Ukraine Quarterly Digest: July–September 2024

1. ROLLOUT OF THE WAR

General Developments during July–September 2024

The dynamics of the war did not change much in the third quarter of 2024 compared to the previous three months. Russian forces applied intense pressure along some parts of the front line and continued advancing in the Donbas direction. According to the DeepState web service, which acquires open-source data, Ukraine lost control of 0.15 percent of its internationally recognized territory during these three months.

Russian forces advanced mostly toward Pokrovsk city, driving a wedge into Donetsk oblast. That was the region of the most severe battles, where Russian field leaders called up available troop reserves. Pokrovsk is vital for Ukrainian metallurgy because coking coal mines are located there. When the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) stopped their advance (in part because troops were redirected to the operation in Russia’s Kursk region in August), the Russian troops were able to advance in the south of Donetsk oblast and capture the city of Vuhledar, which Ukraine had defended for two years. By launching multiple offensives at the same time, Russia tried to stretch UAF resources.

The UAF was disadvantaged by an ongoing shortage of ammunition and smaller troop strength. In areas where Russian forces advanced, they had a strong quantitative advantage in manpower, reaching a 9:1 ratio in some cases. Russia continued using chemical weapons.

The opposite situation obtained in the Black Sea. Ukraine’s domination of the sea through the use of advanced Ukraine-designed sea drones, which caused massive damage to the Russian Black Sea fleet, resulted in Russia withdrawing its last patrol ship from the Black Sea.

Kyiv announced the start of production of a domestically designed cruise missile and the first ballistic missiles. In August, Ukraine received the first batch of F-16 fighter jets from its allies. Later in August, one of those jets crashed when it was used to defend against massive Russian drone and missile attacks. The official investigation has not yet concluded. However, the media reported it could be friendly fire from the surface air defense system.

Russia intensified its air strikes on Ukraine. In just one week in mid-September Russia launched 900 guided aerial bombs and 400 Shahed drones, along with about 30 missiles.

Ukraine’s Operations in Russia

Kursk region offensive operation. On August 6, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) crossed the Russia-Ukraine border in Sumy region and advanced into Russia’s Kursk region. The operation was prepared in secret and came as a surprise to many. At the same time, the media reported that the Russian army knew about Ukraine’s plans but failed to organize an adequate defense. During the first week of the operation, the UAF moved quickly deep into Kursk region and captured hundreds of Russian soldiers—on some days more than 100 Russian and Chechen fighters.

Many of Ukraine’s allies described the operation as a defensive one, saying Kyiv had a full right to conduct such an offensive against Russia, which continues to occupy Ukrainian territories and keeps up the pressure on them. Many allies did not oppose Ukraine using the weapons they had provided in the operation. President Zelensky characterized it as part of Ukraine’s “victory plan” and said it was effective in forcing Russia to move its assets. 

The idea was to pressure Russia to withdraw some of its forces from the Donetsk direction, where they had been advancing recently, and to avoid an offensive operation in Sumy. This worked, in part, as the Russian advance in the Donbas slowed. Russia tried to conduct an offensive operation a few weeks later to liberate the region. But the UAF managed to retain control over most of the area it took. Bellicosities remained stuck in a trench warfare mode in Kursk region. 

Attacks deep inside Russia. Ukraine continued intensive drone attacks on targets deep inside Russia, conducting more successful attacks than at any other time since the full-scale war began. The key targets were, as before, Russian oil infrastructure (refineries and fuel depots), military airfields, military bases, and ammunition warehouses. The most distant target, more than 1,100 miles from the border with Ukraine, was an army airfield used to launch attacks against Ukraine.

During the third quarter the UAF managed to destroy a few important ammunition warehouses in Russia that housed ballistic missiles and guided aerial bombs, including the facility used to store ballistic missiles recently received from Iran. In conducting these attacks, Ukraine used domestically produced weapons only. 

