During his long reign, Vladimir Putin has seen five presidents of the United States, from Bill Clinton to Joe Biden. He may have to deal with a sixth, or meet Donald Trump again. The Kremlin's public position has always been consistent: from Moscow’s standpoint, there is no fundamental strategic difference between American leaders.

There may be some difference in terms of the predictability of political behavior. It is possible that Putin was not obfuscating when he said he preferred Biden to Trump because Biden is more predictable, but this will be irrelevant come January anyway. 

Propagandists have already launched a few racist and misogynistic attacks against Kamala Harris, but official Kremlin has mostly remained silent regarding the recent US electoral upheavals. From the Kremlin’s perspective, certain geopolitical and strategic trends will persist, regardless of who holds the presidency in the White House.

Persistent Trends, from Moscow’s Perspective

I would emphasize three such trends. First, regardless of which party holds the presidency, there are American institutions whose role is to support democracy and freedom of speech abroad—foundations such as the National Endowment for Democracy or the International Republican Institute, and media such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty or Voice of America, funded by the US state. The Kremlin perceives the Russia-related activity of such institutions as “support for the Russian opposition.” 

Second, during at least the last three US presidencies, Moscow has made various attempts to “retaliate” against Washington’s influence through cyberattacks, the creation of English-language media, and social media outreach. Moscow will continue doing this regardless of who wins the election in November.

Third, the Kremlin assumes that assistance to Ukraine and pressure on Russia in one form or another, even if diminished, will continue no matter who is elected president. This is evident in the political analysis produced by research centers close to the government and from pro-Kremlin social media, which assume that the United States will go on trying to weaken Putin through foreign policy and nonmilitary initiatives while continuing to provide military support to Ukraine because some long-term decisions have already been made. They also note that there is a strong opposition to Putin among the US establishment of both parties. 

Difficulties in Achieving an Immediate Peace

It’s safe to assume that the war in Ukraine will remain a key topic between the United States and Russia no matter who is elected in November. Trump has repeatedly said that he will end the war if elected president. But there are three problems that are likely obvious to most potential peace negotiators. First, for a deal to be possible, Kyiv would have to be forced to cede five regions of the country to Russia—Crimea, which Russia illegally annexed in 2014, and four more regions—Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia, as per the “peace proposals” that Putin laid out in June. Barring a crushing military defeat, for many Ukrainians this would be a hard pill to swallow. 

Second, from Moscow’s point of view, the terms of peace would have to allow a restoration of Russia’s international economic activity and an end to its isolation. China and other powers, too, have an interest in seeing economic exchange with Russia restored. But if there are significant concessions from Ukraine, sanctions are unlikely to be lifted because Russia’s aggression would be seen as rewarded by those concessions.

Third, by the time the new US president is inaugurated, the war will have lasted three years. It’s extremely difficult to envision reconciliation after this many years of deaths and bombings inflicted by Russia on Ukraine. It would be easier to sign a peace agreement if Putin was gone, but for now everyone assumes that Putin will remain in office.

Keeping Russia in Its Regional Niche 

The last thirty years have seen the ascent of new significant economies and societies. China, India, Turkey, and the Middle Eastern powers have positioned themselves for a more active role in the global economic and military architecture. A recent study by the European Council on Foreign Relations suggests that these so-called middle powers are working to strategically position themselves for a fragmented world by trying to avoid associating with just one superpower and instead entering into situational, tactical alliances in some cases while breaking them in others, out of a preference for transactional politics and profitable deals.

Russia is unlikely to be able to build the kinds of alliances with these states that would pose a real threat to Europe and the United States: most major regional powers want to stay on planet Earth with Europe and the United States. They would like to expand their presence in Western markets and exploit them. The middle class of the new and growing economies would like to buy German cars and Italian clothes. 

Russia, meanwhile, is dominated by political pundits who are convinced that a global paradigm shift is near, the world is about to experience a tectonic rupture or other catastrophic change, and a new world order will emerge. Few regional powers are ready to follow Putin toward the global destabilization that is guided by this line of thinking. Few, if any, of these regional players are buying into Putin’s proposal to form a destructive anti-Western alliance. 

At the same time, the notion that Russia should suffer a crushing defeat or be strategically weakened is popular only among a minority of these players. Many in the world fear that such a defeat would have unpredictable consequences for the world. This is the reason why such major actors as Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia did not sign a communiqué following the peace summit in Switzerland, and China did not participate in the summit. All these countries want Russia to remain on the political and economic map. The Kremlin would like to see fault lines and conflicts everywhere, but American and European diplomacy, together with the diplomacy of the major regional powers, has so far successfully countered that. 

How Russia Will Likely Behave in the Run-up to the US Elections

Looking ahead to the US elections, Russia is likely to continue its established strategies of media manipulation, and strategic outreach through state-sponsored channels such as RT and Sputnik. Russia’s focus will be on leveraging existing geopolitical dynamics, such as supporting anti-establishment and divisive narratives to undermine the US political system. The Kremlin may also increase efforts to build relationships with non-Western countries. Overall, Russia’s actions will likely continue to seek destabilization and exploitation of fissures in the US political landscape, aiming to maintain a favorable environment for its geopolitical ambitions.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute