How Russia Is Targeting Moldova’s Path to the EU

On June 25, 2024, the EU began its accession negotiations with Moldova—a significant step in the country’s deepening integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. As Moldova prepares for critical presidential elections and a referendum on EU membership scheduled for October 20, 2024, Russia mobilizes its resources to destabilize Moldova from within.

Chess Pieces: Russia's Historical Strategy

In geopolitics, unexpected meetings often signal profound shifts in power dynamics. Earlier this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Evghenia Guțul, the governor of a small autonomous region within Moldova called Gagauzia. This seemingly unremarkable encounter reveals a nuanced tale of Russia’s strategic maneuvering in Eastern Europe. It suggests that paying heed to events in seemingly insignificant places like Gagauzia can reveal threads of grand strategy woven by global powers. 

For decades, the Kremlin has been using small regions as if they were chess pieces, pushing them around in efforts to destabilize the political climate in their respective countries. Like its post-Soviet counterparts—Georgian Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the Ukrainian Donbas and Crimea—the Moldovan Gagauzia and Transnistria regions have been targets of Russian imperial aspirations. While Transnistria is a self-declared breakaway state with a Russian military presence, Gagauzia, though an autonomous region, remains under Moldovan sovereignty. It is here that Moscow focuses its intentions.

The experiences of Ukraine and Georgia augur trouble for Moldova. Russian imperialism often begins with attempts to destabilize separate regions but sooner or later escalates into a full-scale war. This pattern suggests that Moldova is on the verge of experiencing significant geopolitical challenges as one of Russia's strategic targets.

Recent Developments in Gagauzia

Recent tensions between Gagauzia and Moldova’s central government have escalated mainly because of President Maia Sandu's solid pro-Ukrainian stance and aspirations to join the EU.

Gagauzia, the poorest region in Moldova, maintains strong loyalty to Russia. In a 2014 referendum, most Gagauz citizens voted for integration with the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union despite the region benefiting from substantial EU funds for modernization. Since Evghenia Guțul took over as a governor of Gagauzia in 2023, Russian involvement in the region has gained momentum. 

Guțul is a native of the southern Moldovan town of Etulia, where in February this year, pieces of a Russian Shahed drone carrying 110 pounds of explosives that had been brought down in neighboring Ukraine were found. She represents a pro-Russia party led by Ilan Shor, an oligarch sanctioned by the United States, the UK, and the EU for his collaboration with Russia in efforts to overthrow the Moldovan government. Shor fled to Russia after being implicated in a massive scam that led to the disappearance of $1 billion from Moldovan banks, resulting in a total loss of 12 percent of Moldova’s GDP. Now Evghenia Guțul is the new on-the-ground leader. 

Since she met President Putin in March 2023, Guțul has had several pro-Russia engagements. On May 9, she had “the honor of representing Gagauzia and all of Moldova” at a Victory Day Parade in Moscow. After that, she participated in the congress of the Moldovan opposition bloc Victory in Moscow, where she had another round of meetings with Russian officials. Later, at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Guțul inaugurated the Moldavian Court, a stand featuring national music, Moldovan wine tastings, and ethnic cuisine that showcased Moldovan culture and aimed at emphasizing a desire for genuine friendship and cooperation with Russia.

Economic and Political Maneuvering and Disinformation

The primary objective of the pro-Russia factions in Moldova is to sabotage the upcoming presidential elections and EU membership referendum scheduled for October 2024. Their tactics include launching disinformation campaigns, applying economic pressure, and leveraging the authority of religious institutions to foster anti-EU sentiment among the population. 

While Moldova actively pursues EU membership, Gagauzia, led by Guțul, is strengthening its agricultural trade with Russia. Recent bilateral agreements between Gagauzia and the Russian regions of St. Petersburg and Tatarstan aim to build up mutual trade flows. The agreements entertain various incentives, including gas discounts, exporters' benefits, and access to Russia’s payment infrastructure. 

Despite Moldova’s National Bank banning Russian card payment methods owing to Western sanctions, after meeting with President Putin, Guțul agreed to allow Russia's Promsvyazbank to create remote bank accounts for Gagauz residents, enabling Russian banks to distribute monthly allowances to public sector employees and pensioners. Around 130,000 Moldovans have received between 900 and 1,800 lei per month from Promsvyazbank under the premise of voting “No” in the Referendum on accession to the European Union.

The Russian Orthodox Church, as a Kremlin-controlled organization, serves as another power tool in the Russian hybrid warfare armamentarium. The ROC promotes alleged cultural and historical ties between Russia and Gaugazia to foster a sense of belonging to Russia's legacy. The Church's presence at local political events and its self-portrayal as a defender of traditional values against Western secularism reinforce the perception of Russia as a protector of Orthodox Christianity. Guțul has criticized Moldovan authorities for dividing the Orthodox community and manipulating church affiliations to serve political ends, deepening fears of conflict and war among the Gagauz people: "The Gagauz people are an Orthodox people. . . . We are afraid of war."

The Kremlin has further complicated the situation by spreading disinformation aimed at undermining the Moldovan democratically elected government. According to a report by WatchDog.MD, pro-Russia politicians invested over €31,000 to promote disinformation on Facebook. The key themes pushed on social media are: (1) the West will involve Moldova in the Russo-Ukrainian war, (2) Russia isthe main market for Moldovan farmers, and (3) “hybrid war” is a term invented by Moldova’s current government to fight the opposition. 

In June 2024, Meta removed Facebook and Instagram accounts associated with pro-Russia figures, including the fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, MP Maryna Tauber, and Evghenia Guțul, following reports by Moldova’s Security and Intelligence Service. These accounts were flagged for promoting disinformation funded by illicit sources, particularly during the 2023 Moldovan local elections.

Broader Pattern

Interference in Moldova is part of a broader pattern of Russian geopolitical maneuvering in post-Soviet states. 

The Kremlin's use of Gagauzia and its leader, Evghenia Guțul, indicates a strategic move to exploit regional power dynamics by influencing local leaders, issuing propaganda, and dredging up imperial ties, all to foster division and unrest. These efforts are aimed at the political fragmentation of Moldova with the goal of undermining its pro-European central government and sabotaging the upcoming EU membership referendum scheduled for later in October.

Ukraine and Georgia have already suffered the severe consequences of being Russian targets, enduring direct military aggression through occupation and war, as well as covert operations aimed at destabilizing their governments. Given its strategic position in Eastern Europe, proximity to the Black Sea, and the already present Russian troops in a self-declared breakaway Transnistria, Moldova could be the next target of Moscow in this ongoing struggle.

The collective West, particularly the EU and NATO, should recognize the urgency of supporting Moldova not just diplomatically but through tangible security and economic assistance. And here, the importance of aiding Ukraine in its fight cannot be overstated: a Ukrainian victory would secure the safety of Moldova and the whole eastern flank.

The opinions expressed in this article are those solely of the author and do not reflect the views of the Kennan Institute.