With continued heavy fighting in the fourth quarter, the Russian army notched some advances in Donetsk oblast. North Korea upped its contributions to Russia’s war effort. In addition to supplying weapons, it sent troops to Russia to participate in the war against Ukraine. Those forces were deployed in an operation to liberate a part of Kursk oblast controlled by the Ukrainian army, but the mission failed.

Russian air attacks have become more frequent, with a record number of drones being used, while Ukraine has responded with a sophisticated drone campaign of its own. Russia renewed its campaign of energy terrorism, conducting massive attacks on Ukraine’s energy facilities. In addition, Russia resumed attacks on the local energy infrastructure in the front-line region throughout the last quarter of the year. 

Finally, Kyiv declined to renew the contract to transit Russia’s natural gas as of January 1, 2025. European countries have for the most part found alternative sources, but the termination of the contract caused some tensions with Slovakia, which has relied on Russian supplies.

1. ROLLOUT OF THE WAR

General Developments during October–December 2024

The situation at the front continued to be challenging. During the fourth quarter of 2024, Russia’s army exerted pressure along all sections of the front, though with varying intensity. The greatest activity was observed in Kursk oblast, which remains partially controlled by the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF), and in the Donbas, continuing the pattern of recent months. The Russian Air Force approached Dnipropetrovsk oblast and the city of Pokrovsk, which is vital for Ukrainian metallurgy. Some days the number of battlefield clashes exceeded 200. 

The Russian Federation Armed Forces (RFAF) advanced in Donetsk oblast, seizing new territories. At the same time, the UAF realized some gains near Kupiansk in Kharkiv oblast. 

In the last quarter of the year, Russian forces intensified their pressure in the direction of Kherson. Russian forces made several attempts to establish a bridgehead on the western bank of the Dnipro river or one of its islands to transfer firepower there. Despite these efforts, the RFAF did not manage to achieve gains in Kherson. Attempts to advance in Kherson were accompanied by air strikes on Kherson city, including civil infrastructure and residential buildings as targets. In total, in 2024, Russia has occupied more than 1,600 square miles of Ukrainian territory. 

Air attack tactics. Air attacks have become more frequent, and tactics have also changed. In the fall, Russia drastically increased the intensity of its air strikes on Ukraine: The country was targeted with more than 6,000 drones and missiles, twice as many as in the previous three months and three times more than were used in the fall of 2023.

Both parties intensified their drone attacks. In October and November, Russia hit record numbers of drones launched against Ukraine; the targets included civilian structures and spaces. In November, Russia launched 2,576 drones compared to 2,023 in October—a record during the full-scale war. 

Russia also started using Iranian-designed Shahed drones equipped with thermobaric warheads. They are particularly destructive when they strike buildings because they create a vortex of high pressure and heat that penetrates the thickest walls and simultaneously sucks up the oxygen in their path. Such weapons have already been used against civilian buildings. They may be accompanied by a cloud of drone decoys, which requires Ukrainian forces to make split-second decisions as to which incoming drones to target.

The UAF also deployed more drones during the autumn quarter, including some with a longer operational range. The UAF now uses twenty types of long-range drones capable of flying 1,200 miles. As part of its air defense, the UAF has increasingly used GPS spoofing, an electronic warfare technology that affects drones’ location detection. This is why many drones altered their routes upon entering Belarus—over 350 in the second half of the year. Ukraine is developing and testing new models of drones in addition to cruise and ballistic missiles.

In November the UAF received permission from Washington and other allies to use ATACMS missiles—supersonic Army Tactile Missile Systems manufactured in the United States—to hit targets deep inside Russia, the first such forays. Previously permitted use of the ATACMS had been limited to Russian targets in Ukraine.

On November 21, the RFAF used an intermediate-range ballistic supersonic missile to attack the city of Dnipro. Russian officials claimed that the Oreshnik ("Hazel" in English) was a newly designed missile, but Ukrainian intelligence and some international experts expressed doubt, believing it was an older model. This missile was designed to carry nuclear weapons, but it appears that one missile did not have a warhead at all. Thus this action could have been merely an attempt to put psychological pressure on Ukraine and its allies.

Operations in Russia. The UAF still controls part of Kursk oblast, which was captured in August. In October, Russia assembled 50,000 troops, including North Korean soldiers, to conduct counteroffensive operations in Kursk oblast. Despite increasing pressure in November and December, the forces failed to liberate the area, and the UAF still controls about half the territory seized at the beginning of the operation.

