The Helmut Kohl Transcripts: The Middle East and Iran
Helmut Kohl demonstrated a commitment to peacefully resolving the endlessly complex Middle East diplomatic landscape.
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This essay is one in a series about the Helmut Kohl Transcripts, a new Wilson Center Digital Archive resource featuring hundreds of Helmut Kohl’s foreign policy meetings with world lead
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After Saddam Hussein attacked Israel with Scud missiles in 1991, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl felt it was important that newly unified Germany stand firm at Israel’s side. Yet tensions between Israel and Germany only increased when the latter failed to take a military role in the ensuing Gulf War.
After Iraq’s defeat, Kohl aspired to help build a lasting and comprehensive security system for the entire Middle East. He argued that “without a reliable security order for the region, there would be no permanent economic upturn and the region’s social unrest would explode” – a point he reiterated later on with other regional leaders.
But, again, relations with Israel proved a complicating factor for Kohl’s plans. The Israeli government refused to negotiate with PLO leader Yaser Arafat, curtailing any hopes for a lasting solution to the Palestine issue. Despite these roadblocks, Kohl remained determined to help resolve some of the Middle East’s most existential conflicts.
Given the stalemate in the Palestinian question, Kohl instead focused his energy on rapprochement with Iran. Tehran’s policymakers saw Saddam Hussein’s defeat during the Gulf War as a unique chance for Iran to re-enter the world stage, particularly after its own devastating war with Iraq ended in 1988. Kohl sensed the Iran might be susceptible to Western influence given its desire to see Western embargos lifted and to expand trade relations with the European Community. In February 1991, Kohl had a candid discussion with Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati in which they discussed opportunities for the establishment of a new regional security system. (Kohl subsequently briefed President Bush and President Mitterand on his talk with Velayati.)
Velayati reiterated that “Iran wanted a regional peace order which would not repeat the mistakes of the past.” He criticized members of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) for failing to come to Kuwait’s defense after the Iraqi invasion, and stated that the countries of the Gulf must come together “to establish the cornerstone for the future security architecture in the region.” Velayati invited European Commission member states as well as the Soviet Union to “participate in such as security system,” to which Kohl responded that the United States also had to play a vital part in a new security system.
In March 1991, Kohl had an important telephone conversation with Iran’s President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani. Kohl underlined the necessity for a comprehensive solution of the Middle East’s problems. Although Rafsanjani had asked for Germany’s views about the future of Iraq, Kohl argued that the “Israel and the Palestinian question… These problems must not disappear from the agenda. There would be no peace without its resolution.”
With regards to the emergence of a new security system in the Persian Gulf, Kohl stressed that he “thought it was important to have ideas for a solution coming from the region itself. One had to avoid the impression of tutelage from others. We Germans were ready to contribute our experience.”
Meanwhile, Kohl was determined to work with moderate Arab leaders in the search for a Middle East peace arrangement. A prime example was Kohl’s close contacts with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, with whom he reviewed the whole story of the Persian Gulf War in a three-hour conversation in October 1991.
Kohl and Mubarak discussed the chances for an Arab-Israeli rapprochement over the Palestinian question. Mubarak’s view was that Israel’s Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, was not willing to enter into a serious dialogue with the Palestinian side. Israeli intransigence saddened Kohl, but he saw a narrow window of opportunity for a peace settlement as long as President Bush was in office. “President Bush was the first American President who acted decisively against Israel,” to which Mubarak responded, “one would not find a better American government for the resolution of these problems.”
Meanwhile, Kohl worked with the Iranian leadership to gain the release of two German relief workers who were kidnapped in Lebanon in May 1989 while working in Palestinian refugee camps. In June 1992, Kohl’s envoy, Bernd Schmidbauer, negotiated the deal in secret with the Iranian representatives. Schmidbauer expressed gratitude for Iran’s support on Germany’s behalf during the negotiations.
At the same time, Kohl and his advisors turned down Iranian requests for the transfer of sensitive technology for the completion of the nuclear reactor in Bushehr that Iran had started to build with West German assistance back in the 1970s. When Iranian Security Minister Ali Fallahian portrayed the Bushehr project as “a burden for bilateral relations,” Schmidbauer drew a red line. Pragmatic solutions could be found on a lot of issues, but “this did not apply to the Bushehr nuclear power plant and similar cases,” Schmidbauer said.
