NPIHP Working Paper 19

Civil Society and Nuclear Risk Reduction

Michal Onderco
March 2025

Introduction

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, civil society has actively mobilized against nuclear weapons. Its involvement was especially pronounced during the Cold War, whether through protests against uranium mining, mobilizing support for victims of nuclear testing, or carrying out anti-nuclear demonstrations across Western Europe, North America, and beyond. Today, civil society continues to engage in various efforts to mitigate nuclear risk. Academics conduct vital research, think tanks translate scientific insights into policy recommendations, foundations fund research and activism, and activists work directly to influence policy and public opinion. However, a key question remains: how successful is civil society in reducing nuclear risks? In recent years, opinions on this matter have varied widely.

Some analysts have celebrated recent successes by civil society. In particular, the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) by the United Nations General Assembly in July 2017 is widely regarded as a significant achievement for non-governmental organizations.[1] The negotiation and entry into force of the TPNW were driven largely by civil society, particularly the International Coalition to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which actively campaigned in support of the treaty. In collaboration with a few supportive United Nations member states, ICAN advocated for a version of the treaty aimed at stigmatizing nuclear weapon possession. This achievement contrasts with the more limited success of similar efforts during the Cold War, when civil society organizations set ambitious political goals but achieved only modest progress. The TPNW’s adoption is celebrated as a victory for civil society, even as its potential to bring substantial changes to nuclear weapons policies is limited or at least open to debate.

In contrast, some analysts and policy stakeholders remain skeptical about civil society's ability to drive real change in nuclear risk reduction. Despite extensive anti-nuclear activism, numerous funded projects to mitigate or reassess nuclear risks have had minimal impact on the policies of nuclear weapons states. As early as the 1990s, prominent funders like the W. Alton Jones Foundation and the Ford Foundation believed there were few opportunities where charitable support could lead to significant policy change, prompting them to withdraw funding for causes related to nuclear security. In recent years, foundations such as the Hewlett Foundation and the MacArthur Foundation have also exited the field of nuclear risk due to the lack of measurable progress in achieving policy goals.

There is certainly no shortage of historical research on the influence of academics, think tanks, intellectuals, and civil society on nuclear risk management during the Cold War. Significant attention has been devoted to the role of defense intellectuals, particularly in the early Cold War period.[2] Comparatively less attention has been given to more recent periods, with the work on the TPNW being a notable exception. While it is widely acknowledged that a variety of actors seek to influence the policy-making process, our understanding of civil society’s policy impact today remains limited. 

Likewise, the impact of foundations through their funding remains poorly documented and understudied. While political scientists and historians suggest foundations should be highly effective in disseminating their ideas, the evidence for their success is often fragmentary.[3] Experts in philanthropy assess the policy impact of foundations‘ work with notable caution. A study dating from the closure of the Hewlett Foundation's Nuclear Security Initiative suggests that evaluating foundation success requires moving beyond narrow policy metrics to consider more nuanced, qualitative dimensions, such as research quality, communication strategies, institutional networks, and inter-organizational coordination.[4] Nevertheless, comprehensive evaluations of philanthropic funding remain remarkably scarce.[5]

A fundamental challenge in assessing civil society organizations' influence on nuclear risk stems from how we conceptualize “impact” itself. As noted in the Hewlett Foundation's review, “policy work is somewhat like an iceberg: it is not always easy to see in its entirety.”[6] In other words, how we define policy impact influences whether we see activities as impactful. 

Methodology

This project focused on two central research questions: first, how civil society actors conceptualize impact, and second how they assess their own effectiveness in achieving it. The Carnegie Corporation of New York provided a grant to the Wilson Center to investigate, through a series of interviews, the impact of academics, foundations, and other civil society actors in nuclear risk reduction. The project was executed in collaboration with Erasmus University Rotterdam, with interviews and other research conducted by Michal Onderco (Erasmus University Rotterdam) and Robin Möser (University of Potsdam). The project received ethical approval from Erasmus University Rotterdam's Department of Public Administration and Sociology Ethics Board.

The project began with a virtual conference that brought together scholars specializing in civil society and nuclear weapons research. This event helped generate an initial list of approximately 50 potential interviewees, comprising both organizations and individuals. We approached all identified candidates for interviews, with the majority agreeing to participate. While most interviews were completed successfully, two participants later withdrew consent for their interview to be published or used for any other purpose. The remaining candidates either declined participation or could not be contacted. The interviews were primarily conducted with Western civil society actors based in Europe and North America. However, we also interviewed civil society actors from Japan, Kazakhstan, and several African countries, enabling the project to at least partially capture the experiences and perspectives of civil society leaders from across the globe. 