The UAF and Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) continued operations in Russia and in the temporarily occupied territories, with drones launched against various targets. Those targets included just a few oil refineries but many oil and fuel depots instead, some military air bases, and other military facilities.

One significant moment in the fall was the assassination of the senior Russian military general Igor Kirillov in December. Kyiv considered Kirillov, in charge of Russia’s nuclear defense forces, a valid military target as he was acting military and had issued decrees to use chemical weapons against the UAF. Another event of note was the assassination of a former chief of the prison in Olenivka, where at least fifty Ukrainian POWs had been killed. 

Engagement of Russia’s Allies

North Korea stood out as a key Russian ally in the ongoing war against Ukraine. In November, North Korea started sending forces to Russia to join its war against Ukraine. According to the Pentagon’s assessments and Kyiv’s statements, more than 10,000 North Korean troops have arrived in Russia, with more expected. In December, President Zelensky announced that DPRK troops had already participated in hostilities in Kursk oblast, part of which is controlled by the UAF, with the first North Korean deaths. 

In addition to troops, Ukrainian officials also claim that North Korea has supplied Russia with over 100 ballistic missiles and five million artillery shells.

In November, media outlets reported “convincing” evidence that Chinese equipment was extensively used to manufacture the drones that Russia employed to attack Ukraine. 

Energy Terrorism and Other Attacks on Critical Infrastructure.

As winter approaches, Russia has renewed its wide-scale attacks on Ukraine’s energy facilities. These efforts are part of a campaign designed to plunge the nation into a cold winter, put psychological pressure on the populace, and compel Western powers to make political choices that align with the Kremlin’s interests. Massive attacks took place on November 17 and 28 and on December 13 and 25. On December 25, half a million residents in Kharkiv were without heat for a couple of days after the attack. The consequences of the attacks are complicated as Russians now use missiles with cluster munitions.

In addition to these major attacks, Russia frequently carried out local assaults on energy facilities in regions near the front line, targeting power distribution infrastructure and gas infrastructure, particularly underground gas storage facilities. Those underground storage facilities are crucial for Kyiv to meet the winter gas demand.

What was new in Russia's strategy was targeting transmission substations responsible for electricity imports from Europe. Some missiles also targeted transmission substations connecting nuclear power plants with the power grid. So Russia evidently intended to shut down nuclear power plants and disconnect them from the power grid to cause a blackout in the power system, as happened in November 2022. 

Nuclear power plants generate more than half the country's electricity. After the attacks, nuclear power units had to reduce production, leading to a larger power deficit and exacerbating planned and emergency cutoffs.

Attacks on nuclear power plants can also lead to a nuclear incident. On December 12 the thirty-five-nation Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) passed a resolution condemning attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure. Ukraine then called an emergency IAEA board meeting to discuss the wave of attacks.

The resolution highlights the inadmissibility of attacks on electrical substations that supply external energy to Ukrainian nuclear power plants. Such attacks are seen as a direct threat to nuclear security. The resolution does not mention Russia as the perpetrator and has not stopped Russian attacks.

Air defense systems are the only means to protect Ukraine’s energy facilities from Russian air strikes. Ukraine still needs more of these systems to protect the energy system during the winter, including ten to twelve Patriot systems.

Russian Disinformation Campaigns and Cyberattacks

Russia persisted in conducting cyberattacks aimed at Ukraine’s military and governmental services. On December 19, Russia carried out one of the largest cyberattacks in recent times, targeting government services and databases, including state registers overseen by the Justice Ministry. Officials denied any data leaks. The attacks caused damage to databases, requiring two weeks for full restoration.

Russian War Crimes against Ukrainian POWs and Civilians

The number of reported crimes against Ukrainian POWs rose in the last quarter of the year, the same as it happened from the beginning of the year. Such statistics may be attributed to encouragement from Russian commanders to execute Ukrainian POWs. According to official reports, more than 100 POWs were executed on the battlefield in 2024, which is a serious violation of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of POWs.

RFAF continues using chemical weapons. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has for the first time detected the banned substance 2-chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile, commonly referred to as CS gas, in samples of projectiles and soil from the war zone supplied by Ukraine. The UAF reported that since the start of the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, Russia has launched 465 chemical attacks on Ukraine.