Ukraine’s drone attacks on Russian targets increased in frequency and intensity during the quarter, in some months exceeding the number of drones Russia launched. For instance, on September 10 the UAF conducted its most massive drone attack on Russia, with at least 144 drones entering Russian territory. Some of those reached Moscow, which had come under drone attack before. 

Engagement of Russia’s Allies

Western media and later Western officials said that Iran had supplied Russia with short-range ballistic supplies. Tehran officially denied it, but an Iranian MP later confirmed the rumor, saying that Iran needed to barter with Russia for basic foodstuffs and pointing to NATO countries’ support for Ukraine in the war. Russia may use these missiles to attack the regions along the front line and save its own Iskander ballistic missiles, which may be used to attack critical infrastructure deep inside Ukraine. At the same time, the recently elected Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, stated his country opposes war and emphasized the need for an immediate cessation of the war in Ukraine. 

North Korea continued supplying ammunition to Russia.

In August, after the Kursk operation, Belarus moved many of its armed forces, along with additional aircraft and air defense units, toward the border with Ukraine. Minsk also claimed that Ukrainian drones had flown over Belarus, which Kyiv denied. On August 29, the Belarusian Air Force apparently shot down a Russian Shahed drone targeting Ukraine that had entered Belarusian airspace. Though Russian drones had previously flown off course and entered Belarusian airspace, this was the first time Belarus had responded in such a manner. 

Energy Terrorism and Other Attacks on Critical Infrastructure. 

In the course of the war, Russia has damaged or destroyed all Ukrainian thermal power plants and some hydropower plants. So far in 2024, Ukraine has lost 9 GW of power-generating capacity because of Russian strikes, or half the peak winter demand. Some of the lost capacity is expected to be restored by the winter of 2024–2025 

On August 26, Russia conducted its biggest attack on the Ukrainian power system yet, using 127 missiles and 109 drones, more than 200 of which were intercepted by Ukraine’s air defense. For the first time, Russia used cluster munition missiles—missiles bearing cluster bombs—to attack the power system. The aim was to cause a country-wide blackout and an extended period without power. The power system survived; however, the power supply was restricted for almost two weeks. So far in 2024 Russia has not attacked thermal power plants, mostly targeting distributing substations, just as it did in 2022. Russia has also continued its attacks on the gas infrastructure, specifically gas production facilities and underground gas storage facilities. F-16 military jets recently received from Ukraine’s Western allies were instrumental in shooting down Russian drones and missiles.

In addition to the massive attack on August 26, Russia conducted minor attacks on the Ukrainian power system before and after that date. It has shown no sign of backing off from its plan to cripple the Ukrainian energy sector and energy supply services. Kyiv warned that Russia was preparing a winter attack on Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, which are crucial for Ukraine’s power supply. 

In the third quarter of the year Russia also actively targeted railway infrastructure—almost fifty times in August alone—and in early July attacked Odesa’s seaport infrastructure and craft, including a vessel carrying grains. One goal of Russia’s attacks is to deter foreign ships from using the Black Sea corridor to access Ukrainian ports and pick up exports, which would have a negative impact on Ukraine’s economy.

Russian Disinformation Campaigns and Cyberattacks

Russia continued spreading false narratives to sow panic. Since Russia has damaged a considerable part of the Ukrainian power system, Russian propaganda now tries to promote fears about a severe energy crisis in winter, hoping to persuade Ukrainians that the government cannot cope with the energy problem in cold weather. In summer there was another round of disinformation efforts putting out that the power outages were not caused by Russian strikes but because Kyiv was exporting electricity instead of turning it to domestic needs. This false narrative emerged in 2022 but was promoted much more actively in 2024. The same is expected to happen in winter. 

In frontline regions, Russians spread messages through SMS and internet messengers, calling on residents to leave in the guise of Ukrainian authorities. Special Russian drones were used to spread these false announcements. 

Crimes against Civilians and Attacks on Civilian Infrastructure

Russia continued to actively attack civilian objects, including residential buildings. These attacks have become more frequent and have caused a large number of victims since 2022.  During August and September, many medical and educational institutions were damaged, with a huge number killed or wounded. Destroyed facilities include the children’s hospital in Kyiv, one of the biggest in Europe. On a single day, July 8, Russia attackedmultiple hospitals in Kyiv. More than1,800 medical facilities have been destroyed or damaged during the full-scale war. These facilities have been targeted almost daily since December 2023.

In September, when the school year started, academic institutions also became a frequent target. More than 300 were injured and over 50 killed as a result of a single attack on Poltava city that included the Military Institute of Communications and a medical facility as the main targets.

Kyiv says Russians have committed 137,000 war crimes since the start of the full-scale invasion.

POW Exchanges

During the Kursk offensive the Ukrainian army managed to capture hundreds of Russian soldiers. Russian officials immediately addressed Kyiv to arrange POW exchanges. After a long delay a few exchanges took place, in the course of which more than 350 Ukrainians were repatriated. 

2. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

President Zelensky’s Diplomatic Tours

President Zelensky’s international visits remained an important tool in his lobbying efforts on behalf of Ukraine. Nuances of peace plans, the protection of energy infrastructure, aid supplies, and permission to use allies-provided weapons to attack targets deep inside Russia were the key topics discussed at an international level. 

In mid-July, President Zelensky visited the UK to attend the Fourth European Political Community Summit and meet with Britain’s King Charles, the new prime minister Keir Starmer, and the heads of defense companies. At the summit, Zelensky signed ten-year bilateral security agreements with the Czech Republic and Slovenia.

In September, Zelensky attended the 24th meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in Ramstein, Germany (also known as the Ramstein summit) to lobby for air defense systems and long-range arms for Ukraine; at the summit he met with German chancellor Olaf Scholz. This was followed by a visit to Italy to participate in an economic forum, at which the president advocated removing constraints on long-range strikes against Russian targets and speeding up the transfer of air defense systems. Zelensky also met with Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni to discuss Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction, with particular attention to restoring the energy sector.

On September 25 President Zelensky delivered a speech at the 79th session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City in which he emphasized Kyiv’s vision for achieving a just and sustainable peace in Ukraine. Zelensky stressed that Russia can only be forced into peace. The trip was an opportunity to meet other leaders and discuss aid and peace issues. President Zelensky held meetings with U.S. president Joe Biden, German chancellor Scholz, India’s prime minister Narendra Modi, and former NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg. The visit was followed by a visit to Washington, D.C., to meet with U.S. officials. 

Relations with the USA

The United States remained a key aid donor during the quarter, providing loans and grants to finance defense needs, priority budget expenditures, and energy system protection and recovery. On September 11, U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken and his UK counterpart, David Lammy, visited Kyiv. The visit came about in response to Ukraine urging that the ban on long-range strikes deep inside Russia be lifted. 

President Zelensky visited Washington in late September. The main reason for the visit was to present Ukraine’s victory plan to U.S. officials and presidential candidates. The plan was not made public before or immediately after the visit, nor were there official administration comments on it.

Relations with NATO

For the first time, the 75th anniversary NATO Summit in Washington DC recognized Ukraine’s irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO. All NATO member states supported the declaration. NATO members also approved a $43 billion aid package for Ukraine for 2025. 

On July 11, twenty-one NATO member states, the EU, and Japan signed the Ukraine Compact to coordinate and accelerate collective efforts to meet Ukraine's comprehensive security needs. Signatories to the Compact pledged to support Ukraine's immediate defense and security needs, accelerate efforts to build up Ukraine’s fighting forces so that Ukraine can maintain a credible defense and deterrence capability, and determine the appropriate next steps in supporting Ukraine in the event of a future Russian armed attack against Ukraine.

Security Cooperation Agreements

During the third quarter of the year Ukraine continued signing agreements on security cooperation with other states, a process that started in early 2024. Ukraine signed agreements with the Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia. The total number of states that have signed such agreements with Ukraine exceeded thirty as of the end of September.

