Contested Visions of Cold War Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Since the conclusion of the 2024 NATO Summit this past summer, there has been renewed focus on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. As NATO’s activity in the region surges, China and other adversaries of NATO have alleged that Washington seeks to fabricate an “Asia Pacific version of NATO.”

These criticisms are inherently political and should be treated skeptically. Yet there is a deeper history to the idea of an “Asian NATO,” one that is mostly divorced from the activities of the United States.

During the early Cold War, particularly surrounding the Chinese Communist Party’s ascension to power, various leaders in Asia toyed with the idea of a unifying body for the region’s anti-communist and non-communist nations. The President of the Philippines, Elpidio Quirino, was one such visionary. Chiang Kai-shek and Jawaharlal Nehru were others.

This was despite the fact that the United States was generally not supportive of the idea. The US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, even said in a May 18, 1949, statement that Washington was “not considering participation in any further special collective defence arrangements other than the North Atlantic Treaty.”[i]

Left to their own devices, leaders in Asia sought pathways for regional cooperation. But an “Asian NATO” never took off, largely because no one could reach an agreement on what a possible union should look like. Proposals ranged from military alliances, to economic and cultural bodies, to simple conferences of states. 

In July 1949, President Quirino hosted Chiang Kai-shek in the summer capital of the Philippines, Baguio, for some of the first in-depth conversations about what was then being called the “Pacific Pact.” 

Understandably, the two did not see eye-to-eye. While Chiang was desperate for military support, Quirino did not want to get bogged down in the Chinese Civil War. He would only commit to a non-military union involving the Philippines, the Republic of China, South Korea, and possibly Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, and Thailand. 

Because of its non-military nature, and because the Philippines was taking the initiative, Quirino expected that the US would eventually come around to the idea.  Yet Quirino’s plans to forge a “Pacific Union” were still met with disapproval by the American administration, forcing the Philippines to change tact and instead propose a conference of leaders instead of a formal organization.

There were also disagreements between Quirino and Nehru of India. 

From early January 1949, speculations had been abuzz that India would become a signatory to the Pacific Pact. Nehru’s statements at the Asian Conference on Indonesia about creating a "permanent arrangement” for “effective mutual consultation and concerted effort in the pursuit of common aims” fueled such speculation.

But Nehru was also seeking to carefully navigate the changed regional situation following the victory of the Chinese Communist Party. 

Even when Quirino proposed only to host a leaders summit, Nehru reacted cautiously. He wrote in a secret telegram to India’s ambassador to the US and his sister Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit that, under normal circumstances, India “should have been happy to send representatives to Asian Conference in Manila to discuss political and economic trends affecting Asia.” Yet he hesitated to do so, because it was “impossible to divorce [the] proposed Conference from the one which recently resulted in a joint manifesto by the Philippines President, Chiang Kai Shek and the South Korean republic, which announced the formation of united front against Communism.”[ii]

Convincing India to join the conference was a tedious task for Manila. In a telegram to Pandit Nehru, Ambassador Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit cited General Romulo’s assurance to her that the proposed conference was nothing more than the continuation of the Delhi Conference on Indonesia for “the maintenance of peace and freedom in the region.”[iii] A telegram from G.S. Bajpai also pointed out that the Philippines was trying to distance itself from Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee of South Korea.[iv]

India finally agreed to take part in what became known as the Baguio Conference of May 1950 on the condition of limiting matters strictly to economic and cultural affairs. New Delhi’s demand not to invite Chiang Kai Shek and the South Korean Government to the conference was also accepted.[v] For fear of appearing as a participant in an anti-communist conference that might indicate alignment with a bloc, Nehru also did not want any ministers to be sent as delegates, something the Philippines was not delighted about.[vi]

Ramaswami Mudaliar, a diplomat, was chosen to lead India’s delegate. He was advised not to play “too prominent a part in the conference, and, to discourage, so far as possible, grandiose or aggressive ideas.”[vii] India’s main concern was to keep political matters at bay and focus only on economic and cultural interests. 

On the contrary, the Philippines was keen to push forward a political resolution that would foster the creation of a “closer political association for common purpose” [viii] in the region and set up a permanent committee of representatives of nations attending the conference, headquartered at Manila. To the shock of the Indian delegates, the printed headings of the conference papers spoke of a “South East Asiatic Union.” It was an implicit, fervent last attempt to forge a more diluted version of the Philippines' ambitious Pacific Union. Fearing that this would only escalate tension in the region, India and others worked to quash the Filipino proposal.[ix]

Much has changed in the 75 years since these first proposals of a Pacific Pact or a Pacific Union. While leaders in the Indo-Pacific fiercely debated the extent and form of regional cooperation in 1949 and 1950, such ideas for mini-laterals and deeper strategic ties among the region’s democracies seem essential today. Indeed, New Delhi need not feel as nervous about openly aligning itself with the Philippines and other Indo Pacific nations.
 

[i] National Archives of India, Ministry of External Affairs, File no-109 (2), CJK/50, part I, “Correspondence re rumoured Pacific Pact, Baguio Conference, 1950.”

[ii] National Archives of India, Ministry of External Affairs, File no-109 (2), CJK/50, part I, Correspondence re rumoured Pacific Pact, Baguio Conference, 1950. “Jawaharlal Nehru telegram to Vijaya Lakhsmi Pandit” DTO, July 19, 1949

[iii] National Archives of India, Ministry of External Affairs, File no-109 (2), CJK/50, part I, Correspondence re rumoured Pacific Pact, Baguio Conference, 1950. “Telegram from Vijaya Lakhsmi Pandit to Jawaharlal Nehru, August 9, 1949”

[iv]National Archives of India. Ministry of External Affairs, File no-109 (2), CJK/50, part I, Correspondence re rumoured Pacific Pact, Baguio Conference, 1950, “G.S Bajpai’s correspondence to John Mathai, Nov 2, 1949” 

[v] National Archives of India, Ministry of External Affairs, File no-109 (2), CJK/50, part I, Correspondence re rumoured Pacific Pact, Baguio Conference, 1950, “Telegram to Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit from Jawaharlal Nehru dated 11th March 1950”

[vi]National Archives of India, Ministry of External Affairs, File no-109 (2), CJK/50, part I, Correspondence re rumoured Pacific Pact, Baguio Conference, 1950, “Telegram from G.S.Bajpai to Vijayalaksmi Pandit dated April 29, 1950”

[vii] National Archives of India, Ministry of External Affairs, File no-109 (2), CJK/50, part I, Correspondence re rumoured Pacific Pact, Baguio Conference, 1950, “Telegram from G.S. Bajpai to Vijayalakshmi Pandit, May 04, 1950”

[viii] National Archives of India, Ministry of External Affairs, File no-109 (2)/C.J.K./50, Part II, Baguio Conference, 1950, “Report on the Baguio Conference, by Ramaswami Mudaliar, 1950”

[ix] National Archives of India, Ministry of External Affairs, File no-109 (2)/C.J.K./50, Part II, Baguio Conference, 1950, “Report on the Baguio Conference, by Ramaswami Mudaliar,1950.”