A blog of the Kennan Institute
In Moscow, life continues with an air of striking normalcy. US President Donald Trump’s calls to resolve the Russo-Ukrainian war do not evoke urgency or a rush to compromise. Instead, the Kremlin and Russia’s elites see an opportunity in Trump’s push for a settlement—one that allows them to maximize their gains while he remains preoccupied with reshaping US foreign policy and as America’s allies appear uncertain and fatigued.
Putin and his inner circle may be frustrated by the impact of sanctions and the struggles of Russia’s civilian economy. Yet, despite real economic pressures, Moscow has successfully insulated both the militarized sector of the economy and society from the direct consequences of the war. In this landscape, Putin has little incentive to seek immediate peace. For him, negotiations are not an offramp, but another tool to consolidate his position.
Layers of Insulation
Russia’s oil and gas revenues remain strong, with oil-related state budget proceeds rising by nearly a third last year, driven by higher crude prices and the country’s adaptation to international sanctions. War-related industries have been largely insulated from the economic strain affecting the rest of the country. The military sector, bolstered by wartime budgets and subsidized interest rates, remains untouched by the Central Bank’s record-high interest rates. Meanwhile, efforts to curb inflation fall almost entirely on the civilian economy, deepening its financial burden.
According to the Western narrative, Russia’s weakening economy and rising inflation should, in theory, erode domestic support for the war and eventually push the Kremlin toward compromise. However, this logic does not hold in autocracies, where the state has extensive tools to shield itself from political fallout. The Russian leadership has managed to insulate itself from the war’s consequences through financial injections, public opinion manipulation, and repression—ensuring that discontent remains fragmented and largely ineffective.
While economic pressures are real, they are not seen as catastrophic. Russia’s economy remains in a precarious yet sustainable state—what one of my interlocutors from Moscow described as “steadily shaky.” As a result, economic strain alone is unlikely to force the Kremlin into concessions in the foreseeable future.
A particularly crucial mechanism for shielding Russian society from the strains and psychological pressures of war is what can be described as “commercial mobilization.” While the war dominates state propaganda—permeating schools, kindergartens, and official rhetoric—it remains largely invisible in everyday urban life. Walking through the streets of Russian cities, one would hardly notice any war-related imagery beyond enlistment ads. The absence of overt wartime mobilization allows the majority of Russians to go about their daily lives largely unaffected.
This detachment extends to perceptions of those who fight in the war. Veterans are not widely celebrated as heroes because most of them are highly paid volunteers rather than drafted soldiers fighting for a national cause. Many are pardoned convicts, whose return to civilian life raises safety concerns rather than admiration. A majority of those polled by the independent polling project ExtremeScan, approve of draft evaders. The war, for much of Russian society, remains an abstract event—one that is happening elsewhere, affecting others, and requiring little personal engagement. This carefully maintained insulation is key to the Kremlin’s ability to sustain the war without provoking widespread public unrest.
All in all, the Kremlin has effectively insulated itself from both the economic and political pressure that wars tend to cause. Political dissent is contained through a combination of propaganda, repression, and a controlled information space, reinforcing the state’s resilience against external pressure.
Pressuring the Cracks in Putin’s Insulation
That said, Moscow does not have unlimited time to prolong the war. The relative economic stability of the past two years has been driven largely by non-market factors, such as war-related spending and state subsidies, which have significantly expanded the non-market sector of the economy. However, the costs of war and sanctions are steadily mounting, making the war effort increasingly expensive. Society is beginning to feel the strain, with inflation reaching 9.5 percent year-on-year in December 2024 and corporate debt continuing to rise. Some economists warn that rising debt levels could trigger a wave of bankruptcies and even a banking crisis, though this remains more of a subject of debate rather than a consensus view.
Moscow sees Trump’s push for peace as a window of opportunity—not to seek a permanent settlement, but to recalibrate Moscow’s position on the global stage. Putin seeks a summit with a US president to elevate his own profile. The meeting doesn’t need to be conclusive or even substantive to serve this purpose. The Kremlin views Trump’s pushy approach and skepticism toward traditional alliances as an opening to secure concessions without offering much in return. If negotiations do happen, they will not be about ending the war but about reasserting Russia’s global influence under the guise of diplomacy.
Moscow’s strategic priority is maintaining regime stability. Putin will push negotiations on his own terms, leveraging Trump’s foreign policy priorities to his advantage. He sees the shifting geopolitical landscape not as a moment for compromise but as an opportunity to secure gains while sustaining his hold on power.
For now, Russia can sustain the conflict, but cracks are beginning to show. The mounting costs of war, inflation, rising corporate debt, and a financial system increasingly reliant on state intervention all point to vulnerabilities that Washington could exploit. The illusion of normalcy in Russian society depends on keeping the war at arm’s length—shielding both news and consequences of the war from the daily life of average Russians. Putin may not feel urgency now, but that does not mean pressure cannot be applied.
One area where the U.S. can exert meaningful pressure is the humanitarian front. About 20,000 Ukrainian children have been forcibly deported to Russia from occupied territories, and thousands of Ukrainian civilians remain missing or are illegally detained in violation of international law. At the same time, anti-war protesters and human rights advocates continue to face persecution and imprisonment. This is an issue that transcends politics—one that few in the international community would dispute. If the U.S. were to make it a central focus of negotiations and diplomatic efforts, it could reshape the conversation and intensify pressure on Moscow. Even raising these issues forcefully and consistently on the global stage would heighten scrutiny, making it increasingly difficult for Russia to ignore or justify these violations.
The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.
Author
Editor-at-Large, Meduza
Kennan Institute
The Kennan Institute is the premier US center for advanced research on Eurasia and the oldest and largest regional program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The Kennan Institute is committed to improving American understanding of Russia, Ukraine, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and the surrounding region though research and exchange. Read more