This piece is based on a conversation between Lucian Kim and Maxim Trudolyubov, editor of The Russia File, discussing Lucian’s upcoming book, Putin’s Revenge: Why Russia Invaded Ukraine. In the book, Kim draws on years of reporting and personal experiences covering Russia and Ukraine to explore the historical, political, and personal forces that shaped Vladimir Putin’s worldview and led to the war in Ukraine.

Lucian Kim

When the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, I was in Washington—far away from both Ukraine and Russia, the two countries I had been covering since Vladimir Putin’s first term in office. I felt helpless and disconnected from the unfolding tragedy.

But I realized I could tell a story. I had witnessed many of the key events surrounding Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014. As I watched the full-scale invasion unfold years later, I recognized the Kremlin recycling many of its old narratives to justify its actions. Having followed these developments closely, I knew that much of this rhetoric was false, distorted, or deliberately skewed—narratives that needed to be challenged and clarified.

At the same time, I did not approach this project with a specific agenda. My goal was to tell the story as I had experienced it, to explore the motivations behind Russia’s actions, and to examine the broader geopolitical context. I aimed to consider the conflict from multiple perspectives—from the Ukrainian point of view, from the perspective of Russia’s domestic political environment, and through the lens of how Ukraine’s fate resonates with Western Europeans and Americans. Understanding the role of the West, particularly NATO’s influence and policies, was essential to the picture.

Imperial Legacy and Autocratic Ambition

In my view, two key forces propelled this conflict: the enduring legacy of Russian imperialism and Vladimir Putin’s increasingly autocratic rule. These forces converged to create the conditions for war. However, the West also played a role, making serious miscalculations along the way—though this in no way diminishes Putin’s ultimate responsibility for the invasion.

One critical Western misstep I highlight is President George W. Bush’s insistence on pushing for NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia in 2008. This decision was influenced, in part, by the aftermath of the Iraq War. Seeking to reward Ukraine and Georgia for their support during the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, Bush advocated for their inclusion in NATO despite clear opposition from within the Alliance.

At the time, NATO was unprepared to offer meaningful security guarantees, and Ukraine itself was deeply divided on the issue, with only a minority of Ukrainians supporting NATO membership. What ultimately emerged was a dangerous ambiguity: NATO opened the door to future Ukrainian membership without any real intention or capacity to follow through. This left Ukraine exposed and vulnerable to aggression from its revanchist neighbor.

U.S. and Russia at Cross Purposes Over Ukraine 

Putin’s growing obsession with controlling Ukraine developed in stark contrast to the waning interest of the West, particularly the United States. Bush pushed hard for Ukraine’s NATO membership near the end of his presidency, despite limited support from European allies and divisions within Ukraine itself. That push effectively ended with Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, which derailed any immediate prospects of Georgian NATO membership.

This trajectory ultimately led to Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014. The tragedy is that after Bush left office, no subsequent American president showed sustained strategic interest in Ukraine. Contrary to popular narratives, there was no grand U.S. strategy aimed at establishing a foothold there to weaken Russia. In reality, Ukraine faded from Washington’s geopolitical priorities. The more important it became for Putin, who was becoming more and more autocratic, the less important it grew for Americans.

Barack Obama entered office determined to end U.S. military engagements and shift responsibility for Europe’s defense onto its own leaders. He was completely uninterested in Europe. His administration’s foreign policy priority was the “pivot to Asia,” aimed at countering China’s growing influence.

In this respect, Donald Trump’s strategic outlook was similar. While his rhetoric was often unpredictable, his administration’s broader geopolitical focus remained centered on China, with Russia considered a secondary threat to be contained rather than confronted.

When Joe Biden took office, his primary foreign policy aim regarding Russia was stability—reaching a modus vivendi that would avoid direct confrontation. His administration was keen to prevent provoking Putin, and Ukraine played no significant role in Biden’s early strategic thinking. Contrary to conspiratorial speculation, there was no secret U.S. plan to bring Ukraine into NATO.

Successful Autocrat

The reality is that NATO’s eastward expansion effectively stalled after 2004, when the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—joined the Alliance. Following Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, NATO enlargement into former Soviet territories came to a halt. Putin’s aggressive actions ultimately succeeded in freezing NATO’s expansion into the post-Soviet space. This goal was further solidified after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.

In 2020, amid the global COVID-19 pandemic, Putin effectively extended his rule to 2036 through constitutional changes, cementing his status as Russia’s undisputed leader. That same year, he seized a critical opportunity in Belarus. Mass protests against the dictator Alexander Lukashenko put him in a vulnerable position. Putin stepped in, providing crucial support that allowed Lukashenko to crush the protests, effectively binding Belarus more closely to Russia.

Simultaneously, Putin orchestrated the poisoning of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, neutralizing his most prominent domestic critic and sending a clear signal to potential dissenters. These events underscored Putin’s growing paranoia about losing power. He increasingly viewed popular uprisings—whether in neighboring countries or within Russia itself—as Western-engineered conspiracies designed to destabilize his regime. For Putin, the United States became the ultimate architect of these perceived plots. 

