near Tan Son Nhut airport, the primary evacuation node for American citizens. On April 22, Kissinger appealed again to Dobrynin. He said that President Ford’s “primary concern is whether the reported troop concentration around the Saigon airport signals North Vietnamese intentions to capture it and potentially trap any Americans not yet evacuated from Saigon before Hanoi formally responds to Washington’s appeal conveyed through the good offices of the Soviet side.” 

Brent Scowcroft, Kissinger’s deputy National Security Advisor, speaking with Dobrynin shortly afterwards, ominously repeated that currently there were no US Marines securing the airport, but they were being “amassed in numbers and positioned near the South Vietnamese coastline for potential deployment” if anyone interfered with the evacuation process. 

Dobrynin’s memcon does not reveal his evaluation of the veiled American threats, although Kissinger later wrote that he assumed that Dobrynin did not take the implicit warnings of April 19 and April 22 seriously. 

On April 24, Dobrynin telephoned Kissinger to provide Hanoi’s response. The record of this talk was previously published in the Foreign Relations of the United States series. Dobrynin confirmed that Hanoi had “no intention” to interfere with the US evacuation, that any political settlement would “proceed from the Paris agreement,” and that North Vietnam did not “intend to damage the prestige of the United States.” Dobrynin noted that Brezhnev implored Washington not to engage in any “action” that might create a “new exacerbation of the situation,” a reflection of the American warnings. In a call with Scowcroft shortly thereafter, Kissinger remarked that he had spoken to Dobrynin a second time, and that Dobrynin had classified Hanoi’s response as a “positive development.” Dobrynin added that “what is not said in the note is sometimes better than if it was very explicit,” which Kissinger thought was “very interesting.”[2]

Believing that Hanoi had given a “green light” to allow the safe evacuation of Americans, and despite Dobrynin’s caution about not demanding details from Hanoi, Kissinger responded the next day with a series of questions in an attempt to gain “every last possible extension” to remove as many Vietnamese as possible before Hanoi attacked Saigon. He also assured Brezhnev that, as long as no one interfered with the evacuation, meaning attacking Tan Son Nhut, the US would not “exacerbate the situation.”[3] Over the next four days, US airplanes continued to ferry American and Vietnamese citizens from Tan Son Nhut, but when North Vietnamese artillery hit the airport on April 28, killed two US Marines guards and cratered the runway, an outraged Kissinger called Dobrynin.

Kissinger again threatened a US military response if further Americans were killed, and he warned Dobrynin that Hanoi’s actions “cannot help but impact” US-Soviet relations since Hanoi’s message had been transmitted through Moscow. Furthermore, Hanoi’s actions are a “deliberate and calculated blow to the prestige of the administration and the President personally.” Dobrynin claims he “calmly rebutted” Kissinger. He stressed that the Soviets had acted in good faith, and it was the America’s fault for not speeding up the evacuation. He buttressed his argument by citing the “criticism unfolding in the US Congress and the press regarding the delayed execution of the operation to evacuate Americans from Saigon.”

Hanoi’s slim published record is vague about these diplomatic exchanges but confirms that they had agreed to Kissinger’s request of April 19 to allow the Americans to evacuate. However, South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu’s sudden resignation on April 21, and the actions of his successor Tran Van Huong to contact the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG), Hanoi’s front in South Vietnam, to discuss a ceasefire, raised North Vietnam’s suspicions. The Politburo believed that the Americans were using the evacuation as a ruse to install a neutral administration in Saigon and thus delay Hanoi’s attack on the city. Based on this assessment, on April 26, the PRG publicly called for “the total elimination of the entire puppet governmental apparatus and the puppet military and security apparatus. … This in effect was an ultimatum demanding that the enemy surrender.”[4] Thus, Hanoi launched its military attack to conquer Saigon on April 26 partially to defeat what it alleged was a US scheme, rather than Kissinger’s stated but apparently hidden intent to evacuate more South Vietnamese.

Given the shelling of Tan Son Nhut, Ford ordered the evacuation of all Americans. This was accomplished by the morning of April 30 as North Vietnamese tanks rolled into the city center. Although the translations of Dobrynin’s memoranda of conversation offer fascinating new insights into US-Soviet relations, unfortunately his cables to Moscow providing his analysis of American policy and intentions remain untapped. Hence, the diplomatic maneuvering between Washington, Moscow, and Hanoi to end the Vietnam War remains clouded. Hopefully, further archival revelations from Moscow will enlighten the record.

Connected Sources

From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Record of a Conversation with the Secretary of State of the United States,  H. Kissinger, 3 April 1975'

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), f. 0129, op. 59, p. 449, d. 4, ll. 108-114. Contributed by Sergey Radchenko and translated by Angela Greenfield.

From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Memorandum of the Conversation with Secretary of State of the United States, H. Kissinger, 19 April 1975'

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), f. 0129, op. 59, p. 449, d. 4, ll. 129-135. Contributed by Sergey Radchenko and translated by Angela Greenfield.

From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Memorandum of the Conversation with Secretary of State of the United States, H. Kissinger, 22 April 1975'

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), f. 0129, op. 59, p. 449, d. 4, ll. 137-138. Contributed by Sergey Radchenko and translated by Angela Greenfield.

From the Journal of A.F. Dobrynin, 'Memorandum of the Conversation with Secretary of State of the United States, H. Kissinger, 28 April 1975'

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF), f. 0129, op. 59, p. 449, d. 4, ll. 142-144. Contributed by Sergey Radchenko and translated by Angela Greenfield.

[1] Henry Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003), 542.

[2] TELCON, Scowcroft and Kissinger, 5:45 p.m., April 24, 1975, https://www.proquest.com/government-official-publications/north-vietnamese-cooperation-with-evacuation/docview/1679104429/se-2.

[3] Kissinger, Ending the Vietnam War, 546.

[4] Vu Duong Huan, “Ngoại giao trong tổng tiến công và nổi dây giải phóng hoan toan Miền Nam mùa Xuân 1975,” (“Diplomacy During the General Offensive and Uprisings that Totally Liberated Vietnam in the Spring of 1975”), Tạp chí Nghiên cứu Quốc tế (International Studies Journal), No. 2 (101) (June 2015): 60.