Existing Definitions of Impact

The Oxford dictionary defines impact using three terms: effect, influence, and impression.[7] A recent analysis of impact multipliers in nuclear policy by Ruhl uses the term “impact” 28 times without providing a definition. [8] The concept of impact itself proves highly variable. According to Grønvad, Hvidtfeldt, and Pedersen's comprehensive review of social science impact strategies, impact manifests across multiple domains: academic, economic, technological, health and wellbeing, social, educational, policy/political, cultural, and public.[9] 

Because impact does not happen “just so,” we need to conceptually think about how it happens. Reaching policy impact can be done through various pathways. [10] Policy scholars generally identify three main routes through which impact occurs: linear, cyclical, and integrative pathways. [11] While not exhaustive, each pathway encompasses distinct sets of activities:

• Linear: academic education, commercialization, policy advice/criticism, professional training, science communication, tools and services;
• Cyclical: academic consultancy, evaluation and monitoring, platforming, public engagement, personnel secondment, stakeholder dialogues;
• Integrative: action research, co-creation, design methods, engaged scholarship, living labs, monitoring frameworks.[12]

This framework expands our understanding of how civil society and academics achieve policy impact. Additional pathways include conceptual development, facilitation of dialogue, and public outreach activities.[13] Impact can also manifest through academics' professional contributions of training, knowledge, and expertise. Traditional examples extend beyond Western nations to former communist countries, where civil society activism has catalyzed significant policy shifts.[14] 

How Civil Society Defines Impact

To assess civil society's effectiveness in achieving impact, we must first establish how impact itself is defined. We therefore asked all respondents to conceptualize and define impact from their perspective. Two key findings emerged: first, many organizations contextualize impact within broader civil society dynamics rather than focusing solely on their individual organizational outcomes. Second, definitions of impact vary significantly among civil society actors, often correlating with their relative position and privilege within an ecosystem. 

Respondents frequently discussed impact in terms of broader civil society coalitions and campaigns rather than focusing on their individual or organizational contributions. As Patricia Lewis, program director at Chatham House and a key advocate for the TPNW, observed: “the problem with talking about impact is that   unless you're some kind of egomaniac, it's never just you, right?” While many respondents struggled to provide explicit definitions of impact, they offered illustrative examples from which implicit definitions could be derived.

Representatives affiliated with ICAN — whether direct employees or partner organizations — frequently cited the TPNW as evidence of their impact. As the director of Reaching Critical Will Ray Acheson noted, “that treaty wouldn't exist if it wasn't for ICAN’s lobbying, and Reaching Critical Will was part of that process as well from start to finish.” Multiple stakeholders echoed this perspective, identifying the treaty's existence as proof of their effectiveness. These outcomes align with both linear and cyclical impact pathways, encompassing direct policy advocacy, sustained academic consultation, and public engagement initiatives. 

Following the adoption of the TPNW, civil society actors continue to measure their impact through domestic treaty ratifications. African civil society leaders Kudakwashe Mapako and Linnet Ng'ayu cite their respective countries' TPNW ratifications as evidence of their policy influence. ICAN's Executive Director Melissa Parke points to the growing number of ratifications as a measure of the organization's effectiveness. However, German disarmament activist Xanthe Hall offers a more measured assessment, noting that the TPNW has yet to achieve the level of impact envisioned by its architects.

However, even at a local level, the interviewees discussed the idea of impact in terms of shifts. Cameroonian activist and the Director of Programs at Women’s International League for Peace Guy Feugap, for instance, argued that his NGO had impact when it persuaded Cameroonian political establishment that the NGOs have a role in policy discussions about security. Just getting a seat at the table was, for Feugap, a sign of having impact, as it signified a break from the past when civil society was not considered as a partner on issues seen as being relevant for national security. This, again, falls under a cyclical engagement, representing both platforming and stakeholder dialogue. 

Going a bit deeper in this debate, yet another group of respondents underscored that the shift in the language through which topics are discussed constitutes impact. Oliver Meier, a German think-tanker, for instance, argued that shifting the debate in Germany to include the discussion about the humanitarian effects of nuclear weapons is an example of impact. He argued that “our job to raise awareness about the implications of certain decisions on the overall landscape.”  