From Diplomatic Hope to Escalation

The election of Volodymyr Zelensky marked a significant turning point in Ukraine’s political landscape. Initially, the Kremlin seemed unsure what to make of Zelensky. Within Ukraine, Zelensky himself faced accusations of being a Russian puppet because of his outsider status and lack of political experience. Early in his presidency, he attempted to engage with Moscow, aiming to renegotiate the Minsk agreements in hopes of securing peace in eastern Ukraine.

From the Kremlin’s perspective, however, there was no incentive to renegotiate. Ukraine was already in a tight spot, weakened by internal political strife, economic struggles, and ongoing conflict in the Donbas region. Russia likely viewed Zelensky’s outreach as a sign of weakness rather than a genuine opportunity for compromise.

I think one of the critical moments was when Zelensky became disillusioned with the outreach to the Kremlin and more cognizant of Russian influence inside Ukraine. A pivotal moment came when Zelensky shut down three pro-Russian TV channels controlled by Viktor Medvedchuk, a Ukrainian oligarch with close personal ties to Putin. [The channels affected were ZIK, NewsOne, and 112 Ukraine, which were officially owned by Ukrainian MP Taras Kozak but widely believed to be controlled by Viktor Medvedchuk.—MT] Shortly thereafter, Medvedchuk was placed under house arrest on charges of treason. For Putin, it was a personal affront and a clear signal that Ukraine was curtailing the Kremlin’s levers of soft power. It led to his radicalization.

From Liberal Nationalism to Imperialist Ambition

One central theme I explore in my book is the legacy of the Soviet Union and how it shaped Russian identity and nationalism. In this context, Alexei Navalny plays a significant role in my analysis. Navalny represents one strand of Russian nationalism—a liberal nationalist vision that sees Russia as a nation-state in need of national revival but within a modern, law-based framework, separate from imperial ambitions. At the opposite end of the nationalist spectrum is Igor Girkin, a hardline imperialist driven by the belief that Russia must restore its former empire and reclaim "lost" territories. 

What I try to show is that Putin has traversed this entire spectrum. When he took office, he was actually much closer to Navalny’s idea of a nation-state model, focused on modernizing Russia and integrating with the West. But by 2022 Putin had fully embraced Girkin’s imperial narrative, speaking openly about “reclaiming historical Russian lands” and restoring Russia’s perceived lost greatness. This obsession with Ukraine was fueled by a historical narrative reinforced by Russia’s imperial past. Putin and his inner circle became increasingly fixated on historical interpretations that framed Ukraine as essential to Russia’s identity, power, and survival. 

One often-cited reference is Zbigniew Brzezinski’s famous assertion, made shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, that “Russia ceases to be an empire if it does not control Ukraine” [Z. Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, Basic Books, 2012]. While Brzezinski intended this as a geopolitical analysis, the Kremlin seems to have interpreted it as a recognition by the West of Ukraine’s indispensable role in sustaining Russian power. This I think is also a key element in the origins of Russia’s war. 

Manufactured Nationalist Cause 

I lived in Russia for eight years before 2014, and during that time I never once heard anyone express a serious desire to reclaim Crimea. I interacted with people from a wide range of backgrounds, including Russian nationalists, but even among them there was no talk of wanting Crimea back. This absence of widespread nationalist rhetoric around Crimea made Russia’s annexation in 2014 all the more striking. It highlighted how quickly the Kremlin could manufacture and amplify a nationalist cause when politically expedient.

What Navalny wrote at the time was actually very interesting. Navalny was explicitly against Russia’s imperial ambitions. In a lengthy LiveJournal post written shortly before the annexation, he argued that Russia did not need Crimea, stating plainly, “We have enough land.” He was very specific that he was against the imperialist vision of Russia.

However, outright support for Ukraine remained rare among opposition figures. The notable exception was Boris Nemtsov, one of the most prominent Kremlin critics, who spoke out forcefully against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. Nemtsov can be considered the first victim of the Ukraine war on Russian soil: he was assassinated just steps from the Kremlin in 2015, his death a symbol of how dangerous opposing the war had already become in Russia.

Historical Grievances and Imagined Offenses

One of my central points is that nothing about this war was preordained. Historical events are rarely inevitable. What happened was the result of a confluence of forces, choices, and circumstances—not an inescapable fate.

I chose the term “revenge” deliberately, though I realize it can be misunderstood. People often assume that revenge is a response to a specific wrongdoing. But revenge can also be taken for imagined offenses, perceived slights that may not have happened in reality but feel real to those seeking retribution.

In this context, the first target of Putin’s revenge was clearly the Ukrainians, for daring to assert that they are not Russians and for striving to build their own independent state. But just as significantly, Putin’s revenge was directed toward the United States, driven by a deep-seated sense of historical grievance and perceived humiliation following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

A key argument in my book is that this war reflects a generational conflict playing out across the former Soviet space. In Russia, the Soviet legacy remained entrenched, slowing the country’s path toward a post-Soviet identity. In Ukraine, however, a new generation arose more quickly, willing to break with that past and embrace a future separate from Moscow’s influence. This divergence was not just political but deeply generational, a battle over historical memory and national identity.

Lucian Kim is the author of Putin’s Revenge: Why Russia Invaded Ukraine (Columbia University Press, 2025).

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.