Relations with the EU and the European States

On September 20, President of the European Commission Ursula Von der Leyen visited Kyiv. The visit was to demonstrate support for Ukraine by a new cohort of the European Commission and to discuss aid for Ukraine, including its energy needs.

President von der Leyen announced a plan to support the Ukrainian energy sector in the coming winter. The plan includes an additional $67 million for humanitarian aid, such as shelters and heaters, and $111 million for repairing energy infrastructure and developing renewable energy sources. The EU plans to expand electricity exports to Ukraine. Together, these steps may cover a quarter of Ukraine’s electricity demand in winter.

On July 18, the European Commission approved the first regular payment of about $4.59 billion under the Ukraine Facility to support Ukraine's macrofinancial stability and public administration functions. The Commission confirmed that Kyiv met nine reform indicators.

In late September, more than thirty countries and the EU adopted the Joint Declaration of Support for the Recovery and Reconstruction of Ukraine, reaffirming support for Ukraine. Most EU member states continued to be Ukraine’s allies and critically important providers of vital aid

Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán visited Kyiv on July 2, a day after Hungary assumed the six-month rotating presidency of the EU. Orbán engaged in some discussion of steps to peace, but his proposal of a ceasefire was dismissed by President Zelensky, who said Kyiv did not trust Russia to impose a ceasefire without a follow-up peace plan. Orbán then traveled to Moscow and Beijing to meet with Presidents Putin and Xi. (Russia may view Orbán as a “weak link” in the West and a vehicle to restart diplomatic relations with the West; Orbán served in the same role after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.) 

On July 11–12 Orbán took part in the Washington summit, then followed up with a visit to Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago—an unusual situation. Later, Orbán said he had not given up on what he called his “peace missions.”

During the quarter some tensions arose in Kyiv’s relations with Hungary and Slovakia based on a dispute over energy transit from Russia to these countries, as described in the next section.

The Issue of Russian Oil and Gas Transit through Ukraine

Oil transit. In July, Ukraine expanded its sanctions against Russia's oil giant Lukoil, banning the transit of oil through its territory via the Druzhba pipeline, which had supplied resources to Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. The Druzhba pipeline is one of the world’s longest pipelines and has several branches to supply points in Eastern Europe. Hungary and Slovakia claimed the decision would affect their energy security and even threatened to place restrictions on their fuel and electricity supply to Ukraine.

The volume of oil transit has not decreased, as Lukoil’s oil was substituted by other Russian companies, mostly state-owned Tatneft. Instead, the volume of oil transported even increased. The European Commission stated that there was no threat to the security of the oil supply to Hungary and Slovakia because of Kyiv’s decision. It declined Hungary's request for talks with Ukraine over oil sanctions. Kyiv refused to lift sanctions for the same reason.

Natural gas transit. As the UAF started the Kursk operation, Ukraine immediately took control of the Russian gas metering station in the city of Sudzha, close to the Ukrainian border. Only two gas metering stations had been used in the transport of gas to Europe, and the other one, Sokhranivka, had been captured by the Russians in May 2022, after which Kyiv refused to accept capacity booking—next-day volume reserve—for gas transit through Sokhranivka.

Even though Ukraine took control of the Sudzha station, Russia did not suspend its gas supply because retaining a viable gas transit route is crucial to Moscow from a revenue standpoint: Gazprom has lost a vast share of the European gas market, incurring record losses when measured against the past quarter century. Kyiv, for its part, is interested in keeping the route operational for the potential transit of gas with the participation of Azerbaijan. 

The issue of transiting gas from Azerbaijan. Kyiv and Brussels have been negotiating with Baku to supply Azeri gas to the EU through Russia and Ukraine. President Zelensky and Naftogaz of Ukraine confirmed that negotiations were underway. However, Azerbaijan has limited capability to export additional gas, so any gas received by the EU under such an arrangement could be Russian in origin. 