Other respondents spoke about the idea of impact in terms of visibility. Ian Fleming Zhou, a South African scholar and activist, for instance, mentioned the presentations of his work to various conferences and publication of his work as example of impact. Similarly, Walusungu Mtonga, IPPNW Student Representative spoke of the ability to organize events and be there as an important example of impact. This definition of impact links to the linear impact pathway, and is very important for civil society actors who were either traditionally overlooked or are at the beginning of their careers. In their views, impact can equate to presence or visibility. Some of the funders interviewed for this project highlighted the same considerations – the desire to bring new voices to the table as a way to evaluate impact. 

In a related definition, Kazakh youth activist Yerdaulet Rakhmatulla linked his definition of impact to the idea of raising awareness. In a situation where there is a low public awareness and the broader population might not be aware of, for instance, their status as victims of nuclear testing, the impact of civil society might be to raise awareness among the broad public. This definition would draw closer to the integrative approach of civil society impact. 

As former grant officer Geoffrey Wiseman spoke, the notion of “impact” shifted over time. Whereas in the past, a publication was seen as a sign of impact (a very simple, linear idea), today funders usually ask for more. However, Wiseman also warned against too narrow a definition of impact, because each grantee comes with different needs. Wiseman underscored that for funders, it is important to discern what goals they come to the partnership with. Do they want to bring about a particular change, or support an organization and place it on a more sustainable path? Different goals ask for different solutions. As another grant officer Carl Robichaud argued, having a potential to shift things in the real world is an important factor for evaluating impact. 

Is Civil Society Successful in Delivering Impact?

Armed with knowledge about the definition of impact, we set out to investigate whether the respondents see civil society as being successful in the area of nuclear risk reduction.

While we will delve to the complex considerations of success by individual respondents, one should also acknowledge a strange sense of bifurcation. Any civil society actor even remotely related to the TPNW has been ecstatic about the impact of civil society in recent years. Many cited the conclusion and adoption of the TPNW as evidence of the success of civil society. Others mentioned, for instance, the newly found attention to their particular cause – such as the victims of nuclear testing – and their sudden ability to bring them to the spotlight, have their voices heard, and find funding to help them. By contrast, many civil society actors in the United States and in many of the Western European countries (especially those not explicitly tethered to the TPNW) have been rather disappointed about developments in recent years and have seen these developments as a sign of civil society’s as a failure. 

One of the possible explanations can be found in a paper written by academic Keith Krause before the debate about the TPNW even began. Krause said that “one could argue that in the realm of international peace and security, the easier an issue is for civil society to focus on, the less important it is likely to be in generating tangible improvements in international (and human) security.”[15] The adoption of the TPNW has not led to any actual disarmament. But for its supporters that does not even matter, as for them the definition of success is about reframing the discussion about nuclear weapons or about the commitment to the treaty (primarily by states who already find themselves in the nuclear-weapons-free-zones). For instance, in an interview, Melissa Parke, ICAN’s Executive Director, forcefully pushed back against the idea that the declining rate of treaty ratification should be seen as ICAN’s failure. Instead, Parke pointed to the existing ratifications as evidence of ICAN’s success.

By contrast, civil society in the US (and in some parts of the Western Europe) is more concerned with tangible outcomes, such as US-Russian arms control treaties or the nuclear agreement with Iran (the so-called “Iran Deal”). As tangible agreements such as these have been falling apart, a sense of doom set it. This is not entirely surprising. Furthermore, many of the representatives in this space have been around for a long time and remember many of civil society’s past successes, such as the nuclear freeze movement or the protests in Europe during the Cold War.

Obviously, in the social world, very few things are monocausal. It would be very hard to attribute certain developments to the actors of a single actor alone. Furthermore, interventions by civil society are often time-dependent. In an interview, Patricia Lewis argued that success in delivering impact is contingent on timing. For example, she conceded that while one of her papers had some impact on governments to begin talking about nuclear weapons as a humanitarian issue, she was doubtful whether the paper would have the same impact if it arrived 10 years earlier.[16] Timing, as we know, is something hard to control, and may depend on external circumstances. They might also require incubation time, as impact – especially when linked to the broad public awareness – might take some time to materialize.

However, as we argued above, the definition of impact is very broad, and therefore, evaluating whether civil society is successful in delivering impact depends on what the defined goal. That goal might also be different for funders and for the grantees. In our interviews with multiple funders (active particularly in the US), they expressed frustration with their inability to shift policy, but satisfaction with the ability to introduce new voices, shape the debate, or contribute to the success of the grantees by creating and fostering partnerships. This speaks to what impact scholars understand as “unintended” impact.[17] While numerous civil society activities have their clear, intended goals (such as policy shift), some of the outcomes might appear as a corollary, an unintended impact (such as fostering new partnerships). 