Different objects of civil infrastructure were targeted by Russian missiles and drones.

POW Exchanges

Exchanges driven by the UAF’s operation in Kursk oblast, which resulted in hundreds of Russians being captured, continued in the fourth quarter. Almost 500 Ukrainian POWs were liberated in October–December. In total, 1,358 POWs returned to Ukraine in 2024.

Force Losses

In December, President Zelensky reported that since the start of the large-scale invasion, 43,000 Ukrainian military personnel had been killed and 370,000 instances of aid had been provided to the wounded, including care for minor injuries and repeated provision of care for the same injuries. This statement was issued in response to assessments published by some Western media to show that actual troop losses were less than those assessments suggested. About half of the wounded return to service after recovery. 

Earlier, in February 2024, President Zelensky for the first time put a figure to the number killed, 31,000, without mentioning statistics applicable to the wounded. 

Russia does not publish its casualties. According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, since the start of the invasion, the Russian army’s casualties have reached almost 800,000. Russian daily losses broke records in October, reaching 1,354. 

2. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The U.S. elections and the consequent change in administration were among the fourth quarter's most significant foreign developments. These events fueled even more uncertainty about the future of Ukraine’s allies’ coalition, and Kyiv became concerned about Washington’s future posture. Some of Ukraine’s Western allies began considering increasing their support in the event that the United States withdraws from the coalition.

Some countries, primarily those with ties to Russia, have tried to promote their own ceasefire and peace plans. Meanwhile, Kyiv has sought to gain acceptance of Zelensky’s “Plan for Victory,” which, among other things, calls for, and depends on, a boost in military aid for Ukraine.

Zelensky’s Victory Plan

In late September, Ukraine’s presidential administration announced that Kyiv had developed a victory plan that would be presented to allies. President Zelensky visited Washington in late September to meet U.S. president Joe Biden and then presidential candidate Donald Trump to present the plan. He went on to discuss the plan in October during his meetings with Ukraine’s European allies. 

Zelensky publicly presented the plan to the Ukrainian parliament only in mid-October. The plan consists of five major points and three annexes, the latter of which remain classified and have been presented only to allies. The publicly available part of the plan includes a proposal that Ukraine be invited to join NATO, along with an enumeration of steps to boost Ukraine’s economy and strengthen the country’s defense capabilities, deter Russian aggression, and reshape Ukraine’s postwar security architecture, including the replacement of U.S. troops in Europe with Ukrainian troops. 

Despite efforts to keep some part of the victory plan secret, leaks occurred. According to them, the plan includes providing Ukraine with more long-range missiles. However, Washington and Berlin rejected both this idea and inviting Ukraine to join NATO. The NATO membership issue is a two-edged sword: the United States and Germany apparently regard it as a provocation, but failure to act sends a signal to Russia that the West lacks resolve, and encourages Putin to continue warfare.

Overall, the victory plan depends on increased funding from Western allies, and that is unlikely to happen.

International Peace Initiatives

The upcoming change in the White House administration added urgency to international initiatives to bring peace to Ukraine. Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s proposed peace plan stipulating freezing the current front line, providing Ukraine with weapons, deploying international troops to a demilitarized buffer zone, and postponing NATO membership for at least ten years. The Kremlin rejected this plan as unacceptable, particularly the proposed freeze of the front line. 

German chancellor Olaf Scholz called Vladimir Putin for the first time in two years. Criticizing the war, Scholz was said to have urged Putin to enter negotiations. The German chancellor faces political crises at home and is losing popularity even with his own party, and he is looking for ways to improve his political standing. Ending the war in Ukraine would help in this regard. Kyiv and some EU member states criticized his call to Moscow, however, calling it “strange” and an inducement to Russia to continue waging war. 

Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán, who maintains good relations with Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin, began advocating for his peace initiative following the U.S. presidential elections. Kyiv rejected Orbán’s proposals because he is considered too dependent on Putin to forward any negotiation and lacks leverage with which to pressure Putin. Kyiv also rejected Orbán’s proposals to negotiate a Christmas ceasefire for the same reasons. The EU did not show any interest in Orban’s initiatives. 

A handful of European countries have discussed potentially sending a military contingent to Ukraine. These forces would be deployed to guarantee a ceasefire or peace agreement, should one be signed. Some leading European officials consider participation in Ukraine’s future necessary for Europe’s overall securitization.