In a meeting with Rafsanjani, Schmidbauer was more forthcoming. When Rafsanjani reviewed the state of the Bushehr reactor project and lamented that “a failed investment of $4 billion was not acceptable for Iran,” Schmidbauer noted that both sides had to discuss the issue at the highest level. He stated that “it was important to also review those issue areas where both sides had been speechless so far,” and that President Rafsanjani and Chancellor Kohl should be willing to raise “controversial points, in the President’s conversations with the Chancellor. President Rafsanjani had already begun this process, as Germany did not want unresolved problems with Iran, possibly involving the IAEA over the long term to handle some nuclear aspects. A lot of things could be solved "when the fog clears.”
In terms of the Middle East peace process, things changed with the election of Yitzhak Rabin as Israel’s Prime Minister in June 1992. In September of that year, Kohl and Rabin reviewed the prospect for a settlement with the Palestinians. Rabin wanted to foster the peace process but was not very hopeful. First and foremost, he emphasized the need to focus on economic and educational reform in Israel and on the integration of more than half a million Jews from the former Soviet Union. At the time, Rabin was skeptical about Arafat’s readiness for serious dialogue. “He did not think that Arafat was willing to contribute to the continuation of the peace process. Rather, he was continuously creating obstacles as he was concerned that the local Palestinian leaders would become stronger,” Rabin said. From Rabin’s vantage point, conflicts within the Palestinian leadership were one of the main challenges on the path toward a peace settlement.
Meanwhile, Israelis and Palestinians representatives initiated secret peace talks in Oslo in December 1992.In March 1993, Israel’s Foreign Minister Shimon Perez told Kohl that “with regards to the Palestinian problem, one needed a new strategy. Israel wanted the Palestinians to live their lives. One did not want another Yugoslavia. The problem was that the Palestinians did not have a unified leadership. Arafat envisaged himself as the leader of the Palestinian diaspora.”
Though unable to permanently resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict or to fully bring Iran back in the Western fold, this period shows Kohl’s commitment to bringing peaceful resolutions to the endlessly complex Middle East diplomatic landscape. His willingness to personally engage with all sides showed his ability to act as a trusted interlocutor, even when his fellow world leaders refused to speak to one another.
Associated Documents
Kohl and Faisal discuss the situation in the Gulf, Germany's foreign policy and its financial assistance to the Saudis, as well as Saddam Hussein's position in the Arab world.
Kohl and Mitterrand debate the situation in the Gulf, the state of reforms in the Soviet Union, and the prospects for progress in terms of European integration.
Brandt agrees to Kohl's request to serve as a mediator and interlocutor for the Iraqi side in an effort to achieve the release of hostages in Iraq.
Kohl and Gorbachev review the state of bilateral relations, the Gulf crisis, and the situation in the Soviet Union, especially with regards to Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost and the Soviet Union's economic reforms. They discuss Western economic assistance and food supplies for the Soviet Union.
Kohl and Mitterrand assess the relevance of the Paris CSCE Summit and the situation in the Gulf, especially UN resolutions on Iraq and the potential use of force under a UN mandate.
Kohl and Özal debate the Gulf crisis and Turkey's request for the deployment of the air component of NATO's Allied Command Europe Mobile Force. In addition, they discuss the resignation of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.
Kohl and Mitterrand talk about the start of allied military operations in the Gulf War and France's contribution in particular.
The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Terechov on 17 January 1991
On behalf of Gorbachev, Ambassador Terechov complains that the Soviet government was only informed about the start of U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf an hour in advance.
Kohl and Bush review the situation in the Gulf and discuss Germany's financial contribution to the costs of the war. In terms of numbers, Bush has in mind one billion dollars as a contribution to the previous costs for the "desert shield" campaign and another five billion dollars to help cover the first three months of the war.
Kohl and Hurd discuss Germany's financial aid in support of Britain's military operations in the Gulf in the amount of DM 800 million. Moreover, Kohl reviews his efforts for constitutional changes in order to enable Germany's participation in future of out-of-are missions.
Kohl and Major review Germany's financial contributions in the support of the Gulf coalition and Kohl's plans for changes in the German constitution in order to enable the Federal Republic's participation in future out-of-area missions. In addition, they talk about the domestic situation in the Soviet Union.
Kohl and Mitterrand examine the Soviet position in the Gulf War and the situation in the Baltics.
