On January 1, 2025, at 8 am Moscow time, Gazprom ceased delivery of natural gas to Moldova. Moldova was left with a diminished supply of natural gas, and its breakaway Transnistrian region was left totally without. Gazprom’s action has also caused reduced supplies of electricity throughout Moldova, with rolling blackouts in Transnistria. Consumers in Moldova are already affected by rising prices for light and heat. The Transnistrian economy has largely shut down.

The move was connected with, but not required by, the expiration at the end of 2024 of Russia’s contract with Ukraine for transit of natural gas to Europe. The looming energy crisis is likely to have a strong negative effect on Moldova’s ruling pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) in parliamentary elections due in the second half of 2025. The consequences for Transnistria may be even more drastic, as the separatist region and long-time Kremlin ally is so far the major casualty of this latest gambit in Moscow’s gas war against the West.

Same Old Playbook of Gas Blackmail

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, many European countries, including Moldova, received Russian gas via pipelines through Ukraine. The current transit contract through Ukraine expired at the end of 2024, and Kyiv has refused renewal. This Ukrainian action was well advertised in advance, and most of Gazprom’s European customers took precautionary measures to ensure other sources of supply. For a long time, Moldova presumed that it would not be affected, since it had a separate contract with Gazprom through 2026 and an alternate supply route through the Black Sea and the Balkans.

Most of Moldova’s energy has historically come from Russian natural gas delivered via pipelines through Ukraine, supplying both the internationally recognized portion of Moldova (and its capital Chisinau) and the separatist Transnistrian region (and its administrative center Tiraspol). For over two decades, Chisinau and Tiraspol have maintained separate accounts for gas deliveries. During that time, Gazprom consistently and unsuccessfully charged Moldova for gas used by Transnistria while never demanding payment from Tiraspol. Complicating the issue even further, Moldova has depended on cheap electricity from the Moldavskaia GRES power plant in Transnistria—a plant powered by effectively free Gazprom gas. While Moldova and Transnistria both benefited from cheap electricity, Moldova has long been vulnerable to Russian political pressure through gas price or supply manipulation as a result.

Russia initiated a hybrid campaign against Chisinau once its favored candidates in Moldova lost in both the presidential election of 2020 and the parliamentary election of 2021. The Kremlin’s aim has been and remains to install a pro-Russian government in Chisinau and to keep Western influence at bay. After a brief initial effort at establishing friendly relations failed, Moscow has waged a steadily escalating effort at regime change in Chisinau, culminating in massive, unsuccessful efforts to prevent President Maia Sandu’s re-election in November 2024.

Moscow’s use of the energy weapon against Chisinau intensified in 2021, a central part of this hybrid campaign. Gazprom cited alleged arrears and dubious technical issues to repeatedly raise prices and reduce natural gas supplies to Moldova. In late 2021, despite the new contract with Chisinau, Gazprom continued to cut gas deliveries on various pretexts and demanded Moldova pay a “historic debt” for gas used by Transnistria, estimated by Gazprom currently at $770 million. An international audit in 2023 found Moldova owed only $8.6 million, a figure Gazprom has refused to accept, maintaining its demand for the larger sum.

Dependence and Attempts at Diversification

As Moldova pursued and then obtained the status of formal candidate for EU membership in June 2022, Chisinau set out to reduce its energy dependence on Russia. Over the past decade a gas pipeline from Iasi in Romania to Chisinau was constructed, and now carries enough gas to supply the Moldovan capital, roughly half of the country’s population. Moldova has purchased electricity from Romania, but at a much higher price than that for power from Transnistria. A high-voltage line from Romania through Moldova’s south to the capital is under construction, but even when completed will not be able to fully supply the country’s demand.

The Transnistrian region, with at least 300,000 inhabitants, is in the worst position. It has almost no options for power generation aside from Russian gas. Its stock of coal is only sufficient to keep its power plant running for about two months. 

Both Chisinau and Tiraspol declared states of emergency in December and set up special arrangements to manage the looming crisis. However, both governments let the summer pass without taking significant preparatory measures, even though the Russian cutoff was a clear possibility, if not probability. 

As of this writing, the situation in Chisinau is strained but under control. Authorities have called for conservation and announced price increases for heat and light of fifty percent or more, but they assert that supplies of gas and electricity so far are sufficient. In Transnistria, the situation is severe. With no gas, there is no central heating of apartment buildings. Consumers who can use it have been offered firewood. There is electricity, but rolling blackouts are being announced daily. Schools are closed, many hospitals have shut, and patients are consolidated in those that are open. Most industrial enterprises are shut down, and the region’s economic chief warned that many may not have the means to re-open after the crisis.

Moscow’s Risky Strategy

Russia’s calculations are hard to read. Both Gazprom and Russian officials cast the matter as a commercial dispute, exacerbated by Ukrainian unreasonableness. Moscow has not made specific political demands of Chisinau in this dispute, although it has advanced a number of complaints against Moldova’s “Russophobia” in connection with other issues. Moscow likely hopes that Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary election will yield a less hostile, possibly pro-Russian government—a scenario current polls suggest is plausible.

Moscow’s willingness to impose hardship on its erstwhile allies in Transnistria may stem from the region’s increasing orientation toward Western markets, particularly since joining the EU’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) in 2015. Recent developments, including polls showing a majority of Transnistrians supporting integration with Moldova, suggest a shift in local sentiment, with some officials showing interest in a political settlement with Chisinau.

However, the Moldovan government has largely avoided engaging with Transnistrian leaders beyond limited transactional interactions. Their focus instead is on advancing its EU candidacy. It is also likely that they are wary of the potential electoral impact of adding some 200,000 presumed pro-Russian voters to the rolls. At the moment, Chisinau and Tiraspol remain at odds. Moldovan officials claim Transnistria has refused offers of assistance, while Transnistrian leaders deny they have received any such offers.

Depending on whether local authorities or Russia ultimately bear the blame for the hardships caused by the gas cutoff, Moscow’s move will either achieve its intended objective or backfire. It will backfire if Chisinau and Tiraspol are compelled to collaborate more closely to navigate the crisis. Moldova’s promise of EU membership is already appealing to Transnistria’s economic elites, and Russia’s actions could create an opening for greater alignment with Chisinau. Nothing is guaranteed, but traditional economic and political relationships in the region have been upended, making radical changes more conceivable, if not attainable. 

At this point, the outcome is in the balance, with both stability and settlement or collapse and chaos realistic possibilities. Moscow seems to have put all its chips on the table, risking its hold on Transnistria in a desperate effort to reverse Moldova’s westward path and thereby gain control over both.  Given the current electoral prospects in Moldova, this gamble could succeed.

In the longer run, Russia is likely to be the loser either way. For three decades after the Soviet collapse, Moscow has used economic pressure, threats, and coercion in efforts to maintain its influence in and authority over its neighboring former Soviet republics, with Moldova a prime example. This history of intimidation and blackmail has accumulated a legacy of resentment and resistance, which has produced a steady, at times gradual, but quite perceptible waning of Russia’s presence and influence. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine accelerated and strengthened this historical current. Depending on how it is resolved, today’s crisis in Moldova may further hasten this movement. Even a short-term result desired by Moscow will likely only delay, not reverse, this process. 

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.