President Zelensky’s Diplomatic Tours

President Zelensky’s international trips have been a vital part of Ukraine’s foreign policy endeavors during the war. Among the key topics during these meetings are the victory plan and support for Ukraine in the event of a change in the U.S. administration’s disposition toward the nation. 

On October 9, Zelensky visited Croatia to attend the third Ukraine–South-East Europe Summit and hold bilateral meetings. He discussed continuing defense cooperation with the country’s prime minister, rehabilitating Ukrainian soldiers injured on the front lines, and reconstructing Ukraine. At the summit in Croatia, representatives from Ukraine and twelve other states discussed international efforts to advance peace.

The Croatia visit was followed by trips to London, where Zelensky met with UK prime minister Keir Starmer and NATO secretary general Mark Rutte; to Paris, where he met with French president Emmanuel Macron; and to Berlin, where he met with German chancellor Olaf Scholz. At these meetings, President Zelensky shared details of the victory plan contained in the nonpublic annexes. During the meeting with Chancellor Scholz, Zelensky discussed implementing the Ukraine-German security agreement for the upcoming year and initiating joint arms production. On October 17, he attended Brussels to present his victory plan to European counterparts. 

President Zelensky visited Iceland for the first time in late October to attend the fourth Ukraine–Northern Europe Summit. On the sidelines, he met with the country's president, Halla Tómasdóttir, and the prime ministers of Iceland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Key discussion topics once again included the victory plan and enhanced military aid to Ukraine.

On November 7, the Ukrainian president attended the European Political Community Summit in Budapest. Forty-two participants representing different states and the EU discussed Europe’s security challenges in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

On December 7, Zelensky visited Paris, where he met with French president Macron and U.S. president-elect Donald Trump. Macron initiated the meeting to discuss the future role of the United States in supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia and how to end the war. 

On December 18, Zelensky met with NATO secretary general Mark Rutte in Brussels to discuss enhancing air defense for Ukraine and ensuring the sustainability of peace. In the following days, he met with top EU officials in Brussels to discuss the importance of Western efforts to achieve a "just peace."

Relations with the USA

Joe Biden’s administration, anticipating potential shifts in the policies of the upcoming U.S. administration, sought to increase aid supplies to Ukraine. The White House also authorized Ukraine to utilize U.S. long-range missiles to attack targets deep inside Russian territory. Among other measures, this decision was intended to assist Ukraine in resisting the Russian counteroffensive in Kursk oblast, where North Korean troops were aiding Russian forces. 

However, as the media reported, it is doubtful whether all the aid planned will arrive in time. Earlier, in mid-November, President Zelensky noted that Ukraine had received less than half the military aid designated by the United States. Both before and immediately after the elections, Kyiv worked to convince U.S. president-elect Donald Trump and his team to support Ukraine as it fought back against Russia’s aggression.

Relations with NATO

In early October, newly appointed NATO secretary general Mark Rutte visited Kyiv. During a meeting with President Zelensky, officials discussed the plan for Ukraine's victory. Kyiv proposed that NATO accept Ukraine as part of the victory plan. Some NATO member states opposed Ukraine’s membership in the alliance, pointing to the question of which parts of the territory should be covered by Article 5 of NATO’s statute, which stipulates a collective defense obligation. 

Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Kyiv anticipates a NATO invitation within internationally recognized borders, not just Ukrainian-controlled territory, which would exclude the temporarily occupied territory. At the same time, Ukrainian officials said Kyiv would not insist on NATO membership during the war; rather, it would be a strategic goal. 

According to polls of Ukrainians conducted by the Razumkov Center, 86 percent of respondents support Ukraine joining NATO and 88 percent support EU membership. Seventy percent favor a gradual, “West German” approach to NATO accession. Almost 30 percent of Ukrainians believe that NATO membership would provide the best security guarantee for the country, and slightly more consider Ukraine’s possession of nuclear weapons to be a guarantee.

NATO has taken over the coordination of Western military assistance to Ukraine from the United States. The allied leaders agreed on this decision at the Washington summit in July 2024, concerned that a new U.S. administration might step back from supporting Ukraine. 