This understanding underscores that the notion of success is not black or white – funding can foster and strengthen civil society even if it does not necessarily lead to policy change. Such change can still be worthwhile, because it lays ground for future activities or can create fruitful potential for future action. 

Conclusion

So, is civil society successful in addressing nuclear risk reduction in the 21st century? The answer, as concluded from this project, is nuanced: "it depends." When evaluating success through a narrow lens—specifically, focusing solely on the direct reduction of the risk of nuclear weapon use—the answer leans toward "not really." The challenge of significantly diminishing nuclear threats remains daunting, and direct impacts in this specific area have been limited.

However, if we broaden our perspective to include a wider array of activities, the picture changes considerably. Civil society has demonstrated notable success in various supplementary domains. These include fostering network-building, introducing fresh ideas and diverse voices into the debate, and integrating new stakeholders into the discussion. Such contributions are significant and should be recognized as impactful. For instance, when Cameroonian civil society secures a place in crucial dialogues or when Kazakh victims of nuclear testing gain a platform to share their stories and educate global audiences, the world benefits greatly. These actions enrich the global discourse on nuclear risks and can potentially pave the way for substantive policy changes over time.

Moreover, this project has generated valuable resources for future research. These include over 40 in-depth interviews with civil society leaders, where the respondents reflect on their personal experiences, evaluate contemporary world politics, assess their own contributions, and deliberate on the future of nuclear disarmament. The interview transcripts, as primary sources, offer a wealth of insights and are expected to serve as crucial resources for scholars and researchers. Future generations can leverage this material to deepen their understanding of both civil society's role and the dynamics of nuclear politics in the 21st century.

In summary, while civil society's direct impact on reducing nuclear risk may be limited, its broader contributions to the discourse are profound. The resources produced through this project will undoubtedly support ongoing efforts to explore and address nuclear challenges, enriching the field with fresh perspectives and critical analyses.

Interviews

Transcripts for the majority of interviews conducted during this research project are now accessible on the Wilson Center Digital Archive in a topics page titled “Civil Society and Nuclear Risk Reduction.” The interviewees were given the opportunity to review and approve the interview transcripts. Most of the transcripts were lightly edited to ease understanding for the reader. Occasionally, additional explanatory text was added after the interview by either the interviewer or the interviewee. These insertions are indicated in the texts. The interviewees also occasionally requested that names of individuals be withheld from the transcript, in which case we obliged.

Interview with Oliver Meier, 2022 September 19

Interview with Peter Buijs, 2022 September 20

Interview with Patricia Lewis, 2022 September 27

Interview with Susi Snyder, 2022 October 06

Interview with Sico van der Meer, 2022 October 14

Interview with Daniel Hogsta, 2022 November 08

Interview with Beatrice Fihn, 2022 November 11

Interview with Tim Sweijs, 2022 November 16

Interview with Gerard de Korte, 2022 December 02

Interview with Harald Müller, 2022 December 08

Interview with Francesco Vignarca, 2023 January 18

Interview with David Shorr, 2023 January 24

Interview with Geoffrey Wiseman, 2023 February 19

Interview with Ray Acheson, 2023 February 21

Interview with Frank von Hippel, 2023 March 06

Interview with Carl Robichaud, 2023 March 07

Interview with Ira Helfand, 2023 March 10

Interview with George Perkovich, 2023 March 13

Interview with Daryl Kimball, 2023 March 14

Interview with Joseph Cirincione, 2023 March 14

Interview with Bonnie Jenkins, 2023 March 15

Interview with Erica Carere and Liz Allison, 2023 March 16

Interview with Matthew Bunn, 2023 March 16

Interview with Michele Flourney, 2023 March 20

Interview with Emma Belcher, 2023 March 22

Interview with Chris Wing, 2023 March 31

Interview with Hirotsugu Terasaki, 2023 May 15

Interview with Xanthe Hall, 2023 July 06

Interview with Yerdaulet Rakhmatulla, 2023 July 06

Interview with Noël Stott, 2024 February 22

Interview with Edwick Madzimure, 2024 March 07

Interview with Daniel Ajudeonu, 2024 March 08

Interview with Victor Chelashow, 2024 March 26

Interview with Ian Fleming Zhou, 2024 March 28

Interview with Linnet Ng'ayu, 2024 April 04

Interview with Kudakwashe Mapako, 2024 April 10

Interview with Ayo Ayoola-Amale, 2024 April 26

Interview with Guy Feugap, 2024 May 03

Interview with Walusungu Mtonga, 2024 May 07

Interview with Sarah Mabeza, 2024 May 21

Interview with Melissa Parke, 2024 July 03

Interview with Alimzhan Akhmetov, 2024 July 10

[1] Ray Acheson, Banning the Bomb, Smashing the Patriarchy (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021); Alexander Kmentt, The Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons: How it was Achieved and Why it Matters (London: Routledge, 2021); Rebecca Davis Gibbons. "The Humanitarian Turn in Nuclear Disarmament and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons." The Nonproliferation Review 25, no. 1-2 (2018): 11-36.

