In Venezuela, Russia Answers US Support for Ukraine with “Symbolic Reciprocity”

In early August, political tensions escalated in Venezuela as the incumbent Nicolás Maduro was officially declared the winner of the July 28 presidential election—a result disputed by the opposition and independent analysts. The opposition claimed that its candidate, Edmundo González, had actually won, based on 80% of the vote tally sheets collected by volunteers from polling centers across the country.

Amid growing international scrutiny following Maduro’s suspected electoral fraud, the Russian Baltic Fleet's training warship Smolny docked at the Venezuelan port of La Guairá on August 6.

This visit marked the second recent naval mission to the region, following the July Caribbean tour of a small group of ships that called on both Cuban and Venezuelan ports. The flotilla, which first docked in Havana, included the guided missile frigate Admiral Gorshkov, two logistical ships, a tanker, a rescue tug, and a Yasen-class nuclear-powered submarine.

Concerns about Russian interference in Venezuela are not new. Still, they have grown recently, especially after reports of members of Venezuelan security forces displaying Wagner Group insignia during protests. Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky even referred to these developments as part of Russia's “usual strategy of sowing chaos around the world.”

To understand the current situation, it is essential to recognize that Moscow’s loyalty to Maduro is not about unwavering devotion but rather a strategic alliance born out of mutual interests. As Venezuela’s leadership sought political connections beyond the Western Hemisphere, particularly with nations that opposed the established liberal world order, Venezuela found a willing partner in post-Soviet Russia. Moscow already had experience supporting Latin American leaders who had clashed with Washington, such as its backing of Colombian president Ernesto Samper in the late 1990s.

Since the early 2000s, Russia has been a crucial ally for Maduro, providing political support that has helped maintain some degree of international legitimacy for Chavista Venezuela. In 2014, Russia offered a critical lifeline to Maduro’s cash-strapped government, with the state-controlled Rosneft making multimillion-dollar prepayments for Venezuelan oil and investing heavily in the country’s oil sector. Additionally, Russia helped build hidden financial and logistical networks to aid Venezuela in circumventing US-led sanctions. 

Through Russian oil and banking companies, Venezuela has been able to continue selling its oil to external partners. Moscow has also consistently supported Maduro during various domestic crises, including the struggle for presidential legitimacy between former opposition leader Juan Guaidó and Maduro from 2019 to 2023.

But why is Russia so interested in backing Venezuela? For Vladimir Putin’s Russia, the world is divided into two parts. The first, referred to as the “near abroad,” includes the territories of the former USSR, such as Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. In this region, Moscow asserts its right to have the final say on these now-independent countries’ domestic and foreign policies, demanding that other nations respect Russia’s priorities. When this expectation is not met, Moscow may resort to drastic measures, as seen in the war in Ukraine.

The second part is the “far abroad,” where Moscow’s ability to influence other countries’ policies is more limited, and Russia uses other tools to reach its goals. From this perspective, Venezuela is viewed as part of the United States’ near abroad. Putin’s government sees engagement with Maduro as a way to execute reciprocal actions—often symbolic—in response to Washington’s support for Kyiv and opposition forces in Russia’s own near abroad. We call this approach “symbolic reciprocity.”

At the same time, given the growing rift with the United States and the West, Putin’s alliance with Maduro has become more valuable than ever. Russian interests in Venezuela serve as a strategic signal of support for allies opposing US policies.

Against this background, Moscow’s diplomatic response to the 2024 election was predictable. The day after the elections, as the National Electoral Council (CNE) announced the contested results, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognized Maduro’s victory over opposition candidate González. Russian president Putin congratulated Maduro, describing the bilateral relationship as a “strategic partnership” and expressing hope for continued cooperation on key bilateral and international issues. 

A few days later, Putin formally invited Maduro to attend the upcoming BRICS+ meeting in Kazan. Discussions could include Venezuela’s potential application to join the bloc as the second Latin American representative (after Brazil). Argentina contemplated membership under previous government but decided not to join under Javier Milei’s leadership. 

The ongoing standoff in Venezuela between the opposition—backed by the United States, the European Union, and many Latin American nations—and Maduro, supported by Russia and other authoritarian governments, has high stakes for Moscow. If the democratic opposition succeeds in ousting Maduro, the perceived value of Russian support for illiberal regimes will be diminished. 

In such a case, Putin’s government would need to reestablish its credibility as a reliable ally. On the other hand, if Moscow can demonstrate—even if only symbolically—that it contributed to Maduro's survival, it would enhance its standing among authoritarian-leaning regimes not only in Latin America but globally. Russia is acutely aware of this and may go further than usual in protecting Maduro through political, economic, and military means, despite its heavy involvement in the war in Ukraine.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.