Security Cooperation Agreements

In October, Ukraine signed only one security cooperation agreement, with Greece. Hungary refused to support Ukraine’s NATO membership in a related agreement. As a result, Kyiv chose not to sign it. In December, it was anticipated that Dimitar Glavchev, the prime minister of Bulgaria's caretaker government, would sign a security agreement with President Zelensky in Brussels. However, the Bulgarian parliament did not manage to pass a proposal supporting a security cooperation agreement with Ukraine, which Glavchev had begun to view as a mandatory condition for taking such a step.

Relations with the EU and the European States

In the last quarter of the year, top officials from the European Commission and EU member states continued to visit Ukraine and meet with the country’s highest officials. On October 30 the European Commission adopted the annual package of measures on EU enlargement, which contains a detailed assessment of the state of affairs and progress achieved by ten states, including Ukraine. Based on those assessments, the European Commission anticipates the start of negotiations on admitting new states in clusters as soon as possible in 2025. Despite its progress in critical reform areas, Ukraine must beef up its law enforcement efforts regarding high-level corruption cases and improve its track record in tackling organized crime.

Ukraine and the EU signed an agreement to attract up to €35 billion within the framework of the G7's broader $50 billion loan, which is covered by proceeds from frozen Russian assets. The EU has also approved a new payment plan exceeding €4.2 billion in grants and loans to support macro-financial stability under the €50 billion Ukraine Facility program. The program was designed to support Ukraine's recovery, reconstruction, and modernization from 2024 to 2027. Next year, the EU intends to cover almost all of Ukraine's budget deficit.

Many European countries continued to provide military, humanitarian, and economic aid to Ukraine. Most of them also confirmed their intention to sustain support through 2025. 

Joint Efforts to Arm Ukraine

In December, the EU finally delivered one million artillery rounds under the Czech Initiative, matériel that was initially due by spring 2024. 

Acquiring weapons from Ukrainian companies and investing in military production in Ukraine may become a new strategy for European countries to support Ukraine, especially since the EU has yet to enhance its production capabilities. In November, Ukraine’s Defense Minister Rustem Umerov announced a collaboration with twelve countries to include investment in the Ukrainian defense industry as a separate priority.

In November and December, Denmark delivered two batches of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine, totaling twelve aircraft. Denmark has continued to support Ukraine by funding the production of weapons within the country to meet the army’s needs. Denmark plans to create an investment fund to develop the Ukrainian defense industry and accelerate weapons production. Producing weapons in Ukraine is cheaper, faster, and supports Ukraine’s economy. Earlier, the two countries agreed on a $628 million investment in Ukraine’s defense sector. 

The Netherlands has committed to investing in a joint venture to produce drones with Ukraine. In addition, the country delivered three new Patriot air defense launchers, announced its intention to grant Ukraine reconnaissance drones, and additional financial aid. Belgian and Ukrainian companies have agreed to collaborate on the joint production of missiles designed to combat drones. In the same way, Ukrainian companies lead in applying for international tenders within the Drone Coalition. Finland intends to produce drones together with Ukraine. 

Germany remained one of Ukraine’s most prominent supporters and aid providers. During the last quarter of the year, the country supplied several batches of military aid, including air defense systems, missiles, Leopard tanks, and others. German top officials visited Ukraine many times in the period of October–December. 

Tensions arose in relations with Slovakia and Hungary because Kyiv chose not to renew the contract for the transit of Russian gas and because of Viktor Orbán’s peace proposal, which Kyiv views as too closely aligned with Russia’s interests.

Termination of Gas Transit from Russia and Tensions with Slovakia

On the morning of January 1, natural gas transit from Russia to European countries terminated with the expiry of the five-year contract between Ukraine and Russia. Earlier, President Zelensky had stated that Ukraine would not resume gas transit from Russia because Russia has used revenues from natural gas sales to finance its illegal war against Ukraine. European countries have sufficient capacity to import the necessary volumes of gas from alternative sources and suppliers.

Expectations in December that gas transit would stop increased tensions with Slovakia, which favors Russian gas. Slovak prime minister Robert Fico threatened to suspend electricity and fuel supplies to Ukraine after he visited Moscow to meet with Vladimir Putin, and threatened to stop supporting Ukraine’s refugees in his country. Zelensky, commenting on Fico’s statements, said Slovakia appeared ready to open a second energy front against Ukraine, in accordance with Putin’s wishes.

Earlier in 2024, Kyiv announced it was ready to transit gas as long as it did not come from Russia but from countries in Central Asia. In early October, Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal met Robert Fico in Ukraine. The parties announced efforts to create an energy hub to strengthen the energy security of Eastern Europe. This potential agreement now appears to be off the table after Fico’s visit to Moscow.