[2] Donald E Abelson. "Old world, new world: the evolution and influence of foreign affairs think-tanks." International Affairs 90, no. 1 (2014): 125-42; Daniel Bessner. "Organizing complexity: the hopeful dreams and harsh realities of interdisciplinary collaboration at the rand corporation in the early cold war." Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 51, no. 1 (2015): 31-53; Janet Farrell Brodie. "Learning Secrecy in the Early Cold War: The RAND Corporation." Diplomatic History 35, no. 4 (2011): 643-70; Colin S Gray. "What RAND hath wrought." Foreign Policy, no. 4 (1971): 111-29; Jean-Loup Samaan, The RAND Corporation (1989-2009): The reconfiguration of strategic studies in the United States (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

[3] Campbell Craig and Jan Ruzicka. "The Nonproliferation Complex." Ethics & International Affairs 27, no. 3 (2013): 329-48; Joseph Cirincione, "Foundations," in Nuclear Nightmares, ed. Joseph Cirincione, Securing the World Before It Is Too Late (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013),  173-90; Paul Robinson. "Philanthropy, Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Threat Reduction," Urban Institute, 2021, accessed 16 April, 2021, https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/2021/02/05/philanthropy_nuclear_nonproliferation_and_threat_reduction.pdf.

[4] ORS Impact, “The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation’s Nuclear Security Initiative – Findings from a Summative Evaluation,” March 2015, https://hewlett.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/NSI-%20Findings%20from%20a%20Summative%20Evaluation.pdf. 

[5] For another recent study, see Christian Ruhl. "Philanthropy to the right of boom," Founders Pledge, 2023, accessed 29 July, 2024, https://www.founderspledge.com/research/philanthropy-to-the-right-of-boom.

[6] Anne Gienapp et al. "The Legacy of a Philanthropic Exit: Lessons From the Evaluation of the Hewlett Foundation’s Nuclear Security Initiative." The Foundation Review 9, no. 1 (2017): 7-22, https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1347&context=tfr.

[7] Oxford English Dictionary. "impact, n.," OED Online, 2022, accessed 21 March, 2022, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/92036?rskey=mV0Mlz&result=1.

[8] Ruhl, "Philanthropy to the right of boom."

[9] Jonas Følsgaard Grønvad, Rolf Hvidtfeldt, and David Budtz Pedersen, "Analysing co-creation in theory and in practice," in A systemic review of the SSH impact literature ACCOMPLISSH (2017).

[10] Reetta Muhonen, Paul Benneworth, and Julia Olmos-Peñuela. "From productive interactions to impact pathways: Understanding the key dimensions in developing SSH research societal impact." Research Evaluation 29, no. 1 (2020): 34-47.

[11] Jorrit P. Smit and Laurens K. Hessels. "The production of scientific and societal value in research evaluation: a review of societal impact assessment methods." Research Evaluation 30, no. 3 (2021): 323-35.

[12] These elements are based on the literature survey and observations executed by Erasmus Initiatives, "Erasmus Initiatives: Navigating the Road to Societal Impact," (Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2021).

[13] Michal Onderco. "The Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the NPT Extension." The International History Review 42, no. 4 (2020): 851-68.

[14] See, for example, Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed forces : the transnational movement to end the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Lawrence S. Wittner, Toward nuclear abolition : a history of the world nuclear disarmament movement, 1971 to the present (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); Lawrence S. Wittner, Confronting the bomb : a short history of the world nuclear disarmament movement (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009); Emanuel Adler. "The emergence of cooperation: national epistemic communities and the international evolution of the idea of nuclear arms control." International Organization 46, no. 1 (1992): 101-45.

[15] Keith Krause. "Transnational Civil Society Activism and International Security Politics: From Landmines to Global Zero." Global Policy 5, no. 2 (2014): 229-34.

[16] Patricia M. Lewis, A New Approach to Nuclear Disarmament: Learning from International Humanitarian Law Success (ICNND Paper No. 13) (Canberra: International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 2009).

[17] I am grateful to Michael Duijn for bringing the idea of “unintended” impact to my attention.