Relations with India

India’s prime minister Narendra Modi visited Kyiv on August 23—the first visit of an Indian prime minister since Ukraine became independent, more than thirty years ago. The visit came shortly after Modi’s trip to Moscow and may have been intended to soften the negative implications of the latter, or perhaps to signal an intention on Modi’s part to act as a peacemaker.

The two leaders signed four cooperation agreements, in agriculture, medicine, humanitarian relations, and culture, and agreed to hold a Joint Ukrainian-Indian Working Group meeting on military-technical cooperation. In addition, according to media reports, India has been supplying artillery rounds to Ukraine, despite Russia’s disapproval. On September 24 Zelensky again met with Modi at the UN summit in New York to discuss strengthening cooperation between Kyiv and New Delhi. 

Relations with China

Ukraine’s foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba visited China in July to discuss peacemaking issues with his counterpart. China does not support Ukraine’s Peace Formula, arguing that it has its own approach, one that Brazil also promotes but that is unacceptable to Kyiv. Kyiv argues that any initiatives that do not clearly reference the UN Charter and do not guarantee the complete restoration of Ukraine's occupied territories are unacceptable. Beijing’s plan stresses the need for a ceasefire and peace negotiations, but does not mention Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

Some media reported that China was collaborating with Russia in developing military drones and had even supplied some military drones of Chinese origin to Russia. Beijing denies any such allegations that it is helping Russia's war effort in Ukraine. The provision of military drones would mark a significant uptick in China’s support for Russia in the latter’s war against Ukraine.

Other Countries

Mali and later Niger, in a show of support for Russia, severed diplomatic relations with Ukraine. Mali's transitional military government claimed that Kyiv had helped Tuareg rebels battle Malian soldiers and Russian mercenaries linked to the Wagner paramilitary group. A representative of Ukraine’s intelligence service had said earlier that the rebels had received the information they needed, without elaborating.

Mali's Tuareg rebel alliance claimed Ukraine had not helped it, and Mali did not provide any evidence of Ukraine's ties to rebels. Kyiv denied the accusations and considered the decision to be driven by Mali’s solidarity with Russia.

3. INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Reshuffles

Government. One of the biggest governmental reshuffles happened in early September, though it had been expected since March. President Zelensky explained that this step was necessary to inject new energy and strengthen the country. The list of ministers who submitted resignation letters to parliament, which supported their dismissals, included Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine Olha Stefanishyna, Strategic Industries Minister Oleksandr Kamyshyn, Justice Minister Denys Maliuska, Environment Minister Ruslan Strilets, Minister for Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories Iryna Vereshchuk, and Foreign Minister Kuleba.

Stefanishyna became minister of justice and deputy prime minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Andrii Sybiha, a professional diplomat who had worked in the presidential administration in the past, became the new foreign minister. Former deputy energy minister Svitlana Grynchuk became the new environment minister. Former head of the State Property Fund Vitalii Koval became agriculture policy minister.

In addition, parliament filled ministerial positions that had remained vacant for a while. Matviy Bidnyi, who has been acting sports and youth minister, was officially appointed to the position. Mykola Tochytskyi, a career diplomat and deputy head of the presidential administration, was appointed culture and information policy minister. Deputy Defense Minister Natalia Kalmykova became minister of veterans affairs, and Herman Smetanin, head of the state-owned defense company Ukroboronprom, replaced Alexander Kamyshin as strategic industries minister. In total, the Ukrainian government acquired seven new ministers. 

Presidential administration. Volodymyr Zelensky also dismissed deputy chief of the Presidential Office Rostyslav Shurma, who was considered to play a key role in Ukraine’s economy and energy, representing the administration. Iryna Vereshchuk, who had resigned as minister, became one of the deputies of the head of the Presidential Office. Oleksandr Kamyshyn became a presidential adviser.