Restoring Diplomatic Relations with Syria

After Bashar al-Asad’s regime in Syria fell and Russian forces left the country, Kyiv immediately launched efforts to renew diplomatic relations with the new government of Syria. Ukraine had severed diplomatic relations with Syria in 2022 after Syria recognized the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts following their annexation by Russia. 

In late December, Ukraine’s foreign minister Andrii Sybiha visited Damascus to meet with Syria’s new leadership. Earlier, President Zelensky announced that Ukraine had sent 500 tons of wheat flour to Syria as part of its "Grain from Ukraine" initiative to prevent a humanitarian crisis in the country. Kyiv is ready to restore diplomatic relations if Damascus respects Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

3. INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Reshuffles

On October 29, parliament voted to dismiss General Prosecutor Andriy Kostin. Kostin resigned after a scandal involving prosecutors who had obtained disability certificates granting benefits they allegedly were not eligible to receive through corruption schemes. 

Issuing disability certificates to prosecutors was a not unknown practice years ago, before Kostin became general prosecutor. The issue drew public interest during the corruption investigation of the medical examination commissions, which determine the level of disability and issue the disability certificates—another attention-attracting case in the last quarter of the year. It was believed the certificates had been used to obtain certain financial benefits. News accounts in December indicated that Kostin had been appointed Ukraine's ambassador to the Netherlands.

In early December, Oleksiy Chernyshov, board chairman and CEO of Naftogaz Group, the biggest of Ukraine’s state-owned energy companies, resigned. On December 3, parliament appointed Chernyshov deputy prime minister–minister for national unity. The newly established Ministry for National Unity is to assume the functions of the former Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories but will also be in charge of uniting Ukrainians abroad. Chernyshov faces the task of clarifying the ministry’s development plan, team, and key performance indicators, all of which currently are unclear.

In December, President Zelensky reshuffled ambassadors and representatives to over thirty countries and international organizations, a move unprecedented in its scale. However, no public explanations for these changes were provided. Some of the newly appointed individuals are not career diplomats, and some of those who were fired had achieved good results during their service. Thus the justification for such a rotation was unclear to the professional community.

The Energy Situation

As of November 16, the day before Russia conducted its first massive attack on the power system in the second half of the year, the Ukrainian energy system had functioned for sixty-one days without nationwide restrictions on consumer electricity supply since the previous attack, in late August. In October and November, Ukraine resumed electricity export during non-peak hours, demonstrating success in repairing infrastructure after the Russian strikes. 

Subsequent Russian attacks did result in damage to the power system that required restrictions on power consumption, with scheduled power cutoffs. However, the Ukrainian energy companies repaired the damage quickly, helping avoid critical power supply situations.

In recognition of the destruction sustained by Ukraine’s power system, the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) decided to increase the electricity export capacity to Ukraine (and Moldova) from EU countries from 1.7 to 2.1 GW. Ukraine will additionally be able to access a guaranteed 250 MW of transfer capacity from the EU on an emergency basis. The new higher capacity will be in effect from December 1, 2014, to March 2025, when it will be reviewed.

All this should help Ukraine get through the winter with fewer power outages. However, Russian strikes on the transmission infrastructure responsible for importing electricity may undermine the effort. 

Electricity imports in the last quarter of the year were limited by very high prices in Europe, bottlenecks in power transmission infrastructure caused by Russia's attacks, or no need for imported electricity during non-peak hours.

4. PROGRESS IN REFORMS AND SUCCESS STORIES

Ratification of the Rome Statute

In October, Ukraine deposited the certificate of ratification, marking the final official step toward ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. On January 1, 2025, Ukraine officially became the 125th state party to the Rome Statute.

Ukraine signed the Rome Statute in 2000 but postponed its ratification. More recently, Ukraine had considered deferring ratification to the end of the war. For more on this issue, please see this special report by the Kennan Institute.

Russia had initially signed the Rome Statute but withdrew its signature in 2016. Since 2023, the ICC has issued arrest warrants for Russian president Vladimir Putin, Maria Lvova-Belova (for alleged unlawful transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia), and other high-level Russian actors (for allegedly directing attacks on civilian objects and inhumane acts in Ukraine).

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.