Despite enduring sanctions and international isolation, Russia has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to sustain a protracted military campaign, reflecting its strategic shift toward becoming a nation perpetually on a war footing. Many experts express concern that Western, and particularly European, militaries and politicians remain complacent, failing to fully grasp the seriousness of Russia’s potential for future conflicts. 

Russia’s military forces may have been unprepared and inadequately equipped when they launched their full-scale offensive on Ukraine in February 2022. Yet, nearly three years later, the situation has evolved. The Russian military is now combat-tested, having gained experience in conventional warfare. “The Russia military … has become a learning organization that little resembles the chaotic force that invaded Ukraine two years ago,” General Christopher Cavoli said in a statement for the US House Armed Services Committee. 

While the quality of Russia’s military equipment lags behind the cutting-edge systems fielded by the United States and some European nations, Moscow has compensated by dramatically ramping up production. Factories have been operating around the clock, churning out tanks, artillery, drones, and munitions at a pace not seen since the height of the Cold War.

Russian troops are men recruited through financial incentives or coercion, often lacking motivation or professional training. Yet Russian generals have adapted to these limitations, learning to deploy their forces relatively effectively despite the drawbacks. This proficiency has translated into significant battlefield outcomes: the defeat of Ukraine’s 2023 summer counteroffensive, the capture of Avdiivka in February 2024, the reduction of the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Dnieper in Kherson, and the ongoing summer 2024 offensive in the Donbas, point out the authors of a recent report by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

Moscow’s Threats of Nuclear Escalation Reveal Lack of EU and US Preparedness

Putin’s ability to sustain slow but steady progress in Ukraine has revealed a new model of military engagement—conventional warfare underpinned by the implicit threat of nuclear escalation. According to a recent analytical digest by Re: Russia, an independent expertise platform, this strategy significantly raises the likelihood of such a scenario being repeated elsewhere, potentially even in a European country.

Much has been said about Putin’s apparent reluctance to cross certain self-imposed red lines and his frequent, albeit seemingly hollow, threats to use nuclear weapons. Yet these threats—empty or not—have proven effective in deterring the West from significantly escalating its aid to Ukraine. According to British-American historian Niall Ferguson, the West has allowed itself to be intimidated by Moscow’s nuclear posturing.

European countries are particularly vulnerable in this new geopolitical reality as the legacy of Europe's post–World War II "peace dividend" continues to linger. Today’s European military-industrial complex and defense spending priorities remain shaped by the postwar era, when the prospect of large-scale conflict in Europe seemed remote. In the current context of a raging war in Ukraine, this mindset is increasingly outdated.

Russia’s defense and military spending is growing. “Based on seasonal patterns from the last years, I expect defense spending to be 4.3 trillion rubles in the last quarter, leading to a total of 11.5 trillion rubles in 2024 ($109 billion),” writes the economist Janis Kluge of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP Berlin) in his recent report. “In the latest budget documents, the GDP in 2024 is estimated at 195.8 trillion rubles ($1.9 trillion). This would mean 5.9% of GDP for defense spending and 7–8% for military spending.” For 2025, Putin has recently allocated approximately 32.5% of the federal budget—equivalent to 13.5 trillion rubles ($128 billion)—to national defense, an increase from the 28.3% reported for 2024.

Europe’s Defense Spending Under a New US Administration

Europe may face further pressure to adapt as Donald Trump prepares for a return to the White House. Regardless of his specific actions, it is evident that full reliance on the United States for security is no longer viable. The European Union will need to rapidly strengthen its military capabilities to confidently confront a resurgent Russia once the conflict with Ukraine ends, according to the authors of the report European Defense Industry Strategy in a Hostile World, published by the Bruegel think tank. 

During his first term, President Trump repeatedly insisted that Europe needed to take greater responsibility for its own defense—a mantra that left many in Europe scared. However, the US stance on Europe’s historical "free-riding" is largely bipartisan. If Trump’s exhortations weren’t enough, “the greatest salesman for NATO in the history of the alliance, Vladimir Putin, stepped in,” writes Admiral James Stavridis, former supreme allied commander of NATO. “When the Europeans saw Russian tanks rolling west into Ukraine well over two years ago, it rattled old ghosts—World War II, Budapest in 1956, Prague in 1968.”

The Russian threat achieved what former president Trump could not fully accomplish during his time in office. As of 2024, twenty-three out of thirty-two NATO countries are expected to meet or exceed the defense spending target of at least 2 percent of their GDP. This marks a significant rise from ten countries in 2023 and just seven in 2022. Poland leads the list for the second consecutive year, allocating 4.1 percent of its GDP to defense—the highest among NATO members. Estonia and the United States share the second spot, each allotting 3.4 percent of their GDP. The US figure has remained consistent over the past decade. While the UK government has pledged to raise this to 2.5 percent, no timeline has been specified. Canada, Italy, Belgium, and Spain are among the countries that lag on the NATO guidelines for spending on defense. 

Yes, Europe collectively spends considerably more than Russia on defense—$380 billion—and the United States spends even more, at $850 billion. However, comparing military spending in nominal dollars or euros is meaningless, warn the Bruegel report authors. Many internal costs, including labor, may not be comparable. According to the calculations of Richard Reichel, professor of economics at FOM University in Essen, in 2020 Russian defense spending in nominal terms was 8.6 percent of the US spending, and, if one takes into account purchasing power parity, for the military sphere it was 25.6 percent. 

Both the United States under Trump and the broader geopolitical situation are likely to pressure EU countries to increase their defense spending. According to James Stavridis, one of Washington's first requests after the inauguration is expected to be a push for European (and Canadian) defense spending to rise to at least 2.5 percent of GDP, potentially even reaching 3 percent. However, current budget frameworks in major European countries leave little flexibility for such increases. The ongoing government crises in Germany and France exemplify the challenges in reallocating resources to meet these targets. 

Europe Must Spend on Defense—or Be Vulnerable

In an era of mounting geopolitical instability, the EU faces a pivotal choice: adapt to the realities of heightened military demands or risk further vulnerability in the face of a resurgent Russia and shifting US priorities. The echoes of history are clear—complacency is no longer an option. The question remains whether Europe can act decisively before it is forced to react under duress.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.