Energy sector. Another notable dismissal was that of the head of Ukrenergo, Ukraine’s electricity transmission operator. On September 2 the company’s supervisory board voted to dismiss Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, the CEO. Kudrytskyi called the board meeting on his own initiative after the staff of the supreme commander-in-chief, headed by the president, decided to fire him. Two independent members of Ukrenergo’s supervisory board did not agree with the dismissal, calling it politically motivated, and resigned from the board. International donors expressed concern over the proposed dismissal of Kudrytskyi and the subsequent resignations and requested that the decision be postponed until the supervisory board had the opportunity to enroll one more member to fill the lacuna.

The Economic Situation

The government sent to parliament a bill stipulating the most significant tax rise in recent years. The new tax rates, if adopted, are planned not only for the duration of martial law but also for the foreseeable future. Earlier, parliament also passed a law to increase fuel excise taxes, which was a controversial issue, as this step would affect all prices and push inflation up.

Parliament also passed a bill stipulating an increase of $12 billion in expenditures on security and defense. The proposed tax increase probably arose out of fear of a decrease in international aid in the future rather than from a lack of funds this year. The National Bank of Ukraine anticipates such as funding decrease in the coming years. Ukraine’s international partners are expected to provide Ukraine with about $38 billion in soft loans and grants this year and about $31 billion next year.

Parliament passed the state budget for 2025. The budget anticipates that consolidated expenditures will amount to 59.9 percent of GDP, including 26.3 percent to be spent on defense and internal security. The budget deficit is expected to amount to 19.6 percent of GDP. Defense and internal security spending are planned to rise from 22.1 percent of GDP in 2024 to 26.3 percent in 2025.

For more details, please see thisFocus Ukraine piece on Ukraine’s economy in the first half of 2024 and this one on the 2025 budget. 

The Energy Situation

July was one of the most challenging months in terms of the energy supply as most of the thermal power sources were offline after the Russian strikes in 2024 and nuclear power units were undergoing maintenance in preparation for winter. Customers experienced long hours of cutoffs. The situation improved in August, and the transmission system operator even considered allowing the export of surplus electricity capacity. However, the situation abruptly reversed after the biggest Russian attack on the Ukrainian power system, which took place on August 26 and led to Ukrainian customers experiencing an emergency situation in addition to scheduled cutoffs for almost two weeks. 

Outlawed Russian Church 

In August, parliament passed, and the president signed, a law prohibiting religious organizations connected to Russia. Chiefly, the law was enacted to restrict the operation of the Russian Orthodox Church, many of whose priests and other servants were connected to Russia's services and army, justified Russian military aggression against Ukraine, or even acted as spies. The law emphasizes that none of the document's provisions can be interpreted as limiting the freedom of religion, the right to observe religious practices, or the conduct of religious rites.

The Russian Orthodox Church never recognized the Kyiv Patriarchate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, considering itself the only canonical Orthodox church in the region. In early 2019, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew signed a document confirming the autocephaly of Ukraine's newly established Orthodox Church, thus dissolving Russia’s religious control over Ukraine. Following this, a canonical Ukrainian Orthodox Church was established.

4. PROGRESS IN REFORMS AND SUCCESS STORIES

Ratification of the Rome Statute

In August, Ukraine ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It will enter into force sixty days after being received by the UN secretary-general. The Rome Statute “recognizes forms of sexual violence like rape, sexual slavery, and enforced sterilization as distinct war crimes.” Ukraine signed the Rome Statute in 2000 but postponed its ratification. More recently, Ukraine had considered deferring ratification to the end of the war. For more on this issue, please see this special report by the Kennan Institute.

Russia had initially signed the Rome Statute but withdrew its signature in 2016.

Renewables Action Plan until 2030

In August, the government approved the National Renewable Energy Action Plan until 2030. The document aims to increase the share of green energy in gross final consumption to 27 percent. According to the plan, renewable energy sources are expected to account for 27 percent of gross final energy consumption in 2030, of which 33 percent will go to heating and cooling, 29 percent to electricity production, and 17 percent to the transport sector.