Kohl and Velayati debate the future of security and defense issues in the Middle East after the end of the Gulf War. They exchange thoughts on the emergence of a new security order and the participation of the EC, the Soviet Union and the United States.
The Chancellor’s [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with U.S. President Bush on 18 February 1991
Kohl and Bush discuss the Gulf War. Kohl reports on his meeting with Iran's Foreign Minister Velayati and his recent telephone conversation with Gorbachev.
Kohl reports on his meeting with Iran's Foreign Minister Velayati and the latter's meeting with Iraq's Foreign Minister Aziz. Kohl and Mitterrand discuss Iran's plans for the country's return on the world stage after the end of the Gulf War.
Kohl and Mitterrand review the state of the allied military operations in Iraq.
Kohl and Major examine the situation in Iraq. Both reject the idea to send troops to Baghdad and to catch Saddam Hussein.
Kohl and Rafsanjani talk about plans for the emergence of a new security system in the Middle East after the end of the Gulf War. They emphasize the importance of maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity.
Kohl and Levy discuss the situation in Iraq, the Palestine question and Israel's request for financial assistance from the Federal Republic of Germany.
The Chancellor’s [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with the American Jewish Committee on 19 March 1991
Kohl and the American Jewish Committee review the international position of unified Germany in Europe and in NATO in particular. Kohl rejects the term "leadership role" for Germany.
Kohl and Mitterrand comment on the situation in the Middle East, the Palestinian question and the idea of convening an international conference on the region.
Kohl and Gonzalez discuss the state of European integration and the situation in the Gulf. They review the preparations for the forthcoming European Council in Luxemburg arguing in favor of a step-by-step approach as the best way to achieve lasting results.
Kohl and Perez de Cuellar discuss Germany's international role, European integration, the Yugoslavia War, the Middle East and the end of Perez de Cuellar's tenure as UN Secretary General.
Kohl and Mubarak discuss the overall situation in the Middle East after the Gulf War. Mubarak shares his insights examining the positions and competing interests of Israel, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia.
The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with the American Jewish Committee on 4 February 1992
Kohl and the American Jewish Committee discuss the challenge of potential nuclear proliferation after the Soviet Union's disintegration. They scrutinize the problem of increasing xenophobia in Germany after unification.
State Minister Schmidbauer’s Meeting with Iranian President Rafsanjani in Teheran, 2 June 1992
Kohl and Rafsanjani discuss Germany's role in the stabilization of the CIS countries and the Balkans. Rafsanjani expresses Iran's desire for the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in a "good atmosphere" without pressure pledging that Iran was not planning any military use.
Schmidbauer and Vaezi search for new overtures in bilateral cooperation. They discuss the problem of German hostages in Lebanon and attacks on Iran’s embassy in Bonn.
One-on-one talks between Minister of State Schmidbauer and Minister of Security Fallahian
Schmidbauer and Fallahian review possibilities for increasing bilateral cooperation in the intelligence field. Schmidtbauer does not see any chances to assist Iran in the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. He requests Iran's assistance in the release of German hostages in Lebanon.
Kohl and Rabin discuss the situation in the Near and Middle East and the changed in Syria's position toward Israel after the demise of the Soviet Union. Rabin expresses concern about the continued arms race in the region and Syria's purchases of Scud missiles from Russia and Slovakia. He also reiterates Iraq's continued capability to go nuclear within 5 to 6 years despite international arms control inspections. Last but not least, Kohl and Rabin discuss the situation in Iran and Kohl's contacts with President Rafsanjani.
Schmidbauer and Erbakan discuss the situation of Muslims in Western countries and in Germany in particular against the background of rising xenophobia in unified Germany. Erbakan sees Germany as a good Western partner for Muslim countries.
Kohl and Peres examine the state of the Middle East peace process and chances for closer cooperation between Israel and the European Community.
Kohl and Mubarak discuss the recent bomb attack in Cairo and the question of the assassins. Upon Kohl's question, Mubarak rejects the idea that Libya and Gaddafi could be behind it. Rather, Mubarak suggests the changes in Gaddafi’s position and the latter's concern about fundamentalist terror in Libya. Mubarak thinks Iran was behind the terror attack in Cairo.
Author
Stephan Kieninger
Global Fellow;
Independent Historian
Independent Historian
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